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ABSTRACT
This dissertation consists of three chapters analyzing agency problems in political
science. More specifically the role of different/additional information available to
the principal or the agent.
In Chapter 2 we analyze the effect of the politician’s knowledge of the external
shock on his policy decisions on the unrelated issues. Elected politicians cannot
control some external shocks, even if they can still anticipate their occurrence better
than the general public. How can politicians use these types of anticipated external
shocks to their benefit? How do they change their pandering incentives? And
how does a rational voter incorporate these seemingly irrelevant external shocks
in her voting decision? We build on the political accountability model of Canes-
Wrone Herron, Shotts (2001), adding the ability to the voter to observe her utility,
which is affected by an external shock. The shock is observed by the incumbent
politician but not by the voter. Our analyses show that for high or low enough
magnitude external shocks, a politician’s ability to anticipate them eliminates his
pandering incentives in equilibrium. For medium negative shocks, pandering could
be a "gamble for resurrection," while for medium positive shocks, it acts as an
"insurance" to guarantee the reelection. We show that both of these pandering
regions emerge in equilibrium. The politician’s knowledge of the shock, overall,
decreases the voter’s welfare in equilibrium.
In Chapter 3 we endogenize the information acquisition for the voter to study what
types of policy decisions voters pay attention to, and why, and how the rational voter
attention affect the behavior of politicians in office. We extend the Canes-Wrone,
Herron, Shotts (2001) model of electoral agency to allow the voter to rationally
choose when to “pay attention” to an incumbent’s policy choice by expending costly
effort to learn its consequences. When attention is moderately costly the voter
generally pays more of it after the ex-ante unpopular policy than the ex-ante popular
one. Rational attention may improve accountability by encouraging the politician to
be truthful. In some cases it may also severely harm accountability both by inducing
a strong incumbent to “play it safe” with a policy that avoids attention, or a weak
incumbent to “gamble for resurrection” with a policy that draws it. Finally, rational
attention can induce or worsen pandering but never “fake leadership”.
Chapter 4 analyzes delegated information acquisition with a biased agent who also
v
has private information about the state of the world. The information acquired is
public and its informativeness increases with costly effort. Equilibria are charac-
terized for two cases: when the agent decides an effort level and when a principal
imposes formal requirements on it. The analysis demonstrates that even when the
principal cannot commit to an arbitrary decision rule, he benefits from imposing for-
mal requirements by getting as much public information as possible and correctly
aligning the biased agent’s incentives. In the optimal mechanism, the principal
incentivizes the low type agent to truthfully reveal her private information by requir-
ing a relatively low amount of costly effort, while the high private report has to be
followed by the maximum effort in public signal.
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C h a p t e r 1
INTRODUCTION
This dissertation is organized into three chapters examining agency problems in
political science. The first two chapters build on the existing political accountability
model, exploring the consequences of additional information for the principal and
the agent. Chapter 2 assumes the politician has information regarding upcoming
external shock, while Chapter 3 endogenizes information acquisition by the agent
about the policy success/failure. Chapter 4 investigates how the principal can use the
formal requirement on costly public information to extract private information from
the agent. The model is applied to the operation of federal advisory committees but
can be generalized to more cases with a similar setup.
Some external shocks are beyond the politician’s control, either because preventative
measures are too costly or because they fall within the jurisdiction of other orga-
nizations. Even if these external shocks are unavoidable, politicians are frequently
better at anticipating their effects than the general public. In Chapter 2, we analyze
how knowing about the external shocks alters the politician’s pandering incentive on
unrelated policy issues, and how voters rationally incorporate these external shocks
into their electoral behavior. We build on the political accountability model of
Canes-Wrone, Herron, Shotts, 2001, adding the ability to the voter to observe their
utility, which is affected by the external shock. We assume that the voter cannot
disentangle the effect of the external shock from the effect of the policy choice.
We show that the incumbent’s policy choice affects his reelection prospects through
a direct channel—a different voting strategy for different policy choices—and an
indirect channel—the policy choice affects the voting decision through the voter’s
utility. A combination of these two channels shapes strategic incentives for the
incumbent politician. Our analyses show that, for most realizations of the external
shock, a politician’s ability to anticipate them eliminates his pandering incentives
in equilibrium. The politician only panders after observing medium magnitude
shocks, both positive and negative. However, the pandering incentives are different
between these two cases. For medium negative shocks, pandering is a "gamble for
resurrection," while for medium positive shocks, it acts as an "insurance" against
a possible mistake. Welfare analysis shows that anticipation of external shocks
2
eliminates some unnecessary pandering in equilibrium and might even improve the
selection, but overall, decreases the voter’s welfare in equilibrium.
Political accountability models frequently assume voters are ill-informed, providing
them with little information other than observed policy choices. The only models
that allow voters to learn about a policy’s success or failure assume that this knowl-
edge is revealed to them exogenously. Even if the media or government agencies
"exogenously" generate such publicly accessible information, we argue that the vol-
ume of this information, as well as the limited amount of time and resources, forces
the voter to prioritize and make a strategic decision on which information to pay
attention to.
In order to address this issue, Chapter 3 examines what kind of policy decisions
voters pay attention to and how this influences incumbent politicians’ behavior. We
extend the Canes-Wrone, Herron, Shotts, 2001 model of electoral agency allowing
voters to rationally acquire costly information about the incumbent’s policy suc-
cess. Our findings indicate that the voter generally pays attention after the ex-ante
unpopular policy. Rational attention may improve accountability by decreasing the
incumbent’s rewards for choosing an ex-ante popular policy, increasing her rewards
for choosing an ex-ante unpopular one, or both. However, asymmetry in informa-
tion acquisition can also harm accountability. Finally, rational attention can cause
or exacerbate pandering (a bias toward the ex-ante popular policy), but never “fake
leadership” (a bias toward the ex-ante unpopular policy). The latter phenomenon (as
uncovered in Canes-Wrone, Herron, and Shotts, 2001) thus requires an asymmetry
in voter learning across policies that derives from a process both separate from
costly information acquisition, and sufficient to overcome its effects.
Chapter 4 analyzes delegated information acquisition with a biased agent who also
has private information about the state of the world. The information acquired
is public and its informativeness increases with a costly effort. Equilibria are
characterized for two cases: when the agent decides an effort level and when a
principal imposes formal requirements on it. The analysis demonstrates that when
the agent decides the effort level, separation only exists for high enough cost. In
separating equilibrium, the low type acquires no public information, while the high
type acquires just enough public information to separate itself from the low type.
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Evenwhen the principal cannot commit to an arbitrary decision rule, he benefits from
imposing formal requirements by getting as much public information as possible
and correctly aligning the biased agent’s incentives. In the optimal mechanism, the
principal incentivizes the low-type agent to truthfully reveal her private information
by requiring a relatively low amount of costly effort, while the high private report
has to be followed by the maximum effort in public signal.
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C h a p t e r 2
EXTERNAL SHOCKS AND ANTICIPATORY PANDERING
2.1 Introduction
At the end of 2014, Georgia’s national currency—the Georgian Lari (GEL) - started
a sharp devaluation against the US Dollar. Apart from the major long-term negative
macroeconomic consequences for the country, many Georgians also experienced an
immediate hit to their financial well being. A significant part of the population had
their income in domestic currency but bank loans in USD, making it challenging to
repay their debt. The mentioned circumstances influenced voters’ behavior: voters
turned against the government, and the ruling party lost its supporters. In reality,
there was very little the government could do to stop the devaluation of GEL for two
reasons: (1) the USD started increasing its value relative to all currencies, not only
the GEL, (2) the currency exchange rate and the inflation level was monitored by the
National Bank of Georgia (NBG), which is an independent institution, functioning
apart from political interference. So the voters held the government responsible for
financial problems caused by external shocks that were not under the elected govern-
ment’s control. This is just one example of these widespread phenomena, and there
is empirical evidence showing that voting behavior often depends on circumstances
that affect the voters’ well being but is not a consequence of the incumbent’s political
decisions. For instance, natural disasters often decrease incumbent’s support,1 and
consequences of the federal government’s policy are sometimes attributed to local
politicians, etc.2
Even if the government could not do much to prevent currency devaluation, one
could argue that they at least could see it coming. If executives could anticipate this
negative external shock, it could affect their decisions about other relevant policy
choices. An external shock essentially affects the incumbent’s relative popularity,
and if he can anticipate what the voter’s predisposition is, he could certainly use
it to advance his reelection goals. As for the voter, when she gets a noisy signal
by observing her own utility, but cannot disentangle the effects of the external
shock and an unrelated policy choice, she rationally incorporates it in her voting
decision (even when the politician cannot control the effects of the external shock).
1Abney and Hill (1966), Achen and Bartels (2002, 2016).
2Sances (2017).
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How anticipating different external shock levels would shape politicians’ incentives,
whether it would make them more truthful or more deceptive (pander) by hiding
behind the external shock effects, is nontrivial. We construct a theoretical model to
capture these strategic interactions and investigate equilibrium behavior.
We take a classical two-period pandering setup with a representative voter and add
both external shocks to the voter’s utility and the voter’s ability to observe her own
utility. Incumbent politicians can anticipate these external shocks (which may be
positive or negative), which will have significant positive or negative consequences
on the voter’s well being. Even though such shocks might not be under the direct
control of the local politicians (as in the currency devaluation example discussed
above), the voters who observe their utility usually are not well informed enough
to distinguish the external shock’s effect and might misassociate it as a signal of
the performance of the incumbent politician. Having prior information about the
external shock thus enables politicians to anticipate the hostile or favorable mood
of the electorate before making any policy decisions.
If the incumbent politician also possesses some expertise to make a policy choice,
then he has amechanism tomanipulate voters’ electoral decisions through pandering.
Pandering is a well-studied phenomenon when the politician deviates from the
optimal behavior with the sole purpose of winning over the electorate and retaining
office. This paper analyzes the intersection of these two informational advantages
by the incumbent politician: (1) an anticipated external shock that enables him to
somewhat predict the voter’s prior disposition, and (2) policy expertise that creates
the possibility of winning over the electorate through pandering.
In this paper, we show that there are two main channels through which the incum-
bent’s policy decision affects his reelection prospects in equilibrium:
• Direct effect: the voter gives different reelection criteria based on policy
choice;
• Indirect effect: policy choice affects the utility of the voter and thus her voting
behavior.
We show that when the external shock is high in magnitude (either positive or
negative), neither of these two effects matter, and the incumbent’s policy choice
has absolutely no impact on his reelection probability. Therefore, the incumbent
politician never panders when faced with significant external shocks. Conversely,
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if the shock is low enough in magnitude, the policy choice only affects reelection
probability through its impact on the voter’s utility. Since the private signal is
informative and following it maximizes the policy’s success, the incumbent never
panders when the anticipated shock is low in magnitude.
There are only two possible scenarios where the anticipated external shockmight en-
courage the incumbent to pander: positive and negative medium magnitude shocks.
Pandering incentives are somewhat different between these two cases. When the
incumbent politician is faced with a medium negative shock, he knows that he is
most likely to lose office because of these unfortunate external circumstances (even
if he chooses the correct but unpopular policy). The only possibility of retaining
office is choosing the popular policy even if it goes against his private signal. There-
fore, for these external shock values, pandering is a "gamble for resurrection" for an
otherwise doomed incumbent. On the other hand, when a politician anticipates a
medium positive shock, his reelection prospects are rather good. In fact, he might
get reelected even after choosing the wrong but popular policy. Therefore, in this
case, pandering is insurance in case of a wrong policy choice (following the wrong
private signal). We show that pandering plays both of these roles in equilibrium.
Moreover, in both scenarios discussed, pandering succeeds in its mission only when
the incumbent’s private signal is incorrect. This explains why the pandering equilib-
rium only arises when low-type politicians are sufficiently incompetent; otherwise,
our model’s only equilibrium is truthful.
We do the welfare comparison between the equilibria of the baseline and the main
model, in order to show the effect that the politician’s anticipation of the external
shock has on the voter’s welfare. Our analysis shows that the politician’s ability to
anticipate external shocks always weakly harms the voter. The difference in welfare
is mainly due to the different equilibrium pandering levels as well as different voting
rules for the second period incumbent. For certain realizations of the external shock,
the politician’s anticipation of external shocks benefits the voter by eliminating
"unnecessary pandering" in equilibrium. For medium-low external shocks, this
model generates even higher utility than the truthful equilibrium of the baseline
model due to the better selection of the candidates for the second period. However,
the politician’s knowledge of the external shock harms the voter due to worse
selection even for some realizations of the external shock where the equilibrium
pandering level is decreased.
Multiple empirical papers and one recent theory paper by ? investigate the link
7
between electoral behavior and external shocks. This paper moves one step ahead
by showing the effects of external shocks that are entirely out of control of elected
politicians, whether it is because preventative measures are not possible, too costly,
or under the jurisdiction of other institutions (like the exchange rate and the National
Bank in our earlier example). We show that even in that case, the voter’s behavior
is rationally affected by the external shock since she cannot disentangle its effect
on her own welfare from the effect of an unrelated policy choice. This is the first
paper to concentrate on the politician’s strategic incentives in such a setting, and its
main contribution is to explain how an informed politician’s incentives change with
different anticipated external shocks and how these shocks affect their pandering
behavior.
Literature Review
This paper is closely related to the voting literature and especially the works dis-
cussing the politician’s pandering behavior (????). We borrow the definition and
basic setup from ?, who define pandering as a politician’s behavior to go against
the optimal action since "an executive’s reelection prospects may depend on cater-
ing to voters who are potentially ill-informed about public policy." In the standard
setup, the incumbent has better private information or "policy expertise" (?), and
the voter’s prior beliefs are biased towards one "popular" policy decision. These
factors together create the possibility of pandering. Two main differences of our
setup are that the voter can observe her own utility, and that this utility is affected by
an external shock unrelated to the politician’s action. This makes the voter’s utility
an imperfect signal of the incumbent’s performance. Therefore, in our model, the
voter has more information than just the policy choice: she can infer the politician’s
performance through her own observed utility. Moreover, besides policy expertise,
the politician is also better aware of the external shocks, enabling him to use this
information to his benefit.
Since the voter makes a voting decision based on her own utility (as well as the
observed policy choice), this paper is also related to the literature on economic
voting (????). Moreover, since the incumbent has no direct impact on the external
shock but might be judged by its effect on the voter’s utility, our paper also relates
to multiple empirical papers examining the electoral effects of the external shocks
and voter rationality. This literature usually concentrates on two types of shocks:
natural disasters (?????) or international economic shocks (???). Our model is
better suited to examining the second type of external shocks; for example, politicians
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can somewhat anticipate the upcoming global economic trends and their effect on
the country’s economic growth.3
While some papers show that exogenous shocks do not influence incumbents’ re-
election prospects (?), the main consensus in this literature is that a link between
electoral behavior and negative external shocks does exist (???). As briefly dis-
cussed earlier, the closest work to our paper is a recent theory paper by ? showing
that external shocks "can affect electoral outcomes, even if voters are rational and
have instrumental preferences." However, the main idea behind their results is that
even though external shocks (like natural disasters) are not under the direct control
of the incumbent, politicians can still "soften" the damage (with better emergency
preparedness, infrastructure, etc.). Consequently, overall welfare gives the voter
some indication of the incumbent’s performance (and type). Like their model, the
representative voter in this chapter rationally considers their welfare change since it
contains information on the incumbent politician’s performance, but the underlying
mechanism is rather different. In our setup, politicians cannot influence the occur-
rence or the impact of the external shock. However, the representative voter’s utility
consists of both: the politician’s policy performance and an unrelated external shock,
therefore making it a noisy signal of incumbent’s performance and their type. More
importantly, their paper mainly concentrates on explaining the rationality behind the
voter’s behavior, while our paper studies how anticipated external shocks affect an
incumbent politician’s pandering incentives.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the
formal model and shows some preliminary analysis; Section 3 discusses the baseline
model without private information about the external shock and characterizes its
equilibrium. Section 4 analyses the main model with external shock, introduces an
equilibrium and discusses the players’ main strategic incentives for different external
shock realizations. Section 5 shows the welfare comparison between the baseline
and the main models. Section 6 concludes.
2.2 The Model
Formal Description
We consider a two-period model with an election at the end of the first period. There
are two candidates—an Incumbent (I) and Challenger (C)—and one representative
voter (V). We assume that voters have common interests, and therefore they are
3It is harder to believe that politicians anticipate natural disasters and hide the information from
citizens to use it for their electoral benefits.
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reduced to one representative voter. In each period, there are two possible states
of the world l ∈ {, } and two possible policy choices H ∈ {, }. The voter’s
prior is that state  is more likely; specifically %(l = ) = U > 0.5. This means
that the voter who wants the policy to match the state is ex-ante inclined towards
the policy choice . Because the voter is ex-ante inclined towards , we refer to
 as the "popular" policy. In each period, the incumbent politician has to choose a
policy H ∈ {, }. The voter always observes the policy choice.
Types
Politicians get private signals about the state of the world B ∈ {, }. There are two
types of politicians based on the strength of the private signal they receive:
• A High-type politician (I=H) who knows the state with certainty, i,e., %(B =
l| = ) = 1.
• A Low-type (I=L) politician who gets a noisy but informative signal. If this
type of politician wants to match the state, he will follow his signal. Formally
%(B = l| = !) = @ > U.
The voter does not observe the politician’s type, and the prior belief that the politician
(either incumbent or challenger) is a high type is %( = ) = ?.
Utilities
There is no discounting. As for the utilities, politicians are policy motivated but




1 if l = H and in office
0 otherwise
.
The voter always wants to match the state. Her per-period utility is:
DE = 1{l = H} + n,
where n has a symmetric distribution with mean 0. One can interpret this as an
external economic shock that is not affected by the incumbent’s policy choice. For
example, political instability or an economic recession in partner countries (with
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large amounts of trade or remittances) will usually negatively influence the country’s
economic performance.
The distribution of n is common knowledge. The incumbent politician knows the
exact realization of n and therefore can use it to increase his chances of reelection.
As already discussed, n can be interpreted as an external shock on the country’s
economy of which the government has a clear understanding, but ordinary citizens
merely feel its overall effect on their well being. We assume n is drawn from the
triangular distribution between [−1, 1].4 The probability density function (PDF) of
n is triangle :
5 (n) =

0 8 5 n < −1 >A n > 1
−|n | + 1 >Cℎ4AF8B4
.
The voter can see her own utility DE, but does not know the realization of the external
shock n . Therefore, she can only form beliefs about the incumbent’s performance,
and consequently his type, based on her observed utility, her prior belief about the
external shock n , and the incumbent’s policy choice.
Sequence of the Game
• Nature determines each politician’s type, the first period state l, the incum-
bent’s signal B and the first period external shock n ;
• Candidates observe their own type, the signal about the state B and n ;
• The incumbent I chooses a policy for the first period H;
• The voter V observes the policy H and her own utility DE;
• The voter V chooses to either reelect the incumbent I or elect the challenger
C;
• Nature selects the state for period 2 l′ and the signal for elected candidate
according to his type B′;
• The second-state external shock n′ is realized;
• The officeholder observes signal B′ and n′ and chooses the policy for the
second period H′;
• The voter V and the officeholder get their utilities.




The incumbent’s action in the first period and of the elected candidate in the second
period is to choose a policy H for that respective period. Let fB (n) for B ∈ {, }
and  ∈ {!, } denote probabilities of choosing the popular policy  in the first
period for each type and signal of the politician and realization of the anticipated
shock.
As for the voter, she has to choose which candidate to vote for in the election. This
decision will also depend on the chosen policy and the realization of her utility. Let
+
DE
H with H ∈ {, } denote the probabilities of reelecting the incumbent after each
possible information set of the voter (chosen policy and observed utility).5
Discussion
In this paper, we consider forms of external shocks that are entirely out of control
of the incumbent politician. In some cases, the politician’s preventative measures
(which can also signal his competence) might soften the impact of external shocks.
But in this analysis, we consider external shocks that are either too unpredictable or
costly to prevent that even "good" politicians would not implement actions against
them,6 or prevention just does not fall in the jurisdiction of the incumbent politician
(for instance if we model an election for local politicians and the shock is supposed
to be dealt with on a federal level). This is done to eliminate any direct signaling
about incumbent’s type based on the magnitude of the shock.
For example, we think of external shock as some global economic trend (as in the
case of USD revaluation in 2014, change in oil prices, etc.), military actions or
political instability in a trading partner country, or even certain natural phenomena
(like a heatwave affecting the agricultural sector). In that case, the government
usually has better information than the general public and can somewhat predict
an occurrence of external shocks due to the numerous resources such as advisers,
corresponding agencies with field experts, etc. Even if it is too late for preventative
measures or simply not under the incumbent politician’s jurisdiction, the executive
can respond to these predicted external shocks on the voter’s utility while making
other policy choices.





6In this paper, we do not model the prevention, but one could construct another model where
the incumbent could "mute" the effect of external shocks by paying some cost ex-ante. If this cost
is too high, and high magnitude shocks happen with low probability, the incumbent would never
implement preventative measures and we would be back to our setup.
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Another particular assumption of the model is regarding the type of politicians’
utility. Politicians get utility of 1 if and only if they are in office and the chosen
policy matches the state of the world. Following ?, this type of utility is standard
in the pandering literature and gives politicians two motives: (1) matching the state
and (2) getting re-elected. Our goal is to show under what conditions each of
these two factors is more important in guiding politicians’ behavior. Another way
to model politicians’ utility would be making him policy-motivated and add fixed
office-holding benefits. Note that both of those structures result in similar strategic
incentives for the politician (with different weights). Choosing our model’s utility
structure makes calculations easier since politicians do not care about matching the
state when they are out of the office. This is also a sufficient condition to eliminate
unusual and unlikely equilibria where the low-type politician would rather lose the
election to be replaced with the high-type executive in the second period.
We also assume a specific functional form for the PDF of the external shock n . A ro-
bustness check reveals that for our results to hold, the PDF should be a single-peaked
function.7 Changing the expected value of the external shock shifts all the cutoffs
in equilibrium accordingly. For instance, if the voter expects a positive external
shock, her equilibrium utility cutoff points increase after both policy choices. A
single-peaked PDF ensures that the observed utility carries consistent information
regarding policy consequences. Since such functions make high magnitude external
shocks less likely to occur, high negative utilities are attributed to policy failure with
a higher probability (while high positive utilities are attributed to policy success).
This results in the voter’s cutoff reelection strategy in equilibrium. If the PDF does
not satisfy the given property, the nature of equilibrium changes. For instance, if
the external shock is uniformly distributed, the voter’s observed utility carries no
information about policy consequences. Consequently, the indirect effect of policy
decision on reelection probability disappears and our results converge to ?.
The incumbent and the challenger in our model are ex-ante identical as they have
the same probability of being a high type. Adding an additional parameter to
differentiate the incumbent and the challenger moves mixing regions in equilibrium,
but essentially, the equilibria and strategic incentives do not change.
7The PDF should be strictly increasing below some value of the external shock and strictly
decreasing above the same value.
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Preliminary Analysis
In the second period, absent the reelectionmotives, the officeholder’s sole desire is to
match the state given his information set. In our model, the incumbent politician has
two sources of information: his private signal B about the correct state of the world,
and his private information about the realization of the external shock n . Since even
the signal of the low-type politician is informative (@ > U) and the external shock n
is uncorrelated with the true state of the world, an elected politician always follows
their informative private signal in the second period. Given this politician strategy,
the voter’s second period expected utility (since  (n) = 0) for the high type is 1 and
for the low type is @. Consequently, the voting behavior at the end of the first period
will be entirely guided by the voter’s posterior belief about the incumbent’s type.
In the first period, the incumbent politician faces a tension between his desire to
match the state in the first period and his reelection incentives. This choice is trivial
for a high-type politician: he always follows his private signal in the first period
since no reelection incentive is worth sacrificing the immediate first-period utility




= 0 for any n .8
We further differentiate the regions of n in equilibrium based on the behavior of the
low-type politician. We borrow the definition of pandering and truthfulness from
Canes-Wrone, Herron, and Shotts (2001).
















= 0 and f!
B=
∈ (0, 1] for all values of n in given region.
In the truthful regions, both types of politicians follow their signal even when it
contradicts the voter’s prior belief. In a pandering region, a high-type politician
follows his private signal, and a low-type politician follows his signal if it does not
contradict his prior beliefs and he panders after seeing unpopular signal . For
simplicity, in later sections, we denote f to be the probability of choosing the
popular policy  by the low-type incumbent who receives unpopular signal B = ,
i.e., f ≡ f!
B=
.9
8Observe that the low-type politician always choosing the popular policy cannot be an equilib-
rium, since, in that case, the policy choice  would be a perfect signal for being the high type and
ensure reelection, giving the low type strict incentive to follow her private signal when it indicates
policy .
9When the politician observes external shock, these strategies will be the functions of n .
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2.3 Baseline Model: Incumbent does Not Observe n
First, we consider a baseline model where the incumbent does not know n and has
the same prior belief as the voter. Therefore, the incumbent makes a policy choice
only based on his private signal B. The voter still observes her own utility and the
policy choice.
The Voter’s Problem
In the second period, all politicians follow their own signal, and therefore, the voter
always reelects the incumbent if her posterior belief about the politician being a
high-type is at least ?. Moreover, we have already established that a high-type
politician always follows his private signal in the first period.
The voter has two sources of information to update her posterior beliefs about the
likelihood that the incumbent is high ability: her own utility D and the policy choice
H. Using Bayes’ rule, the voter’s posterior beliefs `DG for G ∈ {, } are:
`DG ≡ %( =  |D, H = G) =
%(D |, H = G)%( |H = G)
%(D |, H = G)%( |H = G) + %(D |!, H = G)%(! |H = G) .
The voter reelects the incumbent if and only if this posterior belief is higher than
?. We can think of this as a two-level updating of the voter’s posterior belief. First,
she updates based on the observed policy choice. If the politician is truthful, then
choosing the popular policy  is more likely to come from the high-type politician,
and therefore it increases her posterior belief (%( =  |H = ) > %( =  |H = )).
When the low-type politician starts to pander, the popular policy choice becomes a
weaker indication of being a high type. For a certain pandering level, the two policy
choices result in the same posterior beliefs (absent information from her utility).
The second part of updating is based on the observed utility of the voter. Observing
the utility, the voter gets a signal about the probability of the state being matched,
through which she updates her posterior belief about the incumbent being a high
type. Fixing the policy choice H, when the voter observes her own utility D she
knows one of these two scenarios occurred:
1) The incumbent politician matched the state. From the utility structure, this
would imply D = 1 + n =⇒ n = D − 1;
2) The incumbent politician mismatched the state. Similarly, this would mean
D = 0 + n =⇒ n = D.
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This would mean that based solely on the observed utility, the voter’s belief that
the incumbent matched the state %(l = H |D) equals %(n = 1 − D). Given the prior
belief about the external shock n , for D ∈ [0, 1],10 the probability that the state was
matched increases in D. Therefore, a higher utility is a stronger signal for a matched
state, which in turn increases the voter’s posterior belief about the incumbent ability.
For D = D∗G , the voter is indifferent between voting for either candidate. Thus, in
equilibrium, after observing the policy choice G ∈ {, }, the voter reelects the
incumbent when her utility is more than D∗G and elects the challenger otherwise. A
combination of all the incentives discussed above gives us the following lemma:
Lemma 2 When the incumbent does not anticipate the external shock, the voter’s
strategy is a best response i.f.f. she reelects the incumbent when
[





H =  and D > D∗

]
and votes for the challenger otherwise.
Figure 2.1 visually represents the form of the voter’s strategy discussed in Lemma
2.
Figure 2.1: This graph shows the voting strategy in truthful equilibrium when
U = 0.6.
Note that, in a truthful equilibrium, these cut-offs only depend on U—the prior





voter is more "forgiving" when the incumbent politician makes the "popular" policy
choice, which is the main driving force of pandering.
Corollary 3 In equilibrium, the low-type incumbent always follows the signal that
favors the popular policy B = .
10When D > 1, the voter knows with certainty that the state was matched since n < 1. Similarly,
D < 0 is the perfect signal of mismatched state.
11Moreover, in that case D∗

= U >= D∗

= 1 − U.
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The corollary follows directly from the discussion above. The incumbent politician
always has two forces driving his behavior: (1) matching the state to get high first-
period utility, and (2) maximizing his reelection prospects. When the low-type
politician gets signal B = , he strictly wants to follow it since both incentives work





and a higher chance of matching the state.
The Incumbent’s Problem and the Equilibrium
We have already established three facts about the incumbent’s equilibrium strat-
egy: (1) the second-period officeholder always follows his signal; (2) a high-type
politician always follows his signal even in the first period; (3) a low-type politician
always follows the popular signal B =  in the first period. Now we discuss the
strategic incentives of the low-type incumbent who receives the unpopular signal
B = . His expected utility from following this signal is:


















The first part of this expected utility represents the matched state: the incumbent
gets first-period utility 1 as well as second-period expected utility %(l = B) if he
is reelected (with probability %[n > D∗

− 1]). The second part is expected utility
in case of a mismatched state: the incumbent gets utility 0 in the first period but
still might get second-period utility if he is still reelected (with lower probability
%[n > D∗

]). Similarly, we can calculate the low-type politician’s expected utility
from choosing policy A after receiving private signal B = :


















One can clearly see where the pandering incentives come from the equations of
expected utility. On the one hand, after seeing signal  the low-type incumbent
wants to choose unpopular policy H =  since it maximizes his chance of getting
first-period utility. On the other hand, whether he matches the state or not, second-





interaction of these two incentives guides the politician’s equilibrium behavior.
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Analysis shows that f̃ is strictly decreasing in the competence level of the low-type
incumbent @. This means that increasing the quality of the low-type politician
decreases the probability of pandering. This effect is mainly due to the higher
expected loss from disobeying the signal B. However, with higher @ the voter’s





is increasing in f, we can easily calculate values for @ where a truthful
equilibrium exists.
Proposition 4 When the incumbent does not know the realization of the external
shock n , we have two possible equilibria:12
1) If @ > @̃ only truth equilibrium exists;
2) If @ < @̃, the low-type politician panders after observing B = with probability
f̃.
In both types of equilibria, the voter’s strategy is to reelect the incumbent i.f.f. (H = 
and D > D∗

) or (H =  and D > D∗

).
Figure 2.2: This graph shows regions of different types of equilibria when the voter
observes her own utility. For a relatively high competent level of the incumbent,
the cost of pandering is too high, and there exists truth equilibrium. For a relatively
low level @, information of the voter and her voting strategy is not enough to make
politicians behave truthfully, and low-type starts pandering after B = .
12Proofs of the Propositions as well as the exact values of the parameters are given in the appendix.
18





on the prior probability of the popular state U as well as the competence level of
the low-type politician @. The voter is still more likely to reelect the incumbent




) creating pandering incentives. Moreover,




) increases with a more
informative private signal of the low-type politician (higher @). This result is driven
by the effect of @ on the equilibrium pandering level. For more competent low-
type politicians, the equilibrium pandering level decreases (eventually switching to
the truthful equilibrium for @ > @̃) since pandering becomes more costly. With a
lower pandering level, the popular policy choice becomes a stronger signal for the
politician’s high type while the unpopular policy choice leads to lower posterior
belief about the incumbent being a high type. Consequently, higher @ decreases the
equilibrium pandering level and causes divergence in equilibrium reelection cutoffs
of the voter.
Next, we consider the main model where the incumbent anticipates the exogenous
shock.
2.4 The Main Model: Anticipated External Shocks
For the main model’s equilibrium, we consider a specific type of "cutoff" reelection
strategy of the voter derived from the logic above.13 This equilibrium strategy of
the voter has the following form:
Figure 2.3: This graph shows the "cutoff" strategy of the voter in equilibrium,
depending on the policy choice and her own utility.
If the voter sees the popular policy choice H =  (red lines of the graph above), then:
• Elect the Challenger if the observed utility is low enough (D ≤ D);
• Mix between voting for the Incumbent and the Challenger for an intermediate
level of utility (D < D ≤ D̄);
13Note that we are describing equilibrium and we do not show the uniqueness yet.
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• Reelect the Incumbent if the observed utility is high enough (D > D̄).
Similarly, if the voter sees unpopular policy choice H =  (red lines of the graph
above), then:
• Elect the Challenger if the observed utility is low enough (D ≤ D);
• Mix between voting for the Incumbent and the Challenger for an intermediate
level of utility (D < D ≤ D);
• Reelect the Incumbent if the observed utility is high enough (D > D).
Equilibrium
Similar to the baseline model, a truthful equilibrium with a simple cutoff reelection
strategy exists only for sufficiently high competence levels of the low-type politician.
Intuitively, when the low type’s signal is more precise, his pandering cost is high
enough to make him truthful. For lower levels of @, we get equilibrium where
the voter uses a modified cutoff strategy with the mixing regions discussed above.
Moreover, the incumbent politician panders if he faces medium positive or negative
shocks, and he is truthful everywhere else. In the next section, we explain the
rationale behind the equilibrium behavior of each player. Proposition 4 formally
states the full equilibrium of this game with an anticipated external shock.
Proposition 5 When the incumbent anticipates the external shock n , there exists the
following equilibrium:
1) If @ > @̄ the politician is always truthful, and the voter reelects the incumbent
i.f.f. (H =  and D > D = 1 − U) or (H =  and D > D = U);
2) If @ < @̄:
The Incumbent: • A low-type incumbent who receives private signal B =  and antici-
pates a positive external shock panderswith probabilityf∗+ (n) > 014
when D < n < D;
• A low-type incumbent who receives private signal B =  and antic-
ipates a negative external shock panders with probability f∗−(n) >
015 when D − 1 < n < D̄ − 1.
14f∗+ (n) is increasing for D < n < D̄ and decreasing for D̄ < n < D.
15f∗− (n) is increasing for D − 1 < n < D − 1 and decreasing for D − 1 < n < D̄ − 1.
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Otherwise the incumbent is truthful.
The Voter: After the popular policy choice H = :




• The voter mixes between the incumbent and the challenger with
probability +∗

∈ (0, 1) for intermediate levels of utility (D < DE <
D̄);




After the unpopular policy choice H = :




• The voter mixes between the incumbent and the challenger with
probability +∗

∈ (0, 1) for intermediate levels of utility (D < DE <
D) ;




The exact equilibrium values (pandering and voting strategies) are given in the ap-
pendix. The graph below shows the equilibrium behavior of the low-type incumbent
after observing unpopular signal B = .16
16For illustrative purposes, the graph is constructed for the specific parameter values U = 0.6, @ =
0.67.
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Figure 2.4: This graph shows the equilibrium level of pandering of the low-type
incumbent after observing the unpopular signal B =  depending on the realization of
the external shock. The red line shows pandering after a negative shock (gamble for
resurrection), and the blue line shows pandering after a positive shock (insurance).
The graph is constructed for the specific parameter values U = 0.6, @ = 0.67.
Incumbent’s Problem
For a high-type incumbent and a low-type with popular private signal B = , nothing
changes, and they are still truthful. Given the form of the voting strategy described
above, we now discuss the problem of a low-type incumbent’s who receives the
unpopular private signal B = , for different realizations of the external shock n .
Figure 2.5: This graph shows equilibrium strategy of the low-type incumbent with
unpopular signal B = , depending on realization of the external shock n .
If the low-type incumbent sees unpopular private signal B = , his expected utility
of following this signal and choosing policy  equals:




If instead he panders by choosing the popular policy , he gets:
* = %(l = |B = ) (1 ++1+n @) + %(l =  |B = ) (0 ++
n
@).
Therefore, the net expected benefit of following unpopular signal B =  is:
* − * =
(
%(l = |B = ) − %(l = |B = )
)
















@︸                                                        ︷︷                                                        ︸
3
.
The first part represents the first-period benefit of following signal B = . The
second part represents the future net benefits of following signal , since @ is
the future expected utility of being reelected. The third part is the future benefit
of pandering, and @ is again the future expected benefit of being reelected. The
difference between the second and the third part shows the second-period benefit
of pandering for the low-type politician with the unpopular signal. This pandering
benefit is especially large when the policy choice plays a rather important direct
role for reelection. For example, the pandering incentives are high if the voter
reelects the incumbent after the popular policy choice (but not after the unpopular
policy choice) even with the mismatched state + n

= 1. Another such example is
when the unpopular policy choice always leads to losing office even with matched
state +1+n

= 0. These two cases drive the two distinct motives of pandering in the
equilibrium we discuss below. Now, we consider the incumbent’s problem in more
detail for different regions of n on Figure 2.5.
High Magnitude Shocks: Policy Chose Has No Impact on Reelection
When the incumbent politician anticipates high magnitude shock, either positive or
negative (Region 1 in Figure 2.5), his reelection probability is predetermined: for
large negative (positive) shocks, the incumbent always loses (retains) office whether
or not the state is matched. For these values of n , policy choice has no direct or
indirect impact on the incumbent’s reelection prospects. Since first-period utility is
always higher when following the informative private signal (%(l =  |B = ) >
%(l = |B = )), the incumbent is always truthful in this region.
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Low Magnitude Shocks: Only Matching the State Matters for Reelection
When the politician foresees a low magnitude external shock (Region 2 in Figure
2.5), he only gets reelected if the state of the world is matched. These small shocks
translate into utilities close to 0 and 1, giving a strong enough signal to the voter that
the incumbent matched ormismatched the state, so that she votes solely based on this
observed utility DE. Therefore, policy choice has an only indirect effect on reelection
probability through its impact on the voter’s utility. Given the utility levels, different
policy choices do not lead to different reelection behavior. Since even a low-type
incumbent’s private signal is informative, following it would therefore maximize
both his first-period benefit and his second-period reelection probability. Therefore,
this region is truthful in equilibrium.
Medium-Low Level Shocks Can Still Result in Truthful Behavior Even with
Different Election Rules for Different Policies
For medium-low magnitude shocks (Regions 3 and 3 in Figure 2.5)17 the policy
choice has both direct and indirect effects on reelection probabilities. For positive
shocks (3), matching the state leads to reelection of the incumbent with certainty.
However, if the state ismismatched, different policy choices lead to different electoral
behavior: the voter reelects the incumbent after the popular policy choice H = 
with probability + n

> 0, while she never elects the challenger after observing
the unpopular policy H = ; this creates pandering incentives for the low-type
incumbent.
For positive medium-low magnitude external shocks n , pandering is insurance
against a possible mistake. When the low-type incumbent receives the private
signal B =  and follows it (H = ), he loses office if the state is mismatched. If
he, instead, chooses the popular policy H = , he may still be reelected if the state
is mismatched (since + n

> 0). The reelection probability + ′

that would make the
incumbent indifferent between following the unpopular signal or pandering in this
region equals:
+ ′ =
(1 + @) (%(l =  |B = ) − %(l = |B = ))
%(l =  |B = )@ .
Since higher values of + discourage the incumbent from being truthful, being
truthful will be a best response only for + < + ′. We later compare this reelection
17Note that Regions 3, 3, 4, 4, 5, 5 always exist since we have 1 − U = D < D < D̄ <
D = U.
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probability to the one from Region 4 to show that in equilibrium the incumbent is
indeed truthful in Region 3.
For negative medium-low magnitude external shocks (Region 3 in Figure 2.5),
the mismatched state leads to losing office after either policy choice. However,
if the state is matched, the voter always reelects the incumbent after the popular
policy choice H = , and only sometimes reelects the incumbent after the unpopular
policy choice H =  (with probability +1+n

). This again creates different pandering
incentives for the low-type incumbent compared to the previous case.
For these values of the external shock, pandering is a gamble for resurrection. In
this region, the low-type incumbent who follows his unpopular signal almost always
loses office (he is dismissed after the mismatched state and only sometimes reelected
after the matched state with probability+1+n

< 1). If instead he panders and chooses
the popular policy H = , he guarantees himself reelection after the matched state.
The reelection probability+ ′

that makes the low-type incumbent indifferent between




%(l = |B = ) (1 + @) − %(l = |B = )
%(l =  |B = )@ .




. Note that in this region +1+n

is the same variable as + n

in Region 4.
We later compare + ′

to the reelection probability from Region 4 to show that in
equilibrium the incumbent is indeed truthful in Region 3.
Medium-High Level Shocks Lead to Pandering in Equilibrium
Similar to the previous case, amedium-high positive shock (Region 4 in Figure 2.5)
causes an incentive to pander as insurance against a possible mistake. Choosing
the popular policy H =  guarantees reelection, while choosing the unpopular
policy H =  might lead to losing office after the mismatched state. The reelection
probability+∗

that makes a low-type incumbent with the unpopular signal indifferent
between choosing either policy is:
+∗ =
%(l = |B = ) (1 + @) − %(l = |B = )
%(l = |B = )@ .





means that any reelection
probability that makes the incumbent pander after a negative medium-low shock
from region 3 is not high enough to make him truthful after the corresponding
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positive medium-high shock from Region 4. Thus, Region 4 is a pandering
region in equilibrium, while Region 3 is a truthful region.
For negative medium-high shocks (Region 4 in Figure 5), pandering is a gamble
for resurrection. For these values of n , choosing the policy H =  leads to losing
office with certainty. Choosing the popular policy H = , might lead to reelection
with probability + > 0 if the policy choice succeeds. The reelection probability
+∗

that makes the low-type incumbent indifferent between following the unpopular
signal and pandering is:
+∗ =
%(l =  |B = ) − %(l = |B = )
%(l = |B = )@ .




=⇒ (1 + @)%(l = |B = ) − %(l =  |B = ) > 0. This
condition is always satisfied for +∗

< 1. Therefore, if the incumbent panders after
a positive medium-low external shock from region 3, the reelection probability
+∗

is higher than what makes him truthful after the corresponding medium-high
negative shock from region 4. Since this reelection probability discourages the
incumbent from being truthful, 3 is a truthful region and 4 is a pandering region
in equilibrium.
Medium-Level Shocks Lead to Pandering with Mixed Reelection Probabilities
after Both Policy Choices
When D < n < D̄ (Region 5 in Figure 2.5), the voter always reelects the incumbent
if the state was matched regardless of the policy choice (1 + n > D > D̄). If
instead the state is mismatched, then the voter mixes by voting for the incumbent




after the respective policy choices. When the low-type
incumbent receives the unpopular signal B = , if he follows it and chooses the
policy H =  he gets:
* = %(l =  |B = ) (1 + @) + %(l = |B = ) (0 ++ n@).
If instead he panders and chooses the popular policy H = , he gets:
* = %(l = |B = ) (1 + @) + %(l =  |B = ) (0 ++ n@).
In equilibrium, since this is a pandering region, the low-type incumbent who ob-





. Simplifying this condition we get:





(%(l = |B = ) − %(l = |B = )).
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) play a role in satisfying this
indifference condition.
When D − 1 < n < D̄ − 1 (Region 5 in Figure), the voter always dismisses the
incumbent if the state was mismatched, regardless of the policy choice (n < 0 <





after the respective policy choices. When the low-type
incumbent receives the unpopular signal B = , if he follows it and chooses the
policy H =  he gets:
* = %(l =  |B = ) (1 ++1+n @) + %(l = |B = )0 = %(l = |B = ) (1 ++
1+n
 @).
If instead he panders and chooses the popular policy H = , he gets:
* = %(l = |B = ) (1 ++1+n @) + %(l =  |B = )0 = %(l = |B = ) (1 ++
1+n
 @).
In equilibrium, since this is a pandering region, the low-type incumbentwho receives





Simplifying this condition we get:















from Region 5. Indifference conditions of the low-type incumbent in Regions 5
and 5 define the values for reelection probabilities the voter uses in equilibrium.
This is a rather intricate region with the incumbent pandering after both positive
and negative external shocks. Such equilibrium structure is possible because of
the overlapping regions of the voter’s mixing strategies after the two policy choices
(for D ∈ (D, D̄) the voter uses mixing reelection strategies after both popular and
unpopular policy choices).
To sum up, for high levels of positive (negative) external shocks, the incumbent
knows that he will always get reelected (dismissed), therefore, his policy decision
has no direct or indirect effect on the voting behavior. This eliminates pandering
incentives for the low-type politician for such external shock levels, making him
truthful in equilibrium. The second truthful region of the equilibrium is after the
low levels of external shocks. However, the rationale behind inducing the truthful
behavior is very different from the previous case. In this region, the external shocks
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have a rather insignificant effect on the voter’s utility, and matching the correct state
becomes the decisive factor for reelection. Since following the incumbent’s private
signal maximizes the probability of matching the state, the low-type incumbent
politician is truthful for these realizations of the external shock. Note that in this
region policy choice has no direct effect on the voter’s behavior—different policy
choices lead to the same election decision for a fixed utility. Rather, the policy
choice indirectly affects the voting strategy through its effect on the voter’s utility.
Pandering incentives are only activated after medium-level external shocks (positive
and negative). For medium positive external shocks, the incumbent anticipates a
favorable predisposition of the voter and knows he is likely to be reelected. In this
case, pandering almost guarantees the reelection and acts as an insurance. In con-
trast, for medium negative external shocks, the incumbent foresees an unfavorable
position of the voter, thinking he is most likely to lose the office. Pandering in this
region is a "gamble for resurrection." In our model’s equilibrium, the pandering
region emerges after both types of medium magnitude shocks.
The Voter’s Problem
When the utility is large enough, DE > 1, she knows with certainty that the correct
policy was chosen (but she does not know the type of the incumbent). Since the
incumbent and the challenger are drawn from the same pool and the matched state
increases the voter’s posterior belief that the incumbent is a high type, matching
the state always leads to the reelection of the incumbent. Therefore, a voter who
observes DE > 1 always reelects the incumbent. If the utility is negative, DE < 0,
the voter knows that the state was mismatched. This is a perfect signal that the
incumbent is a low type (only the low-type incumbent mismatches the state since
the high-type politician knows the correct state with certainty and always follows
his private signal). In equilibrium, there are two more regions of the voter’s utility
where the voter knows that the incumbent is always truthful (Figure 2.6):
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Figure 2.6: This graph shows regions for the equilibrium strategy of the voter,
depending on the observed utility (above) and the equilibrium strategy of the low-
type politician with unpopular signal B = , depending on the realization of the
external shock n (below).
As we already discussed, the high-type politician is always truthful in equilibrium.
The voter can infer the low-type incumbent’s behavior from the observed utility and
the policy choice.
For High or Low Positive Utility Levels, the Voter Always Knows the Politician
Was Truthful
For high positive observed utility D < DE < 1 (Region 1 in Figure 6), the voter
knows that either (1) the state was matched and n = DE − 1 ∈ (D − 1, 0) or (2) the
state was mismatched and n = DE ∈ (D, 1). In both cases, the low-type incumbent
is truthful in equilibrium.
Similarly, for low positive observed utilities 0 < DE < D (Region 2 in Figure 6), the
voter knows that either the state was matched and n = DE − 1 ∈ (−1, D − 1) or the
state was mismatched and n = DE ∈ (0, D). In either case, the incumbent is truthful
in equilibrium.
With the knowledge that the low-type politician is truthful, the voter updates her
posterior beliefs and votes for the incumbent when %( |D, H = ) ≥ ? i.f.f. D > U.
Intuitively, the voter sees two signals for the politician’s type: the utility DE = D
and the policy choice H. When the voter observes that D > U and knows that the
incumbent was truthful, the utility is a stronger indicator of the high type of the
politician than the policy choice. Consequently, even the unpopular policy choice
leads to the reelection of the incumbent. Similarly, when the utility is low enough
D < 1 − U and voter knows the incumbent was truthful, it is a strong indicator of
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the mismatched state and therefore the incumbent’s low type. As a result, the voter
elects the challenger even after the popular policy choice H = .
For Medium-Low and Medium-High Positive Utilities, the Voter Does Not
Know Whether or Not the Low-Type Incumbent Was Truthful
For medium-low positive utility D < DE < D (Region 3 in Figure 6), the voter de-
duces that either the state was matched and the low-type incumbent was pandering,18
or the state was mismatched and the incumbent was truthful.19
Based on this knowledge, the voter updates her posterior beliefs %( |D, H = )
and %( |D, H = ). For these observed utility levels, the voter is mixing between
voting for the incumbent and the challenger after observing the popular policy
choice H = . The equilibrium level of pandering f∗−(n = DE − 1) in this region
satisfies %( |D, H = ) = ?. Since in equilibrium the voter always votes for the
challenger after observing the unpopular policy choice H =  and the utility from
this region, we also have %( |D, H = ) < ?. This condition derives the threshold D
in equilibrium. Intuitively, when the observed utility increases, the equilibrium level
of panderingf∗−(n = DE−1) increases as well.20 With higher levels of pandering, the
probability that the low-type incumbent chooses the unpopular policy decreases, and
therefore %( |D, H = ) increases. When the utility level surpasses D, the voter no
longer wants to vote for the challenger after observing H =  (%( |D, H = ) > ?).
Consequently, for higher utility levels we move to the region where the voter is
mixing after observing either policy choice (Region 5).
Similarly, after observing medium-high positive utility D̄ < DE < D (Region 4
in Figure 6), the voter knows that either the state was matched and the low-type
incumbent was truthful,21 or the state was mismatched and the incumbent was
pandering.22
18If the state is matched n = DE − 1, in which case, D − 1 < n < D − 1 and from the previous
part, the incumbent is pandering.
19The state was mismatched and n = DE , in which case, D < n < D and the low-type incumbent
is truthful.
20The higher utility is a better signal for the high type of the incumbent and it should be balanced
with the higher level of pandering to make the voter indifferent between voting for either candidate
after the popular policy choice H = .
21If the state was matched then n = DE − 1, in which case, D̄ − 1 < n < D − 1 and from the
equilibrium strategy, the incumbent is truthful.
22If the state was mismatched then n = DE , in which case, D̄ < n < D and the low-type incumbent
is pandering with probability f∗+ .
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Based on this knowledge, the voter updates her posterior beliefs %( |D, H = ) and
%( |D, H = ). In equilibrium, the voter is mixing between voting for the incumbent
and the challenger after observing the unpopular policy choice H =  and the utility
level from this region. The equilibrium level of pandering f∗+ (n = DE) is chosen
to satisfy this indifference condition %( |D, H = ) = ?. Moreover, for the utility
levels from this region, the voter elects the challenger after observing the popular
policy choice H =  in equilibrium. Therefore, wemust have %( |D, H = ) > ? for
the equilibrium pandering level f∗+ (n = DE). This condition is always satisfied for
D > D̄. Intuitively, with the lower levels of the utility in this region, the equilibrium
pandering level increases.23 When the pandering level increases, the popular policy
choice H =  becomes the weaker signal for the incumbent’s high type, eventually
decreasing %( |D, H = ) below ? when the utility level reaches D̄.
For Medium-Positive Utility, the Voter Knows in Equilibrium that the Low
Type Politician Pandered
After observingmedium-positive utility D < DE < D̄ (Region 5 in Figure 6), the voter
knows that either the state was matched and the low-type incumbent was pandering
with probability f∗−(n = DE − 1)24 or the state was mismatched and the low-type
incumbent was again pandering but with probability f∗+ (n = DE).25 Based on this
knowledge, the voter’s posterior beliefs about the incumbent being a high type after
each policy choice are:
%( |D, H = ) =
5 (D − 1)?U
5 (D − 1)U? + 5 (D − 1)U(1 − ?) (@ + (1 − @)f∗−) + (1 − U) 5 (D) (f∗+@ + (1 − @)) (1 − ?)
,
%( |D, H = ) =
5 (D − 1)?(1 − U)
5 (D − 1) (1 − U)? + 5 (D − 1) (1 − U) (1 − ?)@(1 − f∗−) + U 5 (D) (1 − @) (1 − f∗+) (1 − ?)
.
Since the voter uses mixing reelection strategy after both policy choices in this
region, f∗−(n = DE − 1) and f∗+ (n = DE) are chosen to make the voter indifferent be-
tween voting for the incumbent or the challenger after each policy choice. Therefore,
these equilibrium pandering levels solve %( |D, H = ) = ? = %( |D, H = ).
23The lower utility level decreases the posterior belief of the voter about the incumbent’s type,
the higher equilibrium pandering level balances it out making sure %( |D, H = ) = ?.
24If the state was matched then n = DE −1, in which case, D̄−1 < n < D−1 and from the previous
part the incumbent would pander with probability f∗−.
25If the state was mismatched then n = DE , in which case, D < n < D̄ and the incumbent is again
pandering but with probability f∗+ .
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2.5 Welfare Analysis
Next, we do the welfare comparison between the equilibria of the baseline and the
main models in order to see how the politicians anticipation of the external shock
affects the voter’s welfare. In both cases, the voter is able to observe her own utility
and the policy choice. However, in themainmodel, the incumbent politician can also
anticipate the magnitude of the external shock. Even though the incumbent cannot
change the impact of the external shock, he still uses it to advance his reelection
prospects. From the structure of the equilibrium we discussed, it is not trivial to
predict the overall impact of the incumbent anticipating the external shock on the
voter’s welfare.
Figure 2.7: This graph shows the equilibrium level of the voter’s welfare in the
baseline and the main model, for different competence levels @ of the low-type
incumbent. The graph is constructed for the specific parameter values ? = 0.5,
U = 0.7.
The graph above shows numerical calculations of the voter’s equilibrium welfare
for the two models for specific values of the parameters.
Conjecture 6 The voter’s equilibrium welfare weakly decreases with the incum-
bent’s ability to anticipate the external shock.
The relationship shown on the graph is general in the entire parameter space.26
Overall, the voter is better off in the baseline model when the incumbent cannot
26The expressions for the expected welfare in the equilibria of two models are too complex to do
the comparison by hand, but this result can be obtained using Mathematica.
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anticipate the upcoming external shock. In order to better understand the forces
driving this result, we discuss a few facts from the comparison of the two models.
Observation 1 Everything else fixed, more pandering decreases the voter’s welfare.
There are two effects of pandering on the voter’s welfare: the effect on first period
utility, and the effect on selection for the second period. As pandering requires
the incumbent to act against his informative signal, its effect on first-period utility
is always negative. The higher the strength of the low-type incumbent’s signal @,
the greater is the expected damage that pandering incurs on the voter’s first-period
utility.
As for selection, the only advantage of pandering is when the failed attempt of
pandering leads to the dismissal of the low-type politician from office and therefore
to higher second-period expected utility for the voter. Observe that this only happens
after the mismatched first period policy ("failed pandering"). Given the utility
structure of the voter, she would never want to sacrifice her first-period utility for a
potentially better politician in the second period. Therefore, if the voting strategy is
fixed, more pandering is worse for the voter’s welfare.
Given this observation, in order to better understand the welfare result stated above
we next investigate how anticipating the external shock changes the pandering level,
and what the impact of a more elaborate equilibrium voting rule in the main model
is.
On one hand, when the incumbent anticipates the external shock, it eliminates
"unnecessary"27 pandering in equilibrium for certain realizations of the external
shock n . These are all the truthful regions in the equilibrium discussed in the
previous chapter (either large or small shocks, both negative and positive sides).
Corollary 7 For large enough or low enough external shocks in magnitude both
positive and negative (Regions 1 and 2 in Figure 8), anticipating external shocks
weakly increases the voter’s expected welfare in equilibrium.
27Wecall it unnecessary since, for these realizations of n , pandering cannot increase the probability
of reelection. Therefore, while the incumbent would still pander in the baseline model equilibrium
(for certain values of @), he will always be truthful after anticipating such external shocks in the main
model equilibrium.
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Figure 2.8: The voter benefits from the incumbent’s knowledge of the external
shock.
Trivially, for @ > @̃ the baseline model has a truthful equilibrium so the welfare
of the voter is the same in the two models. However, when the baseline model
has a pandering equilibrium (@ < @̃), anticipation of external shocks eliminates
pandering for these realizations of n . Moreover, for this region voting behavior
in equilibrium is the same for the two models: always choose the challenger for
high-negative shocks, always vote for the incumbent for large-positive shocks, and
reelect the incumbent i.f.f. he matches the true state (based on observed utility
of the voter) after low-magnitude shocks.28 Therefore, it falls directly from the
previous observation that the voter will benefit from the incumbent’s knowledge of
the external shock for these regions.
Earlier we mentioned that besides the pandering level, a different reelection rule also
affects the expected welfare of the voter in equilibrium. For this reason, for medium
levels of the external shock where the incumbent does not pander in equilibrium of
the main model (Region 3 in Figure 9), the voter gets higher expected welfare even
compared to the truthful equilibrium of the baseline model.
28The equilibrium cutoffs from the baseline model always satisfy 1 − U = D < D∗ < D and
D̄ < D∗

< D = U
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Figure 2.9: The voter benefits from the incumbent’s knowledge of the external shock
even compared to the truthful equilibrium of the baseline model.
Observation 2 For medium realizations of the external shock that lead to a truthful
behavior in the equilibrium of the main model (Region 3 in Figure 9), the voter’s
expected utility is higher even compared to the truthful equilibrium of the baseline
model.
This result is easy to see for positive-medium level shocks n ∈ (D, D). When this
type of shock is realized, everyone who matches the state is reelected in equilibria
of both the main and the baseline models. When the state is mismatched (which
only happens when the incumbent is a low type), in the truthful equilibrium of the
baseline model, the low-type incumbent, who chooses the popular policy, is always
reelected since DE = 0 + n > D. However, for the same value of n , in the main
model equilibrium, the incumbent is only reelected with some probability +∗

< 1.
Therefore, for these levels of the external shock, the truthful low-type incumbent
has less chance of reelection after choosing a popular policy in the main model
equilibrium. This is the region showing the benefit of the anticipated external shock
on the voter’s welfare through reelection rule rather than a change in pandering level.
These are the only regions of the external shock that give an advantage to the
anticipated external shocks. For other values of n , the politician’s knowledge of
the upcoming shock decreases the equilibrium expected level of the voter’s welfare.
Even when the equilibrium level of pandering after a certain level of n is lower in the
main model equilibrium, worse selection leads to a lower level of expected welfare
(for that region). This is easy to see for n ∈ (D̄, D∗

).29 For some of these values
29Where D∗

is the equilibrium cutoff of the baseline model and D∗

< D = U.
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of n , the politician’s knowledge of the external shock decreases the equilibrium
pandering level but leads to a worse selection for the second period. The low-type
incumbent who chooses the policy H =  but fails to match the correct state loses
office in the baseline model (DE = 0 + n < D∗) but gets reelected with probability
+∗

in the equilibrium of the main model. This leads to the worse selection for the
second period and overall it decreases the voter’s welfare even with a lower level of
pandering.
To sum up, the voter’s equilibrium expected utility is higher for the main model
for all truthful regions and lower for all pandering regions. The difference does
not solely depend on the equilibrium pandering level but also on the reelection rule
for the second period. By eliminating pandering and imposing a different election
rule, the model with an anticipated external shock performs even better than the
baseline model equilibrium for certain levels of external shock. In other regions, the
politician’s knowledge of the external shock harms the voter’s welfare by increasing
the pandering level or generating worse second-period selection even with lower
pandering. Overall, despite some commonality in the voter’s and the politician’s
motives (matching the state), when the incumbent can anticipate the external shock,
the equilibrium expected welfare of the voter decreases.
2.6 Conclusion
In this chapter we show how anticipation of an external shock affects the politician’s
strategic decision to pander and the voter’s welfare. Our findings suggest that, in
equilibrium, the incumbent only panders when he expects a medium external shock.
Comparing our equilibrium to the baseline model where the incumbent does not
observe the external shock shows that giving information about n to the politician
eliminates pandering for some realizations of the external shock, but overall it harms
the welfare of the voter.
There are two main channels through which the incumbent’s policy choice affects
his reelection prospects:
• Direct: the voter can make different voting decisions for different policy
choices for a fixed observed utility;
• Indirect: the incumbent’s policy choice affects the utility of the voter, which
in turn is used in the voting decision.
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When the shock is too big (either positive or negative), the incumbent’s policy choice
has no direct or indirect effect on the voting decision—the voter disregards the policy
choice and both matched or unmatched states lead to the same voting behavior. A
large enough positive shock guarantees the incumbent reelection whether or not he
matches the state (similarly, a low enough negative shock leads to certain loss of
office). Therefore, the incumbent’s policy choice only affects his first-period utility
and results in him being truthful.
For low-magnitude external shocks (either negative or positive), the incumbent’s
reelection outcome is not determined but rather depends on matching the state.
Similarly, the voter’s policy choice has no direct effect on reelection. Given the state
is matched or mismatched, the voting behavior does not vary based on the observed
policy choice. However, the indirect effect is still present in this case—he incumbent
is reelected i.f.f. he matches the state. Even though the voter does not explicitly
see the matched state, the observed utility is a good indicator of it for small shocks.
Consequently, the incumbent’s only objective (both for the first-period utility and
the reelection prospect) is matching the state, which is more likely to be achieved
following his informative private signal. As a result, the incumbent is always truthful
when he sees a low-magnitude external shock.
Pandering incentives of the politician are activated only formoderate external shocks.
In this region, both of the channels discussed above are present. Policy choice affects
the utility of the politician by changing his reelection prospects, and it also has an
immediate impact on the reelection probability even with fixed policy outcome
(success or failure). In equilibrium, the incumbent panders after both moderate
positive and negative shocks. In our equilibrium, pandering is insurance in case
of a mistake under favorable external circumstances (positive n) or a gamble for
resurrection under unfavorable circumstances (negative n).
Welfare analysis shows that the politician’s ability to anticipate the external shock
harms the voter. In the main model equilibrium, the voter benefits from eliminating
the unnecessary pandering regions after either large or insignificant external shocks.
However, the politician’s anticipation of the external shock sometimes leads to
higher levels of pandering for medium-level shocks, harming the expected utility of
the voter. Even when the pandering level is decreased, the worse selection of the
second period representative gives a disadvantage to the equilibrium of the main
model. Overall, the voter’s expected welfare in equilibrium weakly decreases with
the politician’s ability to anticipate the external shock.
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C h a p t e r 3




The performance of the democratic process depends both on the information that
voters possess and on how they use it. There is a long-standing debate in the elections
literature about voters’ competence to collect and process information (?)—whether
they arewell-informed, what kinds of information they possess, and how they use that
information in their voting decisions. Following these debates, formal scholars have
developed a variety of models to better understand how differing assumptions about
voter information affect the accountability relationship. Scholars have examined
models with voters who are entirely ignorant of incumbents’ policy choices (?),
who have information about their policy choices but not their consequences (?),
and who can exogenously learn about policy consequences as well (?). They have
also examined how the accountability relationship is influenced by information
provided through strategic third-parties such as unbiased or biased media outlets
(????) and democratic challengers (?). However, with the exception of ?, existing
models of political accountability assume —either implicitly or explicitly—that
once information is made available to the voters, it is “free” for them to collect,
interpret, and incorporate into their decisionmaking.
In reality, however, local and national news agencies cannot simply deposit infor-
mation about policy performance directly into the minds of voters. Instead, their
reporting must be actually be read (or viewed) and interpreted by voters to influence
their decisionmaking. In addition to the news media, many academic centers as
well as public and private research institutes produce reports that evaluate govern-
ment performance in a large variety of policy areas on the local, state, and national
levels. However, the target audience for such reports is typically an insular audi-
ence of policy professionals; for voters (or even reporters) to locate and digest this
ostensibly-free and public information requires considerable time and effort. More
generally, we argue that no matter how much free and even unbiased information is
present in the public sphere, such information is never entirely free for voters to find
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and interpret. Instead, for such information to influence voters, they must (at least on
some level) choose to spend some of their limited time and attention consuming and
interpreting it. In this paper we seek to understand how this “attention constraint”
affects voter behavior and democratic performance.
Our analysis is based on the canonical political-agency model of ?. In this model,
there is a representative voter who attempts to evaluate the incumbent’s degree
of competence at identifying effective policy alternatives. (There is no “partisan”
element in themodel, whereby voters and politiciansmay disagree intrinsically about
the desirability of certain policy instruments or outcomes). In the baselinemodel, the
voter evaluates the incumbent’s competence by observing which policy he chooses.
Even a relatively-incompetent incumbent is better informed than the voter about the
likely efficacy of the available policies. However, one of the available policies is
already perceived by the voters to be superior (that is, it is “popular”). Consequently,
a less-competent incumbent fears that choosing the “unpopular” alternative—even if
he privately believes it to be best—will be interpreted by the voters as a signal of his
lack of competence and harm his electoral prospects. This leads him to sometimes
pander and select the ex-ante popular policy even when he privately believes it to
be mistaken.
To this model we add an ability for the voter to learn about the consequences of
the incumbent’s policy by paying costly attention after it is implemented. (An
extension of the original model also examines the effect of information that may be
exogenously revealed about the policy’s consequences, but the main insights of that
model are present when this possibility is absent, and our findings shed additional
light on results when it is present). Thus, while our voter need not base his voting
decision on the incumbent’s policy choice alone, he must expend costly effort if
he wishes to base his decision on something more. To simplify the analysis, we
assume that a voter who pays costly attention perfectly learns the outcome of the
incumbent’s policy—that is, whether it succeeded or failed at achieving the intended
goal. While strong, this assumption is intended to capture the conceptual opposite
of existing analyses of voter information—that it is not information itself about
incumbent performance that is scarce, but rather the attention required by voters to
collect and process this information.
Forcing the voter to pay a cost to learn about the policy’s consequences complicates
the analysis—in our model, the voter must choose not only how to vote after each
potential sequence of events, but also when to pay attention and learn more about
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the implemented policy. The first key insight of our analysis is that the disposition of
the voter’s attention is not neutral. Rather, a voter who is fully rational is looking for
something specific when she chooses to pay attention. Specifically, she is looking
for evidence that would reverse her current voting intention. Thus, if her current
voting intention is to retain the incumbent, then she will only pay attention in order
to find negative information about the incumbent’s performance that would justify
instead replacing him. Conversely, if her current voting intention is to replace the
incumbent, then she will only pay attention to find positive information about the
incumbent’s performance that would justify instead retaining him. A key implication
of this calculus is that the voter’s willingness to pay attention will depend on the
incumbent’s policy in a particular way—it is not necessarily choosing the more or
less popular policy that will garner the most attention, but rather the policy most
likely to reveal an outcome that would reverse the voter’s current voting intention.
Having established howandwhy rational voter attentionwill naturally be asymmetric
across different policy alternatives, we next consider how this asymmetric attention
affects the incumbent’s incentive to disregard his private beliefs for electoral gain.
In the original ? model, the incumbent has an incentive to pander by choosing
the ex-ante popular policy. This incentive derives from the fact that selecting an
ex-ante popular policy signals expertise (under the twin presumptions that a high-
ability incumbent is more likely to choose correctly, and the popular policy is more
likely ex-ante to be correct). If the incumbent and the challenger have sufficiently
similar initial reputations, pandering then becomes an effective strategy for securing
reelection.
When the voter can choose whether to pay attention, however, this introduces a
potentially-distinct rationale for the incumbent to disregard his private beliefs; to
influence the level of attention paid by the voter. The reason is that an anticipated
asymmetry in the voter’s attention can lead a strong incumbent to want to “play it
safe” by avoiding the policy that will draw more scrutiny, and a weak incumbent
to want to “gamble for resurrection” by seeking out the policy that will draw it
(e.g. ?). In theory, an asymmetry in the voter’s attention could bias the incumbent
both toward or away from the initially-popular policy, depending on the incumbent’s
incentive to seek or avoid attention given her electoral standing. Closely related to
this observation is a key finding in ?; that when information about the unpopular
policy is exogenously more likely to be revealed, a less-competent incumbent may
sometimes pursue it even when he privately agrees that it is mistaken, gambling that
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his assessment is actually wrong and that the voters will then confuse his accidental
success for competence. ? term such a strategy “fake leadership.”
Our first main result is that when the voter’s information about policy consequences
is filtered through rational attention, fake leadership cannot occur—even though
rational attention is naturally asymmetric. The intuition is as follows. An incumbent
who starts out strong has an incentive to avoid attention, while an incumbent who
starts out weak has an incentive to seek it. At the same time, however, the voter’s
willingness to pay attention after each policy depends on the possibility that this
attention will reveal information that reverses her current voting intention. Thus, if
the incumbent starts out strong enough that the voter is inclined to retain her, then
the voter will be most willing to pay attention to the unpopular policy, because it
is the one thought to be most likely to fail. Conversely, if the incumbent starts out
weak enough that the incumbent is inclined to replace her, then the voter will be
most willing to pay attention to the popular policy, because it is the one thought
to be most likely to succeed. Thus, when the incumbent has an incentive to seek
attention it is specifically pandering that will draw it, and when he has an incentive
avoid attention it is again pandering that will deflect it.
We next consider which of the two policies will garner the most attention from a
rational voter. Interestingly, we find that in general (though not always) it is the
unpopular policy that will garner the most attention, despite the fact that it is the
popular policy that is associated with pandering. Intuitively, the reason is that it
is more difficult for the voter to “catch” a low-ability incumbent who is pandering
than it is to “uncover” a high-ability incumbent who is exercising leadership. The
former is so incompetent that he may accidentally achieve a policy success when
he meant to pander, but the latter will always achieve a policy success when he
meant to exercise leadership. While it is possible for the popular policy to garner
more attention in equilibrium, this will only be the case under narrow conditions—
specifically, when the incumbent is weak enough to be replaced after either policy
absent attention, still strong enough to gain reelection if the voter uncovers a policy
success, and the voter’s cost of attention is both low and falls in a small range. Under
these conditions, the voter is relatively more willing to pay attention to the popular
policy  because she thinks it more likely to reveal a success than the unpopular
policy , but she is not very willing to pay attention overall because a relatively
strong challenger is already available.
We last consider how rational attention influences a low-ability incumbent’s pan-
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dering, and by implication the voter’s welfare. We find that this effect depends both
on the cost of attention and on the size of the competence gap between a high and
low-ability incumbent. When the cost of attention is sufficiently low the voter will
pay attention regardless of which policy the incumbent chooses. This will restore
a low-ability incumbent’s incentive to be truthful by tying is his electoral prospects
to his policy successes. When the cost of attention is sufficiently high the voter will
simply never pay attention, and so the incumbent’s behavior will be unaffected its
theoretical possibility.
However, if the cost of attention is moderate—so that the voter is inclined to pay
attention after only one policy—then the competence gap between a high and low-
ability incumbent determines whether the ability to learn about policy consequences
ultimately improves or harms voter welfare. If the competence gap is not so large,
then even asymmetric attention will be sufficient to reduce or eliminate a low-ability
incumbent’s incentive to pander; either because it “punishes” him with attention
for choosing the popular policy, or because it “rewards” him with attention for
choosing the unpopular one. However, if the competence gap sufficiently large,
then asymmetric attention will introduce a new incentive to pander either to avoid
attention (if the incumbent is strong) or to seek attention (if the incumbent is weak).
This effect can both cause pandering that would not have occurred if the voter
were unable to learn about policy consequences at all, and exacerbate pandering
that would have already occurred. In fact, the harmful effect of asymmetric voter
attention on accountability may be so severe that the voter would actually be better
off were she unable to acquire any information about incumbent performance. A
surprising implication is that voters may actually be harmed by the availability of
public and unbiased information about incumbent performance once their “attention
constraint” is taken into consideration.
3.2 Related Literature
Our model contributes directly to a now-large literature studying electoral account-
ability through the lens of principal-agent models. A substantial portion of this
literature analyzes distortions in policymaking that are caused by forward-looking
rational voters who lack the ability to commit ex-ante to their voting decisions (e.g.
?, ?, ?, ?). We build specifically on the canonical pandering model of ?; in their
work they discuss multiple real-life examples of politicians following popular opin-
ion (i.e., pandering) because of re-election motives, and develop a theoretical model
explicating the conditions under which pandering arises.
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The main (indeed, only) difference between our model and ? is that information
about the success or failure of the incumbent’s policy may only be revealed after
an endogenous decision by the voter to acquire it. In modeling rational information
acquisition by the voter, ourwork connects to several large literatures that collectively
examine the effect of transparency and strategic information revelation in principal-
agent relationships. These literatures are distinguished both by how such information
is revealed—including generated exogenously, collected by the principal herself, or
strategically revealed and/or collected by third party strategic actors—as well as
the setting of the principal-agent relationship—including electoral representation,
bureaucratic oversight, and the judicial hierarchy.
Within the study of electoral accountability in particular, earlier works sought to
understand the effects of transparency by exogenously varying the process by which
information was revealed to the voter—key works include ?, ?, and ?. ? argues that
(exogenous) transparency about a politician’s policy choice may decrease welfare by
inducing pandering, but transparency about that politician’s performance generally
improves it. (? reaches a similar conclusion in a setting where incumbents differ in
their preferences rather than their abilities.) In contrast with these works, ? show
that exogenous information about incumbent performance may also decrease voter
welfare, if there is also an exogenous asymmetry in the cost of choosing poorly.
Subsequent works consider strategic acquisition and/or revelation of information by
a variety of third parties, including biased and unbiased news agencies (????) and
opposition parties (?). Similar to our findings, these papers suggest an ambiguous
effect of information on accountability and voter welfare. ? show that an unbiased
media outlet that receives and reports on exogenous information about political
performance can sometimes eliminate the incentive to pander. A fallible media,
however, can also cause pandering that would not have occurred in its absence. ?
shows that media bias has an ambiguous effect on voters welfare, since an unbiased
media improves selection but worsens accountability, while a biased media has the
opposite effect. ? shows that an opposition party can discipline the incumbent and
increase accountability, but only if the opposition is sufficiently strong and policy-
motivated. The main difference between these papers and ours is that we model
endogenous information acquisition directly by the representative voter, instead of
the third party media outlets with their own agenda. This enables us to examine
the conditions under which the incumbent’s policymaking is more or less likely to
attract voter attention.
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The only work of which we are aware that considers endogenous information ac-
quisition by the voter in an electoral accountability setting is ?. In that model,
incumbents are differentiated by their preferences rather than their abilities. A key
finding is that the voter pays too much attention to the incumbent’s policy choice
relative to the consequences of that choice, worsening accountability and voter wel-
fare. However, these results largely derive from two modeling assumptions that do
not hold in our setup: that the incumbent and the challenger are ex-ante identical,
and that the information acquired by the voter is imperfect.
In examining information acquisition by the principal herself an agency relationship,
our model also relates to several large literatures that span across political science,
economics, public finance, and accounting studying “auditing” in principal-agent
relationships. In these models, a principal (and sometimes other actors as well) can
strategically acquire information about an agent’s hidden actions or consequences
thereof, and the acquisition of this information can influence the degree of moral
hazard in the relationship. Such models have been applied most widely within
political science to the study of bureaucratic politics (e.g. ?, ?, ?, and ?) and to the
judicial hierarchy (see ? for a review).
Notably, in many auditing models, an audit affects the agent’s incentives predomi-
nantly by increasing the chance that the agent is “caught” deviating from the prin-
cipal’s wishes. For example, in the seminal judicial hierarchy model of ?, a higher
court (the “principal”) only reviews cases decided by a lower-court (the “agent”)
when noncompliance is most likely, with potential reversal of the lower court acting
as the punishment. In the setting of congressional oversight, ex-post audits are
generally viewed as tools for detecting violations of legislative goals, whether it be
through “police-patrols" (?,?, ?) (that is, direct oversight by Congress), or “fire-
alarms” (?) (that is, citizens and interest groups calling Congressional attention to
deviant decisions). Similarly, in our model, better accountability can be induced
with attention when it increases the risk that the agent will be caught pandering.
However, accountability may also be improved through a different logic—it may
make an agent more likely to be “found” having actually followed the principal’s
wishes despite having made a seemingly-bad policy choice.1 In other words, ra-
tional attention may also improve accountability by functioning as a “reward” for
1Worth noting is that the absence of “auditing for compliance” in judicial hierarchy models
also stems from the maintained assumption across this literature that “summary reversals” (in which
a higher court can reverse a lower court decision without a costly rehearing of the case) are not
possible.
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choosing the unpopular policy.2
Our paper also speaks to a long literature examining voter competence. Early papers
in this literature argued that voters do not possess enough information to effectively
fulfill their electoral duties (?, ?). Many authors argue that even when the voters
are retrospective (?, ?), or use other information such as party affiliation (?) and
economic performance (?), they regularly misuse such information (?) or take into
consideration irrelevant factors outside the control of policy-makers (?????. As
pointed out by ?, however, these debates have been “single-minded" in the sense
that they do not typically take into consideration the interaction between the voters’
information and the incentives of strategic politicians. Our paper is a further step in
this direction—we investigate not only how voters rationally pay attention, but how
that rational attention affects politicians’ incentives to pander.
An additional literature to which our work relates is on rational inattention (RI), al-
though we do not specifically adopt this technology to model the voter’s information
acquisition. The RI literature was started by Sims in a series of papers (?, ?, ?) on
macroeconomic questions. Since then, similar tools have been used in finance (?,
? ?, etc.), labor economics (?, ?, etc.), behavioral economics (?, ?, ?, ?, etc.), and
two-candidate elections models (?, ?, etc.). A key finding of RI as applied to two-
candidate election models is that voters will pay little attention when their personal
stakes in an election are low. Moreover, in previous RI applications to elections the
main factor determining a voter’s endogenous information acquisition decision is
her “pivot probability”: if the voter believes that her vote will not be pivotal, she will
not acquire information. In keeping with the political agency literature, however,
our model features only a single representative voter so the question of pivotality
does not arise. In addition, the voter already observes some information—the in-
cumbent’s policy choice—and her decision about acquiring information pertains to
learning the consequences of that choice.
Finally, our paper also relates to ?, who also study a voter’s endogenous attention
allocation but in an electoral competition model. In their model, the voter is
distinguished both by her exogenous interest in politics and her endogenous attention
to politics, and they show that the voter’s attention only improves her welfare when
she is moderately interested in politics. An additional difference between their work
and ours is that the process of information revelation about candidates’ choices in
2Similarly, see ? for how rebates can be used to improve incentives to truthfully report income
in a model of tax auditing.
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their model is “two-sided”—it requires both costly attention from the voter as well
as costly communication effort by the candidates.
3.3 The Model
We consider a two-period model with an election at the end of the first period. There
are two candidates—an Incumbent () and Challenger () – and a representative
voter (+). In order to avoid a pronoun confusion, we refer to the politicians as “he”
and the voter as “she.”3 In each of two periods, nature draws a state of the world
l ∈ {, } that determines which of two potential policies H ∈ {, } maximizes
voter welfare.4
Information and Types The voter’s prior belief %(l = ) that the state is  in
each period is denoted c. This is assumed to be strictly greater than 12 , implying
that the voter is ex-ante inclined towards ; we therefore refer to  as the “popular”
policy. Politicians, on the other hand, receive informative private signals about the
state of the world B ∈ {, }. Specifically, each politician 9 ∈ {, } may be either
of high or low ability _ 9 ∈ {, !}. A high-ability politician (_ 9 = ) learns the
state with certainty (%(B = l|_ 9 = ) = 1), while a low-ability politician (_ 9 = !)
receives a noisy but informative signal, where %(B = l|_ 9 = !) = @ > c. A
politician’s ability is his private information, and we denote the prior probability
that the incumbent (challenger) is high ability as ` (W)
Actions In each of two periods, the current officeholder chooses a policy H ∈
{, }, and this choice is observable to the voter. The “correct” policy in each
period—i.e., the policy that maximizes voter welfare—is the policy that matches
the state of the world (H = l). After the first period the voter chooses to reelect
the incumbent or to elect the challenger. However, before making this decision
(but after observing the politician’s policy choice) the voter also chooses whether to
the incumbent’s “pay attention” to the policy decision (U ∈ {0, 1}) by learning its
consequences (i.e., her payoff), which costs 2.
Utilities and Preferences. Players are assumed to have a common discount factor
X ∈ (0, 1). The voter only cares whether the officeholder in each period chooses the
3While the assumption of a representative voter is standard in the literature, it is more conse-
quential in our model with costly information acquisition because the probability that an individual
voter is pivotal in a large electorate is infinitesimal, but the cost of information acquisition is not.
4In a slight abuse of notation we do not superscript by period—throughout the analysis we make
sure to clarify which period we are considering.
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policy that maximizes her welfare. Specifically, in each period *+ = 1l=H − U · 2;
i.e., the voter always wants the politician to match the state, and “paying attention”
costs 2.
Politicians are assumed to be policy motivated, but only if they are in office. That
is, in each period a politician’s utility is
* 9 =

1 if l = H and 9 is in office
0 otherwise
This form of utility transparently combines two motives: (1) to maximize voter
welfare, and (2) to get reelected.
Sequence of the Game The game proceeds as follows.
1. Nature determines each politician’s type and reveals it her;
2. Nature determines the first period state of the world l;
3. The incumbent  observes a first-period signal and chooses a first-period
policy H;
5. The voter + observes the policy H, and chooses whether to pay attention
U ∈ {0, 1}:
– If U = 1 the voter + learns the her payoff*+ and pays cost 2,
– If U = 0 the voter + learns nothing and pays no cost;
6. The voter + either reelects the incumbent  or elects the challenger ;
7. Nature selects the second-period state of the world;
8. The officeholder observes a second-period signal B′ and chooses a policy H′.
The solution concept employed is Sequential Equilibrium.
3.4 Preliminary Analysis
In the last period, whoever holds office will follow his signal regardless of his ability
(since @ > c). Moreover, the voter will never choose to pay attention, since the only
value of paying attention is to help decide whether to retain the current officeholder.
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Incumbent’s First Period Strategy In the first period, the incumbent politician
 chooses a first-period policy H as a function of his private signal B ∈ {, } and
ability _ ∈ {!, }. When doing so he may face a tension between his desire
to match the state and his desire to get reelected. However, the only benefit of
reelection in our model is the opportunity to maximize the voter’s future welfare.
Consequently, a high-ability politician will always strictly prefer to follow his first-
period signal, since no increased likelihood of being able to maximize the voter’s
welfare “tomorrow” is worth sacrificing the voter’s welfare for sure “today” (recall
that X < 1). Correspondingly, we only introduce notation for the policy choices
of a low-ability incumbent conditional on each possible signal; let fB denote the
probability that a low-ability incumbent chooses policy  after signal B ∈ {, }.
Voter’s First Period Retention After observing the incumbent’s first period-
policy, the voter forms an interim belief `G ∈ [0, 1] about the probability that the
incumbent is high ability using Bayes’ rule. This belief then determines the (interim)
optimal probability of retaining the incumbent aG ∈ [0, 1] if she chooses not to pay
attention. We term aG the voter’s posture toward the incumbent following policy G,
since it reflects how favorably she treats an incumbent who chooses policy G if she
chooses not to pay attention. If aG = 1 (always reelect) we call the voter’s posture
fully favorable; if aG ∈ (0, 1) (sometimes reelect) we call it somewhat favorable; if
aG = 0 (always replace) we call it adversarial.
Voter’s First Period Attention In our model, the voter must also choose whether
or not to pay attention after observing policy G by paying 2 to learn her actual utility
*+ (recall that *+ = 1 if and only if the incumbent’s policy choice matched the
state). However, since the incumbent’s policy choice G is perfectly observable to
the voter, learning that policy’s consequences *+ is equivalent to learning the true
value of the state l. We therefore equivalently describe a voter who pays attention
as one who learns the state, and let dG denote the probability the voter pays 2 to
learn the state after policy G.
In considering how a rational voter will choose to pay attention, observe that (as
is standard in signaling models of electoral agency) the voter is unable to commit
ex-ante to how she will respond to the incumbent’s policy choice G, and therefore
the probability she will pay attention dG to each policy. This aspect of the model
means that the voter may only rationally take into consideration how paying attention
might improve selection (the probability that the second-period policyholder will
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be high ability) rather than accountability (how the incumbent uses her first-period
information). In a broad sense, the voter’s inability to commit to her attention
decisions is what accounts for the potentially harmful equilibrium affects of (interim)
rational attention.
The voter’s inability to commit to attention also substantially simplifies the anal-
ysis. In particular, it implies that the voter will only pay costly attention when it
might actually improve selection, which in turn is only the case if attention might
reveal information that would persuade her to make a different retention decision
than the one she intended (i.e., her posture aG) based on policy alone. An imme-
diate simplifying implication is that whenever the voter chooses to pay attention in
equilibrium (dG > 0), it must also be optimal for her to retain an incumbent who
is revealed to have matched the state, and replace an incumbent who is revealed to
have mismatched it (with at least one preference strict).5
The Incumbent’s Problem
To analyze the calculus of a low-ability incumbent, observe that his utility from
choosing policy G ∈ {, } given whatever information I he has at the time of his
decision is:




G) aG∅︸       ︷︷       ︸
no attention
+ dG% (l = G |I)︸            ︷︷            ︸
attention
ª®®®¬︸                                       ︷︷                                       ︸
utility “tomorrow”
.
The contemporaneous benefit of choosing policy G is the possibility that it matches
the state, which the incumbent believeswill be the casewith probability % (l = G |I).
The future benefit (discounted by X) is the value of being reelected @ (the probability
that a low-ability incumbent’s future signal will be correct) times the probability
of reelection after choosing G. This probability, in turn, is equal to the voter’s
posture aG if the voter chooses not to pay attention (with probability 1− dG) and the
probability % (l = G |I) that G is correct if the voter does choose to pay attention
(with probability dG).
5More formally, let `Gl and aGl denote the voter’s beliefs and retention probability after policy G
and state l. Since a high-ability incumbent always matches the state, an incumbent who mismatches
the statemust be low ability (`G¬G = 0) and always replaced (aG¬G = 0). It then follows that for attention
to have value, the voter must strictly prefer to retain an incumbent who matches (`GG > _→ aGG = 1);
otherwise attention would not affect the voter’s optimal retention decision.
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Several features of *GI are worth highlighting. First, the incumbent’s rewards for
choosing G are strictly increasing in his private belief % (l = G |I) that G is correct.
Consequently, a low-ability incumbent must be weakly more likely to choose a given
policy G when his signal indicates that this policy is correct. This observation further
implies that in equilibrium he may only sometimes disregard his private information
in two ways: (i) by sometimes choosing the popular policy  even when his private
information indicates that the unpopular policy  is correct (f = 1 andf ∈ (0, 1))
(which Canes-Wrone, Herron, Shotts (2001) term “pandering”), or (ii) by sometimes
choosing the unpopular policy  even when his private information indicates that
the popular policy  is correct (f ∈ (0, 1) and f = 0) (which Canes-Wrone,
Herron, Shotts (2001) term “fake leadership.”)
Second, more voter attention after policy G makes the incumbent’s utility from
choosing G depend less on the voter’s posture aG , and more on that policy’s actual
quality. Thus, whether greater voter attention to policy G makes that policy more or
less attractive to the incumbent overall depends on whether the incumbent’s private
belief % (l = G |I) that G is correct is more or less favorable than the voter’s initial
posture toward G. A crucial implication is that asymmetry in the voter’s attention can
bias the incumbent’s policy choice both toward or away from the policy indicated
by his private signal.
The Voter’s Retention Problem
In both the baseline version of the Canes-Wrone, Herron, Shotts (2001) model
(henceforth CHS model) and in our model, the incumbent’s incentive to follow her
information is distorted by the voter’s attempt to evaluate his ability via his policy
decision.
To see this formally, observe that after seeing the incumbent’s policy H ∈ {, }
the voter bases her retention decision on her posterior belief that the incumbent is
high ability `H, and how it compares to her prior belief W that the challenger is high
ability. These posterior beliefs are calculated as follows. First, the probability a
high-ability incumbent chooses policy  (or ) is simply the probability c (or 1−c)
that it is the correct policy. Second, the probability that a low-ability incumbent
chooses policy  is f (f, f), where
f (f, f) = (c@ + (1 − c) (1 − @)) f + (c (1 − @) + (1 − c) @) f.
Observe c@ + (1 − c) (1 − @) is the probability a low-ability incumbent receives a
signal of , and c (1 − @) + (1 − c) @ is the probability he receives a signal of .
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Then by Bayes’ rule,
`G (f, f) =
{
`c
`c+(1−`)f(f,f) for G = 
`(1−c)
`(1−c)+(1−`) (1−f(f,f)) for G = 
.
Using the above, it is simple to see that the voter’s attempts to infer the incumbent’s
expertise from his policy choice is what gives the incumbent an incentive to pander.
Specifically, when politicians are differentiated by their expertise and the voter
deems policy  more likely to be correct (c > 12 ), then she rationally believes that
a high-ability incumbent’s private signal is more likely to favor it. Consequently, if
the incumbent is believed to always be “truthful”–that is, to always choose the policy
indicated by his private signal—then a high-ability incumbent is also expected to
more-frequently choose the popular policy  than a low-ability incumbent, i.e.,
c > @c + (1 − @) (1 − c) = f (1, 0). Thus, choosing  () will be interpreted as
a favorable (unfavorable) signal about the incumbent’s ability, i.e., ` (1, 0) > ` >
` (1, 0).6
Pandering Absent Attention
To clarify how this effect can generate pandering in equilibrium and also establish
a baseline against which to compare the model with rational attention, we conclude
this section by revisiting the equilibrium of theCHSmodelwith no attention (d = 0).
Let ¯̀G denote the voter’s posterior belief `G (1, 0) about the incumbent’s ability
following policy G when she believes a low-ability incumbent to be truthful. Now
first suppose that the voter’s inferences when she believes the incumbent to be
truthful are not strong enough to influence her retention decision, either because the
incumbent is beginning very weak relative to the challenger (W ≤ ¯̀) or very strong
(W ≥ ¯̀). In these cases, a low-ability incumbent will clearly have no electoral
incentive to pander, and the unique equilibrium will be truthful. Next suppose that





. Then a low-ability incumbent who privately observes signal B = 
faces a tradeoff between following his signal and getting reelected. Applying our
previous characterization of a low-ability incumbent’s expected utility *GI from
policy choice G given information I yields an incentive to pander after signal  if
6This “expertise pandering” effect is distinct from the “preference pandering” effect exhibited in
models like ?, in which the voter is uncertain not about the incumbent’s expertise, but about whether




μB(1, 0) = μ̄B
μA(1, 0) = μ̄A
σB = 0 σB = 1
μ
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μπ + (1− μ)
Figure 3.1: Posteriors after each policy as a function f.
only if:
X@ > % (l =  |B = ) − % (l = |B = ) ,
or if the net future benefit X@ of reelection exceeds the net current benefit of following
the signal. It is straightforward to show that this inequality will hold (and thus that
equilibrium must involve pandering) if and only if the quality @ of a low-ability
incumbent’s information is below a unique threshold @̂ ∈ (c, 1) that solves the
equality:
X@̂ · ((1 − c) @̂ + c (1 − @̂)) = @̂ − c. (3.1)
To complete the characterization, let f̂G

(W) denote the unique probability of pander-
ing that makes the voter indifferent between retaining and replacing the incumbent






= W). (Recall that the baseline CHS
model cannot exhibit fake leadership, so in equilibrium the incumbent will always
follow a signal of , i.e., f = 1). As depicted in Figure 3.1, it is easily verified
that (i) `G (1, f) is strictly increasing (decreasing) in f when G =  (), (ii) f̂G




, and (iii) there exists a unique f̂ (W) satisfying
f (1, f̂ (W)) = c (where a low and high-ability incumbent are equally likely to
choose ), and at this pandering level ` (1, f̂ (W)) = ` (1, f̂ (W)) = ` (policy
choice is uninformative to the voter). Equilibrium is then as follows.
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Proposition 8 Let f∗
#
denote the equilibrium level of pandering in the CHS model
absent voter attention (d = 0). If a low-ability incumbent begins far ahead of or




), or if his information is sufficiently high quality
(@ > @̂), then he is always truthful. Otherwise he must sometimes pander.









(W). The voter always reelects after  (a = 1) but only sometimes
after  (a ∈ (0, 1)).









(W). The voter sometimes reelects after  (a ∈ (0, 1)) but never
after  (a = 0)
• If he is evenwith the challenger (W = `), then he panders with probabilityf∗
#
=
f̂ (W), and there are a continuum of equilibrium voter retention probabilities
(a, a) ∈ [0, 1]2.
Figure 3.2 depicts the type of equilibrium that prevails in the CHS model as a
function of the challenger’s reputation W (on the x-axis) and the quality of a low-
ability incumbent’s information @ (on the y-axis). A low-ability incumbent will
be truthful either if policy choice is an insufficiently strong signal to influence the
voter’s retention decision, or if the quality of the incumbent’s information makes
pandering too costly. Otherwise, equilibrium must involve some pandering. In a
pandering equilibrium the voter must “mix” by sometimes reelecting the incumbent
after one of the two policies, but which policy this is depends on the incumbent’s
initial strength. If the incumbent is initially stronger than the challenger (W < `),
then the equilibrium level of pandering f̂

(W) induces the voter to always retain
the incumbent after policy  and sometimes retain him after policy . If the
incumbent is initially weaker than the challenger (W > `), then the equilibrium level
of pandering f̂

(W) induces the voter to always replace the incumbent after policy
 and sometimes replace him after policy . Finally, equilibrium pandering is
maximized (as a function of W) when the incumbent and challenger begin equally
matched (` = W); pandering decreases and eventually vanishes as the challenger
either becomes stronger or weaker than the challenger.
The Voter’s Attention Problem
The distinctive feature of our model relative to CHS is that the voter need not rely
only on what she can infer from the incumbent’s policy choice; she may also expend
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q̂
νA = νB = 1 νA = νB = 0
νA = 1 1 > νA





Figure 3.2: Canes-Wrone, Herron, Shotts (2001) equilibrium.
costly attention to learn the actual consequences of that policy (i.e., the state l) in
order to better evaluate the incumbent’s ability. How the voter rationally allocates
her attention after each policy choice, and how this rational allocation affects the
incumbent’s behavior, is the focus of our analysis. (Throughout this section we will
temporarily suppress notation that explicitly indicates the dependence of the voter’s
beliefs and best responses on a low-ability incumbent’s strategy (f, f)).
To begin the analysis, first let `Gl denote the voter’s posterior about the incumbent’s
ability after the incumbent chose policy G and attention reveals the state to be l. If
attention reveals that the incumbent did not match the state, then the voter infers that
he is definitely low ability (`G¬G = 0), since a high-ability incumbent both receives
a perfect signal and always follows it.7 Alternatively, if attention reveals that the
incumbent did match the state, then the voter infers that he is high ability with
7Note that if a low quality incumbent always chooses , then policy  being revealed tomismatch
is off-equilibrium path, and the stated beliefs require the application of sequential equilibrium.
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probability
`GG = Pr (_ =  |H = G, l = G) =
Pr (H = G |l = G, _ = ) Pr (_ = )
Pr (H = G |l = G)
=
`
` + Pr (H = G |l = G, _ = !) (1 − `)
,
where Pr (H = G |l = G, _ = !) denotes the probability that a low-ability incumbent
will choose policy H = G conditional on G actually being correct. This is equal
to @f + (1 − @) f if G =  and @ (1 − f) + (1 − @) (1 − f) if G = . Thus,
discovering that the incumbent matched the state with a given policy G is always
“good news” about his ability, but the more biased low-ability incumbents are known
to be toward that particular policy, the less informative that news is. With these
beliefs in hand, we may now calculate the voter’s value of attention after observing
policy G (denoted qG). Because the voter chooses whether to pay attention after
observing the politician’s policy choice, best response behavior straightforwardly
requires that she always (never) pays attention after policy G whenever 2 < (>)qG .
The value of attention to the voter derives from the possibility that learning the
outcome of the incumbent’s policy Gwill improve selection by changing her retention
decision; if there was no chance that attention would change her vote, then attention
would have no decision-relevant value. A crucial implication is that what the voter
is looking for when she pays attention depends on how she would vote absent that
attention, i.e., her posture following G. Specifically, if her posture is favorable
(`G ≥ W) then she pays attention after G in order to find negative information about
the incumbent’s ability in the form of a policy failure (l ≠ G). Conversely, if her
posture is adversarial (`G ≤ W), then she pays attention after x in order to find
positive information about the incumbent’s ability in the form of a policy success
(l = G).
Correspondingly, let qG− and qG+ denote the value of negative and positive attention
following policy G, respectively. We then have that,









To explain, first observe that the expected net benefit of choosing a high vs. low
ability officeholder for the second period is X (1 − @). The value of negative attention
is then this benefit, times the probability Pr (l ≠ G |H = G) of uncovering negative
evidence, times the difference in probabilities W − `G¬G that the incumbent and
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challenger are high ability conditional on that evidence. Similarly, the value of
positive attention is X (1 − @), times the probability Pr (l = G |H = G) of uncovering
positive evidence, times the difference in probabilities `GG − W the incumbent and
challenger are high ability conditional on that evidence. Lastly, it is easily verified
that qG− < (>) qG+ if and only if the voter has a strictly favorable (adversarial) posture
toward the incumbent following G. Thus, the true value of attention following G is
simply qG = min{qG−, qG+}, and the voter best-response is as follows.
Lemma 9 The voter’s strategy is a best response if and only if ∀G ∈ {, }:
• Her posture following G is strictly favorable (adversarial) when `G > (<)W;
• She always (never) pays attention following policy G when the cost of attention







• After paying attention, she never retains an incumbent who mismatched the
state, and always (never) retains an incumbent who matched the state when
`GG > (<)W.
Attention Absent Pandering
To clarify how rational voter attention works, we last briefly consider equilibrium
when there is no ex-ante popular policy, so that both are equally likely to be correct
(c = 12 ).
Proposition 10 If c = 12 , then in equilibrium the incumbent is truthful (f = 1 >
f = 0). After either policy G ∈ {0, 1} the voter always retains (replaces) the
incumbent absent attention whenever ` > (<)W, and always (never) pays attention
whenever
2 < (>) q = X(1 − @) · (W(1 − `) (1 − @) − <0G{W − `), 0})
Absent any ex-ante difference between the two policies, the voter’s treatment of
the incumbent in equilibrium cannot depend on his policy choice. Consequently,
the incumbent never panders. Despite perfect accountability however, it is still
sometimes rational for the voter to pay attention in equilibrium in order to uncover
the mistakes of a low-ability incumbent and improve selection.
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φ−(γ) φ+(γ)
Figure 3.3: Value of attention with symmetric policies.
Figure 3.3 depicts the value of attention as a function of the challenger’s reputation
W (holding the incumbent’s reputation ` fixed). If the incumbent is initially stronger
than the challenger (` > W), then the value of attention derives from the possibility
of discovering that the incumbent’s policy mismatched the state, and he is therefore
low ability. Consequently, the value of attention q is (locally) increasing in the prior
W that the challenger is high ability. Conversely, if the incumbent is initially weaker
than the challenger (` < W), then the value of attention derives from the possibility
that the incumbent’s policymatched the state, and he is therefore sufficiently likely to
be high ability to justify retention. Consequently, the value of attention q is (locally)
decreasing in the prior W that the challenger is high ability, and becomes 0 when
the incumbent is so weak that even matching the state cannot gain him reelection
(`GG =
`
`+(1−`)@ ≤ W). Finally, the voter pays the most attention when the race is




Recall that there are two ways that a low-ability incumbent might misrepresent his
information in equilibrium—(a) by sometimes choosing the ex-ante popular policy
 even when his private information indicates that  is correct (f > 0, f = 1),
i.e., pandering, or (b) by sometimes choosing the ex-ante unpopular policy  even
when his private information indicates that  is correct (f = 0, f < 1), i.e., fake
leadership.
In the CHS model with either no attention or symmetric exogenous attention, only
pandering can occur in equilibrium. The reason is that the only force distorting
the incumbent’s policy choice is a strategic incentive to signal competence by
choosing the popular policy (see Proposition 8). Asymmetric attention, however,
can introduce two additional forces that could, in theory, distort the incumbent’s
incentives both toward pandering or toward fake leadership—an incentive for an
initially-strong incumbent to avoid attention, and an incentive for an initially-weak
incumbent to seek it. Specifically, if the voter is inclined to retain the incumbent
outright after a policy G but pay attention after ¬G, then an incentive to avoid
attention will bias the incumbent toward G in order to escape the risk that the voter
will discover ¬G to have been incorrect and replace him. Alternatively, if the voter
is inclined to pay attention after G but replace outright after ¬G, then an incentive
to seek attention will bias the incumbent toward G in the hopes that the voter will
discover G to have been correct and retain him. Indeed, in an extension considered
in Canes-Wrone, Herron, Shotts (2001) where the voter exogenously pays more
attention after the unpopular policy  (d = 0 < d = 1), fake leadership can
occur in equilibrium when a weak low-ability incumbent chases the attention that
the unpopular policy  brings, hoping that this attention will reveal him to have
matched the state despite ignoring his private signal.
Our firstmain result is thatwhen the voter’s attention is endogenous, fake leadership—
driven either by a desire to seek attention or to avoid it—cannot occur in equilibrium.
This is true even though the voter’s attention is generically asymmetric, and does
indeed distort the incumbent’s policy decisions in equilibrium above and beyond the
CHS model.
Proposition 11 In an equilibrium of the rational attention model, a low-ability
incumbent never exercises fake leadership, i.e., chooses policy  after observing
signal .
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It is far from obvious that rational voter attention can induce or exacerbate pandering,
but never induce fake leadership. The key insight is that the incumbent’s interim
reputation `G does not alone determine how much attention the voter will rationally
pay; rather, it interacts with the voter’s interim belief % (l = G |H = G) that the
chosen policy H is correct in a particular way. Specifically, if the incumbent begins
sufficiently weak that the voter prefers to replace her even after the popular policy
(` < W), then it is the popular policy that will receive more attention, because
the only information that will change the voter’s decision is discovering that the
incumbent chose correctly. Conversely, if the incumbent begins so strong that the
voter prefers to retain her even after the unpopular policy (` > W), then it is the
unpopular policy that will receive more attention, because the only information that
will change the voter’s decision is discovering that the incumbent chose incorrectly.
Consequently, when the incumbent prefers to seek attention (because he begins
weak) it is precisely pandering that will draw that attention, while when he prefers
to avoid attention (because he begins strong) it is again pandering that will deflect
that attention.
Leadership and Pandering with Rational Attention
Having established that rational voter attention can only distort the incumbent’s
incentives toward pandering and never fake leadership, we nextmore closely examine
why and when rational attention can either induce a low-ability incumbent to be
truthful who would have otherwise pandered, or visa versa. Henceforth we assume
that f = 1 (a low-ability incumbent always chooses the popular policy when his
signal indicates it) and denote f (the probability a low-ability incumbent panders
after a signal indicating the unpopular policy) as simply f.
How Rational Attention Can Induce Leadership
Recall that in the CHS model, a low-ability incumbent will pander if and only if





) (so that the voter will condition retention on policy choice), and (2)
his information is sufficiently poor to make pandering profitable (@ < @̂(X, c)). The
latter is equivalent to:
% (l = |B = ) + X@ > % (l =  |B = ) .
It is easy to see that these two conditions no longer suffice to induce pandering when
the voter can pay attention. For example, if she were to pay attention after both
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policies, then shewould clearly restore the incumbent’s incentive to be truthful, since
matching the state would then maximize both the incumbent’s contemporaneous
payoffs and his reelection prospects.
More interestingly, however, attention after only one policy may also be sufficient
to restore the incumbent’s incentive to be truthful. To see this, observe that if the
voter were to pay attention after only the popular policy  (and still replace outright
after ) the incumbent would only have an incentive to pander when:
% (l = |B = ) (1 + X@) > % (l =  |B = ) ,
since now the incumbent will not always be reelected after choosing , but only
when she succeeds with it. Attention after  thus functions as a “punishment”
for choosing the popular policy relative to simply retaining the incumbent outright.
Similarly, if the voter were to pay attention after only the unpopular policy  (and
still retain outright after ) the incumbent would only have an incentive to pander
when
% (l = |B = ) + X@ > % (l =  |B = ) (1 + X@) ,
since now the incumbent may be reelected even after  if it is actually correct.
Attention after  thus functions as a “reward” for choosing the unpopular policy
relative to simply replacing the incumbent outright.
It turns out either form of asymmetric attention will be sufficient to restore the
incumbent’s incentive to be truthful (relative to asymmetric attention) if and only if
% (l =  |B = ) − % (l = |B = ) ≥ X@ · % (l = |B = ) ,
or if the net policy benefit of following the signal B =  exceeds the net future benefit
X@ of reelection, times the probability %(l = |B = ) that the signal B =  is
wrong. The intuition is simple; under either form of asymmetric attention, pandering
will actually yield an electoral benefit only when the incumbent’s private signal
indicating  is actually wrong. It is next straightforward to show that asymmetric
attention of either formwill restore a low-ability incumbent’s incentive to be truthful
if and only if the quality @ of his information exceeds a unique threshold @̄ ∈ (c, @̂)
that solves
X@̄ · c (1 − @̄) = @̄ − c (3.2)
Using the preceding we now state formal conditions under which rational attention
will eliminate pandering. (Recall that qG (f) = min
{




voter’s value of attention following policy G ∈ {, }, where we now make the
dependence of these quantities on a low-ability incumbent’s pandering probability
f explicit.)
Proposition 12 Say that a low-ability incumbent receives high-quality information
if @ ∈ [@̂, 1], moderate-quality information if @ ∈ [@̄, @̂), and poor-quality informa-




and @ < @̂—so that the incumbent will pander
absent attention—rational voter attention will eliminate the incumbent’s incentive
to pander i.f.f. either:
1. The voter has a low cost of attention (2 ≤ min
{
q (0) , q (0)
}
) and pays
attention after both policies;








q (0) , q (0)
}
],
and a low-ability incumbent receives moderate information (@ ∈ [@̄, @̂)).
Figure 3.4 indicates the regions of the parameter space within which rational atten-
tion induces a change in whether a low-ability incumbent is truthful or panders in
equilibrium (note that it does not also identify the regions where both models exhibit
pandering, but to different degrees). The challenger’s reputation W is on the x-axis,
while the voter’s cost of attention 2 is on the y-axis. In the lower white pentagon
the voter pays symmetric attention even when believing that low-ability incumbents
do not pander in order to catch their mistakes. In equilibrium, this attention induces
the incumbent to be truthful regardless of the quality of his information. In the
upper two dashed triangles the voter pays asymmetric attention when believing that
low-ability incumbents do not pander, but this asymmetric attention only restores a
low-ability incumbent’s incentive to be truthful when he receives moderate-quality
information (@ ∈ [@̄, @̂)). In the larger left triangle, attention restores leadership
by effectively rewarding the incumbent for choosing the unpopular policy . In
the smaller white triangle, attention restores leadership by effectively punishing the
incumbent for choosing the popular policy .
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q ∈ [q̄, q̂)
q ∈ (π, q̂)





Figure 3.4: Regions where attention eliminates or induces pandering.
How Rational Attention Can Induce Pandering
In the CHS model, a low-ability incumbent is always truthful when he starts out so
far ahead of or behind the challenger that the voter will not condition retention on




. Clearly, introducing symmetric voter attention will not
induce such an incumbent to pander because it simply makes reelection contingent
on policy success instead of policy choice. However, we have already shown that
asymmetric voter attention reduces, but does not eliminate, the incentive to pander.
An immediate implication is thus that introducing asymmetric voter attention to
an environment in which the incumbent’s electoral fate would have otherwise been
sealedmight induce him to pander. Finally, such asymmetry is a fundamental feature
of rational voter attention. The reason is two-fold. First, when the incumbent is
sufficiently strong (W < ¯̀) the voter will want to look for negative evidence after
both policies, but be more likely to find it after . Conversely, when the incumbent
is sufficiently weak (W > ¯̀) the voter will want to look for positive evidence after
both policies, but be more likely to find it after . We thus have the following.




—so that the incumbent is truthful in the model
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absent attention—rational attention will induce pandering i.f.f. a low-ability in-
cumbent receives poor information (@ ∈ [c, @̄)) and the voter has an intermediate
cost of attention, i.e.,
2 ∈ (min
{




q (0) , q (0)
}
] .
The two darkly shaded triangles in Figure 3.4 depict the regions of the parameter
space within which rational attention induces pandering from a low-ability incum-
bent with poor-quality information. When the incumbent begins sufficiently ahead
of the challenger, a voter with an intermediate cost of attention will subject the
unpopular policy  to extra scrutiny, inducing a low-ability incumbent to sometimes
pander in order to avoid that scrutiny and ensure his reelection. Conversely, when
the incumbent begins sufficiently behind the challenger, a voter with an interme-
diate cost of attention will grant the popular policy  extra attention, inducing a
low-ability incumbent to sometimes pander in order to receive that attention and
potentially win reelection. Finally, rational voter attention generally tilted is favor
of the unpopular policy; it is therefore more likely to lead a strong incumbent to
“play it safe” and avoid the unpopular policy than a weak incumbent to “gamble for
resurrection” with the popular one.
3.6 Equilibrium Characterization
Having both ruled out fake leadership, and established when and why rational
voter attention can both eliminate and induce pandering, we now fully characterize
equilibrium. (In the Appendix we show that the equilibrium level of pandering in




We first provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the voter to pay “symmetric”
attention in equilibrium – i.e., the same level of attention after either policy. These




Lemma 14 In an equilibrium of the rational attention model, the voter pays the
same level of attention after either policy (d = d) if and only if either:
• 2 < min{q (0), q (0)}, so that the voter pays full attention after both policies
(d = d = 1) and the incumbent never panders
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)), so that the voter never pays attention after either
policy (d = d = 0), and the incumbent panders to the same degree f∗
#
as
in the CHS model






















Figure 3.5 depicts the two disjoint symmetric attention regions by graphing the
values of attention after each policy when the incumbent is believed to be truthful,
and when the incumbent is believed to be pandering at level f∗
#
. The darkness of
the lines indicates the policy (dark for , light for ), while the texture indicates
expected incumbent behavior (solid for truthful, dashed for pandering). When
the cost of attention is below the minimum of the values of attention q (0) =
min
{
q− (0) , q+ (0)
}
and q (0) = min
{
q− (0) , q+ (0)
}
when the voter believes
the incumbent to be truthful, the voterwill pay full attention after both policies, which
will indeed induce the incumbent to be truthful. These two values of attention cross
at a unique challenger reputation W ∈ (`, ¯̀). Conversely, when the cost of attention


































when the voter believes the incumbent to
be pandering at level f∗
#
≥ 0, then the voter will never pay attention after either
policy, and the incumbent will indeed behave as if attention is impossible. These
two values of attention again cross at a unique challenger reputation W̄ ∈ (W, ¯̀).
Asymmetric Attention
Having identified the conditions under which the voter will pay symmetric vs.
asymmetric attention in equilibrium, we next characterize which policy will elicit
more attention in equilibrium. For use in this and subsequent propositions, let
f
G ′,B′
G,B denote the level of pandering that satisfies the equality qGB (fG
′,B′





where G ∈ {, } and B ∈ {−, +}; so for example, f+
− is the level of pandering
that will induce the voter to equally value negative attention after policy  and
positive attention after policy .8 Further, by Lemma 9 we have that `G (fG+G−) = W.
In other words, the level of pandering fG+G− that equates the values of positive and
negative attention after a policy G is exactly the level of pandering that makes
the voter indifferent over retaining the incumbent after G absent attention. Thus,
in the (now obsolete) notation of Section 3.4 characterizing the CHS model, we
8In the Appendix we derive these six quantities more precisely and derive a variety of properties.
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Proposition 15 Suppose that the voter pays asymmetric attention in equilibrium.
• If W < W then the voter pays more attention after policy 
• If W > W̄ then the voter pays more attention after policy 




then the voter pays more attention after policy  () if








Figure 3.6 illustrates the regions of the parameter space within which the voter pays
more attention to each policy. A rational voter clearly exhibits a strong attentional
bias toward the unpopular policy , which is surprising given that it is the popular
policy  chosen by “panderers.” The intuition is as follows.
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Figure 3.6: Regions where attention is biased toward each policy
The voter’s willingness to pay attention to the unpopular policy  dominates if the
challenger is weak, when it is motivated by the incentive to discover the incumbent
made a mistake and should be replaced. Even in the presence of pandering, this
incentive is strong given B’s initial unpopularity and the strength of the evidence
about incumbent ability contained in a visible policy failure. Thus, under these
conditions there is a comparatively large range of attention values where the voter
is willing to pay attention after policy  but not policy . Conversely, the voter’s
willingness to pay attention to the popular policy  dominates if the challenger
is strong, when it is motivated by the incentive to discover that the incumbent
actually chose correctly and should be retained. However, the presence of a strong
challenger makes information about the incumbent less valuable overall; in addition,
a policy success is weaker evidence about the incumbent’s abilities than a policy
failure. Consequently, whenever the voter is more willing to pay more attention to
policy  than , she is also not very willing to pay attention overall. Finally, when
the incumbent is relatively even with the challenger, the voter pays attention to find
different types of information after each policy—specifically, she pays attention after
 to “catch” a low-ability incumbent who is pandering, but after  to “uncover” a
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high-ability incumbent who is exercising leadership. However, it is easier to do the
latter than the former—a low-ability panderer is so incompetent that he may actually
achieve a policy success when he meant to pander, but a high-ability leader will
always achieve a policy success when he meant to exercise leadership. Thus, under
these conditions the incentive to pay attention after  largely dominates.
Attention Favoring B
We next characterize the exact form of equilibrium when the voter pays more atten-
tion to , beginning with case of a low-ability incumbent who receives moderate-
quality information.
Proposition 16 Suppose that the voter pays more attention to policy  in equi-
librium, and a low-ability incumbent receives moderate-quality information (@ ∈
[@̄, @̂]). Then the voter always retains the incumbent outright after policy 
(a = 1 > d = 0).
• If the voter is willing to pay attention to  given truthfulness (2 < q (0)), then
then in equilibrium the incumbent is truthful, and the voter pays full attention
to  (d = 1).
• If the voter is unwilling to pay attention to  given truthfulness (2 > q (0)),
then in equilibrium the incumbent panders (f∗
'
> 0), but strictly less than in




), and the voter pays some attention to  (0 = a <
d < 1).
Equilibrium when a low-ability incumbent receives moderate-quality information is
depicted in Figure 3.7; the voter pays more attention to  in the lightly shaded area.
As described in Section 3.5, the incumbent is truthful when the voter is willing to
pay attention to  given the expectation of truthfulness. When she is not, the unique
equilibrium involves partial attention after  (d ∈ (0, 1) > d = 0)—just enough
to make a low-ability incumbent indifferent to pandering. The incumbent in turn
panders, but just enough to make the voter indifferent to paying attention after .
We next turn to the more complex case of a low-ability incumbent who receives
poor-quality information (@ ∈ (c, @̄)). As discussed in Section 3.5, when a low-
ability incumbent receives poor information, asymmetric attention can create or
exacerbate the incentive to pander. As a consequence, rational attention can have a
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Figure 3.7: Asymmetric attention equilibria with moderate information
variety of effects on the incumbent’s equilibrium behavior. It can decrease (but not
eliminate) pandering that would have otherwise occurred absent attention, induce
pandering that would not have occurred absent attention, and even worsen pandering
that would have already occurred absent attention.
Proposition 17 Suppose that the voter paysmore attention to policy  in equilibrium
and a low-ability incumbent receives poor-quality information (@ ∈ (c, @̄)) Then the
incumbent always panders (f∗
'
> 0) to avoid the attention that the unpopular policy
brings.
• If 2 < min{q− (f−− ), q

− (f+−)}, then the voter always pays attention after
policy  (d = 1) and sometimes after policy  (d ∈ (0, 1) and a = 1).
• If 2 > max{q− (f−− ), q

− (f+−)}, then the voter sometimes pays attention
after policy  (d ∈ (0, 1) and a = 1) and never after policy  (d = 0 and
a = 1).
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ρB ∈ (0, 1) > ρA = 0
νA = νB = 1
ρB = 1 > ρA ∈ (0, 1)
νA = 1
νA ∈ (0, 1)
ρB = 1 > ρA = 0 ρA ∈ (0, 1) > ρB = 0
νA = νB = 0
ρA = 1 > ρB ∈ (0, 1)
νB = 0
Figure 3.8: Asymmetric attention equilibria with poor information
• If 2 ∈ [q− (f+−), q

− (f+−)], then the voter always pays attention after policy
 (d = 1), and sometimes retains but never pays attention after policy 
(a ∈ (0, 1) and d = 0).
Equilibria when a low-ability incumbent receives poor-quality information are de-
picted in Figure 3.8. The voter pays more attention to  in the lightly shaded area,
and within this area there are three types of equilibria. In the first, the voter pays
a “high” amount of attention – always after policy  and sometimes after policy
. Moreover, the incumbent panders more as attention becomes costlier, because
this exacerbates the voter’s propensity to pay different levels of attention to the two
policies. For sufficiently high attention costs the incumbent actually panders strictly




), and choosing the popular policy  per-
versely becomes an unfavorable signal about the incumbent’s ability. In the second,
the voter pays a “medium” amount of attention—always after policy  and never
after policy —but sometimes replaces the incumbent outright after policy . The
incumbent’s pandering is unaffected by the cost of attention, but is strictly worse
than in the CHS model if incumbent is initially strong (` > W). In the third, the
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voter pays a “low” amount of attention—sometimes after policy  and never after
policy . Here the incumbent panders less as attention becomes costlier, because
this again diminishes the voter’s propensity to pay different levels of attention after
the two policies. Eventually, attention becomes too costly to be paid after either
policy, and equilibrium becomes identical to the CHS model.
Attention Favoring 
We last characterize equilibriumwhen the voter’s attention is biased toward , again
beginning with the case of a low-ability incumbent who receives moderate-quality
information.
Proposition 18 Suppose that the voter pays more attention to policy  in equi-
librium, and a low-ability incumbent receives moderate-quality information (@ ∈
[@̄, @̂]). Then the voter always replaces the incumbent outright after policy 
(a = d = 0).
• If the voter is willing to pay attention to  given truthfulness (2 < q (0)),
then in equilibrium the incumbent is truthful, and the voter pays full attention
after  (d = 1).
• If the voter is unwilling to pay attention to  given truthfulness (2 > q (0)),
then in equilibrium the incumbent panders (0 < f∗
'
) but strictly less than




), and the voter pays some attention after 
(0 = a < d < 1).
The voter pays more attention to  in the darkly shaded area of Figure 3.7; the
structure of equilibriumclosely resembles the case of a voterwho paysmore attention
to policy .
Conversely, when a low-ability incumbent receives low-quality information, equi-
librium with attention favoring  is as follows.
Proposition 19 Suppose that the voter pays more attention to policy  in equilib-
rium and a low-ability incumbent receives poor-quality information (@ ∈ (c, @̄).
Then the incumbent always panders (f∗
'
> 0) to seek the attention that the popular
policy brings.
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• If 2 < q+ (f++ ), then the voter always pays attention after policy  (d
 = 1)
and sometimes after policy  (d ∈ (0, 1) and a = 0).
• If 2 > q+ (f++ ), then the voter sometimes pays attention after policy 
(d ∈ (0, 1) and a = 0) and never after policy  (d = a = 0).
The voter pays more attention to  in the darkly shaded area of Figure 3.8. The
structure of equilibrium again resembles the case of a voter who pays more attention
to policy  in that there are also high and low-attention regions, and within these
regions a higher cost of attention affects pandering in the same manner as previously
discussed. However, there is no equilibrium in which the voter always pays attention
after  and never after  (and therefore sometimes retains outright after ). Such
an equilibrium would require the incumbent to be weak, the voter to be willing to
retain her after , but to also be more willing to pay attention after . However, the
voter will only retain a weak incumbent who chooses  if she believes pandering
to be very severe—so severe that she will also become more optimistic about ’s
prospects for success, and more willing to pay attention to it.
3.7 Voter Welfare
Since rational voter attention sometimes comes at the expense of electoral account-
ability, we conclude our analysis by comparing the voter’s equilibrium utility in the
rational attention model and the CHS model absent attention. This comparison can
be interpreted in two ways. First, it could represent the difference between a setting
in which the voter’s attention costs are low enough that the ability to pay attention
meaningfully impacts her behavior, and one in which those costs are so prohibitive
that it is as if attention is impossible. Second, it could represent the comparison
between a setting in which the information sources that the voter can pay attention
to actually contain useful information about incumbent performance, and one in
which those information sources are either absent or uninformative.
To ease the exposition we first provide a simplified characterization of the voter’s
utility difference between the two models that exploits properties of equilibrium.
Lemma 20 The voter’s equilibrium utility difference between the rational attention
and CHS models may be written as
*'+ −*#+ = Pr (H = ) ·max
{
qB − 2, 0
}
+ Pr (H = ) ·max
{
qB − 2, 0
}




, where B = − if W ≤ ` and B = + if W ≥ `.
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All quantities are evaluated with respect to f∗
'
unless explicitly indicated otherwise.
The voter’s utility difference between the two models consists of two components.
The first is the second-period selection benefit of being able to learn the policy
outcome andmake a better-informed retention decision. This benefit in turn consists
of the unconditional probability Pr(H = G) that each policy will be chosen, times
the value of attention qGB conditional on that policy being chosen less the cost 2 of





(which is actually a benefit if attention also reduces pandering).
With this characterization in hand, it is simple to state the welfare consequences of
attention when a low-ability incumbent receives moderate information (@ ∈ [@̄, @̂])).
Proposition 21 When a low-ability incumbent receives moderate-quality informa-
tion, the voter is always weakly better off in the rational attention model, and strictly
better off i.f.f. she pays some attention in equilibrium (∃ G ∈ {, } s.t. dG > 0).
As previously discussed, when a low-ability incumbent receives moderate-quality
information, even asymmetric attention will restore his incentive to be truthful.
Consequently, in equilibrium the ability to pay attention always weakly benefits the
voter, and strictly benefits her when she actually pays some attention in equilibrium
(since attention is always associatedwith strictly better accountability and sometimes
strictly better selection as well).
In the case of an incumbent who receives poor-quality information (@ ∈ [c, @̄]),
there is a potential tradeoff between accountability and selection as follows.
Proposition 22 When a low-ability incumbent receives poor-quality information,
there is a unique cost cutpoint 2̂(W) such that that the voter is strictly worse off in





9Worth noting is that the selection benefit is calculated as if the voter will always have a favorable
posture (adversarial) posture toward an initially strong (weak) incumbent, even if these are not her
equilibrium postures in the rational attention model. The reason is that they are her equilibrium
postures in the CHS model. To clarify the implications of this subtlety, consider an initially-strong
incumbent who panders in both models (so W ∈ [ ¯̀, `]), but to a lesser degree in the rational
attention model (so ` < W and d = 1). Then in equilibrium the voter actually looks for positive
information after policy , so the true interim benefit of attention is q+ . The expression in Lemma
20 then embeds an additional selection benefit q− − q+ that the voter would enjoy from reduced
pandering were she to deviate to paying no attention after .
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• If W < `, then 2̂(W) ∈ (q− (0),max{q− (f−− ), q

− (f−+ )})
• If W ∈ (W̄, ¯̀GG), then 2̂(W) ∈ (q+ (0), q+ (f++ ))





Figure 3.9 recreates Figure 3.8, but explicitly indicates the two regions within which
rational attention strictly harms voter welfare. Although the notation of Proposition
22 is cumbersome, the interpretation is straightforward. First, it is immediate that
within the two “attention-avoidance” and “attention-seeking” regions where the
voter’s attention is also low (1 > dG > 0 = d¬G), the voter must be strictly worse
off in the rational attention model. The reason is that within these regions, the
voter enjoys no selection benefit from paying attention (since she either strictly or
weakly prefers not to), but suffers a strictly positive accountability cost (since the
incumbent panders strictly more than in the CHS model). Second, moving away
from the boundaries of these regions—by either lowering the cost of attention 2
or shrinking the difference in candidate reputations |W − ` |—must strictly increase
voter welfare through some combination of better selection and better accountability.
Finally, along the boundaries that separate the asymmetric attention and full attention
regions, the voter must be strictly better off in the rational attention model, since she
enjoys a strictly positive selection benefit from attention but no accountability cost
(since the incumbent is truthful).
3.8 Conclusion
In this paper we consider a variant of the canonical political agency model of ?
in which the voter must pay an attention cost to learn about the consequences of
the incumbent’s policy. Our model is intended to study political accountability in
environmentswhere it is not information about incumbent performance that is scarce,
but rather the voters’ attention in consuming and processing such information.
Our key findings are as follows. First, rational voter attention will be asymmetric
across different policy alternatives when the voter’s cost of attention is moderate.
The reason is that the voter’s willingness to pay attention is determined by his belief
that such attention will uncover information that reverses his voting intention based
on the observed policy alone, and these beliefs generically differ across the twopolicy
alternatives if one is initially more-popular. Specifically, if the voter’s current voting
intention is to retain the incumbent, then she will only pay attention to uncover a
failure that would justify replacing him. Alternatively, if her current voting intention
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γ̄
ρB ∈ (0, 1) > ρA = 0
νA = νB = 1 ρA ∈ (0, 1) > ρB = 0
νA = νB = 0
Figure 3.9: Where rational voter attention strictly worsens voter welfare.
is to replace the incumbent, then she will only pay attention to uncover a success
that would justify retaining him. These effects make a rational voter generally more
willing to pay attention after an unpopular policy than a popular one. The reason
is that the prospects for uncovering a “leader” who chose the unpopular policy are
better than the prospects for uncovering a “panderer” who chose the popular policy.
Second, rational attention can improve electoral accountability—by rewarding the
incumbent with attention for choosing the unpopular policy, punishing the incum-
bent with attention for choosing the popular policy, or both. However, it can also
harm electoral accountability, by giving an ex-ante strong incumbent an incentive
to choose the policy that evades attention, or by giving an ex-ante weak-incumbent
an incentive to choose the policy that draws it. Both of these effects can worsen
pandering relative to a setting in which the voter cannot learn about policy con-
sequences at all, and these effects can be sufficiently strong to harm voter welfare
despite the improvement in selection that attention brings. However, they cannot
induce the phenomenon of fake leadership (choosing the ex-ante unpopular policy
to draw or evade attention attention) as uncovered in the original ? model with
exogenous information revelation.
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Our positive results about rational voter attention yield several testable empirical
implications. First, if “paying attention” in the model is interpreted as an increase
in the consumption of political media, then a clear implication is that it is unpopular
policy choices that will generally drive political media consumption. Moreover, the
model suggests that this increased media consumption will be specifically motivated
by the desire to “find reasons” that the incumbent’s policy choice was not as mis-
guided as it appeared to be. Second, the model adds to the set of conditions under
which incumbent politicians can be expected to follow public opinion. The classic ?
model highlights the relationship between pandering and electoral competitiveness.
To this we add a relationship between pandering and the sensitivity of voters’ con-
sumption of political information. If voters’ consumption of political information
is largely insensitive to policy choice—either because they always consume a great
deal of it or little to none—then incumbents will be more likely to follow their own
guidance. However, if voters’ consumption of political information is very sensitive
to policy choice—because doing so is somewhat but not prohibitively costly—then
incumbentswill bemore likely to follow popular opinion to shape those consumption
choices.
Finally, with respect to implications about voter welfare the model adds to a small
but growing literature that identifies reasons why improving voters’ informational
environment—either by improving the accuracy of information sources or by low-
ering the costs to voters of acquiring political information—may be a double edged
sword for both politicians and voters (e.g. ?). In our model, both may be harmed
by such improvements if they do not overcome, or even exacerbate, the propensity
of rational voters to apply different levels of scrutiny to different policy choices.
Our model also suggests several avenues for future research; we comment on two in
particular. First, a now large literature considers voters’ choices over the consump-
tion of biased media (?????). Our model can be easily extended in this direction by
allowing the voter to choose between two binary noisy signals of the incumbent’s
policy outcome when she pays attention—one that is biased in favor of the incum-
bent, and another that is biased against. Since a key feature of the model’s logic is
that the voter is looking for something in particular when she pays attention, such
an extension could shed light on how voters’ choice of news media is influenced
by both an incumbent’s actual policy choices and by his competitive environment.
Second, an existing literature examines what sort of media landscape best promotes
well-informed voting and political accountability (???). An extension of our model
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could shed further light on this question by having the voter choose whether to pay
attention to a noisy (rather than perfect) binary signal about incumbent performance,
and analyzing features of the conditional probability distribution over this signal that
improve or maximize voter welfare once her rational attention decisions are taken
into consideration. In particular, the logic of the model suggests that democratic
accountability may be improved if the media environment is biased in a manner that
somehow counterbalances the voter’s natural propensity to apply different levels of
scrutiny to different policy choices. We hope to explore these and other avenues in
future work.
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C h a p t e r 4
FORMAL REQUIREMENTS ON COSTLY INFORMATION
4.1 Introduction
Motivation
The U.S. government heavily relies on federal advisory committees that provide
recommendations for different government agencies. The Federal Advisory Com-
mittee Act (FACA) limits the power of these committees to administer advice, which
may or may not be used by a specific government agency or the executive branch.
Even though the committees do not make any policy decisions, their overall level of
influence is high. There is strong empirical evidence suggesting that these commit-
tees often make biased recommendations. As a consequence, the literature mainly
assumes their preferences are biased, and the majority of the work on this topic ex-
plores agency problem between government agencies and these biased committees.1
We take research on federal advisory committees a step further in this study, for-
mulating a formal theoretic model that explains where the bias in elected policies
comes from, even when the final policy decision is made by an unbiased commit-
tee. We also show how procedural requirements can be imposed by the committee
itself (rather than upon them) in order to improve the fairness of the policy choice
and increase overall welfare. Our approach suggests that bias in policy decisions
stems from another agency problemwithin the committee’s working procedures that
cannot be resolved with standard "auditing" or procedural requirements often used
in the bureaucratic oversight literature. We illustrate how the optimal mechanism
based on formal requirements might work.
We construct a model with an unbiased principal (committee) who makes a final
policy choice optimal for the unobserved binary state of the world. The principal
relies on a proposal consisting of private/soft and public/hard information from the
biased agent (the proposer). The agent’s preferences are biased toward electing the
highest possible policy. Private information is costless for the agent and unverifiable
for the principal. Public information requires some costly effort from the agent, this
information is publicly observable and unfalsifiable. We analyze the equilibria
1There is a small empirical literature on the effects of administrative procedures on agency
performance (????).
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of two different models: (1) the agent can freely choose the amount of costly
public information supporting her proposal; and (2) the principal imposes formal
requirements on the amount of public information conditional on the private report
from the agent. Since the agent has private information and her preferences are
biased, our problem is a mix of the literature on delegated information acquisition
and the persuasion literature. The idea is that if the principal does not control the
amount of public information required, the biased agent can manipulate it in her
favor to induce higher policy outcomes.
In order to better understand ourmotivation, we apply ourmodel toMedicare pricing
of medical services. The committee of physicians, also known as the RVS Update
Committee (RUC), makes a final decision about the price of a specific medical
service based on the proposal made by the group of specialists/doctors (or just one
doctor).2 We assume that the committee wants to implement fair prices for medical
services. In the real world, proposers have to provide a subjective opinion based on
their expertise (soft information) as well as the results of a survey (hard information)
to support their price evaluation. The fact that proposers usually perform themedical
service under considerationmakes their preferences biased towards higher prices. In
reality, the proposer is free to choose the number of people surveyed and this number
varies across the proposals. Therefore, the proposer could in principle manipulate
the number of people surveyed to achieve higher prices.
Our results support this intuition. When agents freely choose the amount of public
information, for a relatively costless public signal they do not reveal their private
information. Instead, in the best possible equilibrium for the principal, the agent
always acquires the maximum public information (not revealing her private signal)
and the principal makes a decision just based on this information. However, for
relatively costly public signals, separation is possible. In equilibrium, the agent
observing the low private signal acquires no public information and her proposal
consists of only her report of the private signal. Since the agent with a low private
signal expects the public signal to also point towards the lower policy choice, she
decides not to acquire any in order to avoid such an undesirable outcome. The
preferences of the agent observing the high private signal coincide with those of
the principal. In equilibrium, such an agent acquires some small amount of public
signal, just enough to differentiate herself from the low agent and make her report
of private signal believable.
2Medicare uses a physician payment system based on the resource-based relative value scale
(RBRVS).
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In contrast, when the principal can impose formal requirements on the amount of
public signal, the amount of public signal serves two different purposes: (1) more
public signal increases the precision of the policy choice; and (2) the number of
surveys can be used as a tool for extracting the private signal from the agent, if
the requirements of the principal are conditioned on the "soft information" reported
by the proposer. Our analysis shows that if public information is too cheap, it
fails to serve the second purpose. However, for high enough costs, the optimal
mechanism requires maximum evidence (in terms of public signal) to support the
proposal with high private report. Since the low private report goes against the
agent’s preferences, such a proposal must be accompanied by less public evidence.
This mechanism incentivizes the agent to reveal her low private signal by relieving
her of some of the burden of acquiring a costly public signal.
Welfare analysis shows where the benefits of formal requirements come from. For
high enough costs, separation (truthfully revealing the agent’s private information) is
possible in both models. However, the motivation andmechanism behind separation
are different based onwho takes control over the possible amount of the public signal.
When the decision is in the agent’s hand, the agent with a high private signal acquires
just enough public signal to differentiate herself from the low agent.3 As the cost
of the public signal increases, it gets easier for the high type to make her private
report believable and, therefore, she collects even less public signal, decreasing
the principal’s welfare. In contrast, if the principal puts formal requirements on
the public signal, then in separating equilibrium, the costly public signal is used
as a mechanism to encourage the low type to reveal her private signal by lifting
some of the burden of public proof. When the public signal is costly, the formal
requirement is a more effective tool in the principal’s hand for separation and he can
compromise less on the public signal from the low type. Overall, when the principal
imposes formal requirements, his equilibrium expected welfare is increasing in cost
of information.
Another interesting finding is that agents sometimes separate when the principal
would prefer to disregard their private reports for the sake of a better public signal. If
the private signal is not too valuable and the cost of the public signal is intermediate,
in absence of formal requirements, the agentwould truthfully reveal her own type and
exert little effort in public signal. Meanwhile, for the same parameters, the principal
does not find the separation worth forgoing some amount of public signal. When
3We refer to the private signal of the agent as her type.
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principal imposes formal requirements, he would rather require maximum public
signal from everyone and make a policy decision solely based on the maximum
public information.
To summarize, there is empirical evidence that government advisory committees
generate biased policy decisions. So far, the literature has primarily focused on
assessing the influence of various procedural restrictions imposed by government
agencies on these advisory committees (such as transparency, providing feedback
on committee recommendations, etc.), assuming that their preferences are biased.
Despite their overall influence, however, little theoretical research has been done
exploring how these committees work and where the bias in their decisions comes
from. Our paper points out the apparent flow in the operating procedures of the
advisory committees (allowing the proposer to choose the amount of public signal),
resulting in biased decisions even with unbiased principal. We explore the optimal
mechanism for procedural requirements within the advisory committee and show
how it improves the final policy choice and the overall welfare.
The setup in this chapter is not uncommon in many principal-agent relationships.
When the agent has soft private information, usually there is a possibility to require
costly verifiable information as well (such as additional market research or cost-
benefit analysis, etc.). Therefore, even though the main application of our model is
to advisory committees, it can be applied to any principal agent problem with the
possibility of costly (for the agent) verifiable public information.
Related Literature
Our paper relates to a large literature on agency problems in political science, es-
pecially in bureaucratic oversight. The types of bureaucratic control can be divided
into two major categories (?): ex-post oversight with direct auditing of the bureau-
crat’s actions (?) or indirect control based on fire alarm system from interest groups
(?), and ex-ante prevention using different procedural requirements (??). The latter
is the focus of this chapter. Proponents of the positive theory of administrative pro-
cedure have demonstrated that employing procedural requirements for legislative
oversight has various benefits. On the other hand, supporters of the "ossification
thesis" (???????) believe that procedural constraints obstruct the efficient operation
of many agencies. The majority of the work on this topic focuses on the interac-
tion between elected officials (such as the president or Congress) and government
agencies whose operations show that their preferences are biased. Instead, we con-
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centrate on specifics of the decision making process of the advisory committee to
explore the agency problem within, and use verifiable costly information to partially
resolve it.
Since the principal in our model uses a costly verifiable public signal to check the
soft/private reports of the agent, our paper also relates to the literature on costly
verification (???) and more closely ? who study the general delegation framework
with costly but feasible verification. The main difference is that "auditing" in our
model is a continuous decision since the principal has to choose the effort level
4 ∈ [0, 1] and the outcome/precision of the audit is not perfect but depends on this
effort level. Moreover, in our case, the "cost of the audit" is completely born by the
agent who has state independent preferences.
The main model in this study depicts a situation in which the principal controls
the agent’s effort level in acquiring the public signal but is unable to commit to
an arbitrary decision rule. This model can be classified as a mechanism design
problem with limited commitment. The initial motivation of the paper originates
from the literature on persuasion with a biased and informed agent. ? find the
necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a signal that strictly benefits
the sender. In their example, under specific conditions, an agent could construct
a truthful signal that would bring her a favorable outcome. Similarly, if there are
no formal requirements from the principal, the proposer who always favors higher
Medicare prices might be able to construct a signal that would be beneficial for her
(although she is now constrained by the evidence from surveys).
More relevant to our example are the findings of ? about biased election organiza-
tions. According to their model, if voters are uncertain about which state is correct
but they do not know the size of the electorate, the organizer can ensure a favorable
outcome with high probability. The authors show that when the number of partici-
pants across states is exogenous but dependent on the state, a biased equilibrium can
be sustained in large elections. In their model, the organizer should know the state
in advance. This assumption is applicable to our case assuming that the proposer
has a good sense of fair prices. The findings of this paper suggest that, even without
the assumption that the incentive compatibility of voters is automatically satisfied,
the proposer could manipulate the number of people surveyed and guarantee that the
outcome of the survey supports her claim about high prices with high probability.
Consequently, prices of medical services will be biased up if the committee bases
its decision on the results of this survey.
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As already mentioned, ? find empirical support for this hypothesis. The authors
also investigate how bias in prices increases with the affiliation of the committee.
The difference in our case is that we assume there is no affiliation since the proposer
is biased but the committee always wants fair prices. As we will briefly discuss
in the last section, introducing partial bias for the committee could be one of the
possible extensions of our model.
Findings in the literature about persuasion suggest that the current mechanism used
by the RUC, not regulating the number of people surveyed, could result in higher
prices. In this paper we show how the RUC can use formal requirements for the
amount of hard information gathered to ensure more equitable prices on medical
services. A similar question has been investigated by ?. The authors undertake a
game theoretic approach to compare outcomes of three different setups, relaxing the
full commitment assumption in different ways. The authors do not use a mechanism
design approach, and unlike our case, their model does not assume preexisting
private information of the agent.
This paper is also related to the literature studying task delegation both in continuous
and discrete time structures. One significant difference, however, is that we do not
model sequential search. The player who has the authority decides an effort level
to acquire public signal (which can be thought of as the amount of public signal
gathered). Moreover, the majority of the literature about delegation focuses on the
moral hazard problem, which is not relevant in our case since the effort level exerted
is public information and the agent is not able to falsify or hide the public signal. The
effort level can affect the utility of the principal directly through the output (??) or
indirectly through the informativeness of the signal (?). In this model, we undertake
the second approach, linking the costly effort to the informativeness of the public
signal. An important feature of the model is the pre-existing private information of
the agent, which is valuable for the principal.
The rest of this chapter is organized in the following way: Section 2 formally sets
up the model for the problem discussed so far. Section 3 does some preliminary
analysis for the optimal policy choice. Section 4 shows pooling and separating
equilibria for the biased agent who has the authority to choose her own effort level
but the principal makes the final decision. This case is the closest to the real-world
procedure of deciding prices of medical services by the RUC. Section 5 analyzes the
optimal mechanism for the main model in which the principal formally requires a
certain level of effort after each report of soft information from the agent but cannot
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commit to a decision rule. Section 6 is devoted to the welfare comparison of the two
models and further explains the mechanism through which the formal requirements
increase welfare. Formal proofs as well as the exact values for cutoffs and bounds
for the regions of the parameter space are provided in the appendix.
4.2 The Model
We consider a one-periodmodel with two players: the principal (RUC) and the agent
(specialist in an area who makes a proposal). In order to avoid pronoun confusion,
we refer to the principal as "he" and the agent as "she." Nature draws a binary state
l ∈ {0, 1} which determines the desirable policy choice for the principal.4 The
principal has to make a final policy decision G ∈ [0, 1]. With respect to the RUC
example, a state of the world can be interpreted as the true price of a certain medical
procedure being either high (1) or low (0).
Information: The agent receives a private signal B about the state of the world. The
precision of this signal is \, meaning:
%(B = 1|l = 1) = %(B = 0|l = 0) = \,
where \ ∈ [0.5, 1] can be interpreted as the competence level of the agent. Even
without further investigation, based on her professional opinion, the proposer has
some idea about the difficulty of the procedure. If the agent is completely incompe-
tent, \ = 12 , then she has no prior information and thinks that both states are equally
likely. A perfectly competent agent, \ = 1, instead knows the correct state with
certainty. The principal knows the competence level of the agent \ but he does not
observe the signal B. The principal’s prior about the state being 1 is 0.5.
The agent can acquire additional public information 8 ∈ {0, 1}, but the precision and
the cost of this signal are proportional to the effort level. The cost of the effort level
4 ∈ [0, 1] is quadratic 2(4) = 242, where 2 > 0. The precision of the public signal
depends on the effort level in the following way:
%(8 = 1|l = 1) = %(8 = 0|l = 0) = <(4) = 0.5(0.54 + 1),
<(4) is the informativeness/precision of the public signal. If the effort level is
0 (<(4) = 0.5), then the signal is random. Since <(4) is increasing in 4, the
probability of getting the correct public signal increases with effort. The public
information acquired by the agent in the RUC example is the surveys filled out by
4We assume that the agent has a state-independent preference.
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different doctors and the effort is the relative number of filled surveys. Observe that
for 4 = 1, we have <(4 = 1) = 0.75 < 1, meaning that even if the agent invests
maximum effort in the public signal, it will never be certain.5 This assumption is
logical for our example, since no matter how many questionnaires are filled out,
their informativeness is always limited (due to the structure of the questionnaires as
well as the knowledge of the unknown procedure by the doctors in related fields,
and their incentives to invest time and effort in being as precise as possible).
Utilities: Depending on the true state of the world and the policy choice G, players’
utilities are:
*? = −(l − G)2;
* = −(1 − G).
These utilities show that the principal cares about "fairness" and therefore wants to
implement correct prices, while the agent is biased toward the highest policy. Since
the proposer’s future income directly depends on the price of the medical service
under consideration, she wants higher prices regardless of the real difficulty of the
procedure.6
We characterize strategies for players in our main model where the principal chooses
the effort level but cannot make an arbitrary policy decision. For this paper, we only
consider pure strategies:
• The strategy of the agent is to choose private report based on the realization
of her private signal B̃ : {0, 1} → {0, 1}.
• The principal chooses the effort level for each report from the agent 4 :
{0, 1} → [0, 1].
The principal also makes a final policy decision G( B̃, 8, 4( B̃)) ∈ [0, 1] after observing
the public signal and the private report. We consider the model where the principal
cannot commit to an arbitrary decision rule for the policy choice. Rather, he has
to make an interim rational policy decision based on his posterior belief about the
5This assumption is needed to rule out a trivial solution when the principal always requires
maximum effort in the public signal and finds out the true state with certainty. The nature of the
results stays the same if we vary this upper limit.
6Preliminary analysis shows that similar results should be achieved with a quadratic utility
function for the agent as well. However, the exact calculations and closed-form solutions are easier
to achieve with this utility function.
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state, conditional on public information, private report, and his own beliefs. In the
case of the RUC, the meetings are regulated and transparent to make sure the prices
are fair. Since the goal is to match the state, the decision depends on the posterior
beliefs after both private and public signals have been observed (given the effort
level).
The sequence: The sequence of the game where the principal imposes formal
requirements on the effort level is the following:
0) The principal commits to a mechanism requiring certain effort levels based
on private reports of the agent.
1) Nature decides the state l and private report of the agent B.
2) The agent observes her private signal B and decides what to report to the
principal B̃(B).
3) The principal requires the effort level from the agent, based on her private
report 4( B̃) as described in (0).
4) The agent invests 4( B̃(B)) effort in the public signal and the public signal is
realized.
5) The principal observes the public signal and a policy decision is made.
6) Utilities are realized.
It is important to notice that the agent cannot hide public information and has to
invest the effort level asked. This assumption is intuitive in the RUC example, since
the proposer has to collect the number of surveys required by the RUC and she
cannot tamper with their results.
For comparison, we also consider the model where the agent freely chooses the
effort level they want to invest in the public signal. This allows us to compare how
the costly effort can be used in equilibrium by the biased agent in order to induce
higher policy choices.
4.3 Preliminary Analysis: Policy Decision
Given our assumption regarding the policy choice discussed earlier, we can calculate
the policy choices after each information set. Since the principal has a quadratic
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utility function, we already know that his interim rational policy decision is the pos-
terior belief about the state of the world. We can use the Bayes Rule to characterize
policy choices depending on each information set for different effort levels.
Observation 3 If the principal observes public signal 8 and believes that the re-
alization of the private signal is B, the policy choice follows the Bayes Rule and
equals:
G00 = %(l = 1|B = 0, 8 = 0) =
(1 − <(4)) (1 − \)
(1 − <(4)) (1 − \) + <(4)\ ;
G01 = %(l = 1|B = 0, 8 = 1) =
<(4) (1 − \)
<(4) (1 − \) + (1 − <(4))\ ;
G10 = %(l = 1|B = 1, 8 = 0) =
(1 − (<(4))\
<(4) (1 − \) + (1 − <(4))\ ;
G11 = %(l = 1|B = 1, 8 = 1) =
<(4)\
(1 − <(4)) (1 − \) + <(4)\ ,
where G 9 ,8 to denotes a policy choice after observing 9 private and 8 public signals.
These policy choices are relevant in separating equilibria, where the agent chooses
different effort levels depending on the realization of her private signal (and for
off-path beliefs in pooling equilibria). As for the policy choice when the agent pools
on the same effort level regardless of their private signal:
Observation 4 If the agent chooses the same effort level regardless of her private
signal, in equilibrium the principal disregards her private reports for this particular
effort level and makes a policy decision solely based on the public signal.
Imagine by contradiction that the agent always chooses effort level 4 but the principal
trusts her private report B̃ as well. For the same public signal, the principal always
makes a lower policy choice after observing a low private signal than after observing
a high one: G0,8 < G1,8 for 8 ∈ {0, 1}. Since the effort levels are the same, the low-type
agent wants to report a high private signal and get a higher policy choice. Therefore,
everyone has an incentive to report a high private signal and the principal should
entirely disregard it. With a biased agent, when the agents pool on the same effort
level, the private report simply becomes cheap talk.
Corollary 23 In the pooling equilibrium, after observing low and high public
signals and equilibrium effort level 4, the principal’s optimal policy choices are
G∗0 = 1 − <(4) G
∗
1 = <(4) respectively.
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This corollary directly follows from Observation 2 using Bayes Rule.
4.4 Agent Decides Effort
We now consider the case of a biased agent who decides by herself how much
effort to exert into the public signal after each realization of her private signal. This
arrangement is closer to the reality of how the RUC operates. There is no official
requirement for the number of surveys and the proposer decides this amount. The
principal cannot commit to the decision rule and chooses his action according to his
posterior belief. For the welfare comparison, we restrict our attention to equilibria
that provide the highest expected payoff to the principal.
Separating Equilibrium
We consider the best separating equilibrium for the principal that satisfies the Intu-
itive Criterion. In separating equilibria, 40 denotes the effort level selected by the
agent with low private information and 41 denotes the effort level selected by the
agent with high private information.7
Observation 5 When the agent decides effort: in a separating equilibrium, 40
should maximize the low-type agent’s expected utility over 4 ∈ [0, 1] when treated
as a low type.
In a separating equilibrium, for the same effort level, the agent gets strictly more
utility when considered as a high type than a low type. Therefore, regardless of
the beliefs of the principal (on and off path), if 40 does not maximize the low
agent’s utility when treated as a low type, she will have a profitable deviation to the
maximizer. The expected utility of a low (high) type, if considered as low (high),
can be written as:
*!! = −
[
%(8 = 0|B = 0) (1 − G00) + %(8 = 1|B = 0) (1 − G01)
]






%(8 = 0|B = 1) (1 − G10) + %(8 = 1|B = 1) (1 − G11)
]




The first part of the expected utilities are the benefits of effort and the second part
are the costs. Observe that G00, G01 in these equations also depends on 40 through
7We refer to the private information of the agent as her type.
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= 2240 > 0. The marginal
benefits instead can be further simplified to
!! = −\;
 = −(1 − \).
As we can see, the marginal benefit does not depend on the level of effort in the
public signal when the principal correctly assumes the agent’s type. This is not
surprising since from the point of view of the agent, the expected decision made by
the principal (correctly believing the agent’s type) equals  (G) = Pr(l = 1|B) and it
does not vary in the precision <(4) of the public signal. Moreover, in a separating
equilibrium, we cannot have 4′ < 40 such that the principal believes the agent is the
high type when exerting 4′ level of effort. In such a case, the low-type agent would
have a profitable deviation to 4′ being considered the high type (which results in
higher policy choice for the same realizations of the public signal) and having to
spend less cost on effort. These two observations imply that the low-type agent will
always exert 0 effort in separating equilibrium, i.e, 4=0 = 0.
Since *

is also decreasing in effort, 41 in separating equilibria should be the
lowest effort level for which the principal believes that the agent is a high type;
otherwise, the high agent will have a profitable deviation.
If the low type is treated as a high type by the principal, her expected utility is:
*! = −
[
%(8 = 0|B = 0) (1 − G10) + %(8 = 1|B = 0) (1 − G11)
]
− 2421.
Claim 1 When the agent decides effort: if the low-type agent is considered to be
the high type, her expected utility is decreasing in 41.
This claim is intuitive since the low-type agent expects the public signal to agree
with her private signal and point toward the lower policy choice. Moreover, a higher
effort level 41 would both decrease the expected policy choice further and increase
the cost of effort. Therefore, the low type, when considered as the high type, prefers
the lowest possible effort level for 41.





(4=1). If this inequality is strict, a separating equilibrium will fail the Intuitive
Criterion. For 4 = 4=1 − n with n > 0 small enough, the principal believes that the
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agent is a low type, but given themost favorable strategy of the principal (considering
the agent a high type), only the high agent will want to deviate to this effort level
(the expected utility of both agents when considered as a high type is decreasing
in effort). With this belief of the principal (considering 4 to come from the high
agent), a high type will always want to lower her effort to 4. Thus, we consider 4=1






Proposition 24 When the agent decides effort: a separating equilibrium only exists
for high enough costs 2 > 3−6\−3−4\+4\2 ≡ 2̄. In this equilibrium, the low type exerts








(4=1). The off-path beliefs are assuming the agent to be a
high type i.f.f. 4 ≥ 4=1. This equilibrium satisfied the Intuitive Criterion.
In the appendix, we show that there is a unique effort level 4∗1 for the high type
that makes the low type indifferent between reporting either private signal. We also
check that the high agent does not have an incentive to deviate to any point below







This separating equilibrium once again proves the disadvantage of letting the agent
choose their own effort. When the agent can choose the level of effort they want
to exert in acquiring a public signal, the agent with a low private signal exerts no
effort whatsoever, while the agent who believes the true state is high exerts just high
enough effort to differentiate herself from the low agent. This result agrees with
empirical observation of ? stating that in case of RUC, "the sample sizes of the
survey are extraordinarily small."
When the agent chooses the effort level, the separating equilibrium only exists for
a high enough cost that keeps the low agent from deviating and pretending to have
a high signal just to increase the final policy choice (even exerting the maximum
effort). Increasing the effort level has two disadvantages for the low type: effort
is costly, the public signal is likely to decrease the policy decision even more
with higher effort. When the cost is very low, 2 < 2̄, the first concern becomes
insignificant. Moreover, since the public signal is never perfect (even with the
maximum effort), sometimes the low type would rather be considered a high type,
exert maximum effort and hope that the public signal disagrees with her private
beliefs (as opposed to being considered a low type, exerting no effort, and getting a
8This condition is simplified since for 2 > 3−6\−3−4\+4\2 , the high type who is considered as low,
always prefers lowest level of effort 40 = 0.
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low policy choice). This is the reason why the separation is not possible below the
cost cutoff 2̄.
Even though both agent types have the same ex-ante preferences, what drives the
separation is that after observing their private signals, their interests diverge. Mostly,
divergence is due to the fact that the agents have opposite direct preferences for<(4)
and consequently for effort. If we fix the decision rule, the high agent’s benefit is
increasing in effort, while the low agent’s benefit is decreasing, due to agents’
expectations over whether the public signal is going to push the decision toward
their preferred policy 1. Next, we characterize pooling equilibria when the agent
chooses the effort level.
Pooling Equilibria
There are multiple pooling equilibria of this model supported by different off-path
beliefs. For instance, one trivial pooling equilibrium is when the agent (regardless
of her effort level) always exerts zero effort in the public signal. Therefore, the
principal chooses a high or low policy with equal probabilities. The off-path beliefs
of the principal are to assume that anyone exerting positive effort has a low private
signal. Observe that this is the worst case for the principal since he receives no
information (public or private) and just randomly makes the decision according to
his prior belief. For comparison with the main model where the principal decides
the effort levels, we will ignore these kinds of equilibria and consider only the best
possible pooling equilibrium (pooling at the highest possible effort level) for the
principal.
If (4, G∗0, G
∗
1) is a pooling equilibrium, the principal should believe that anyone who
exerts effort lower than 4 has a low private signal; otherwise, both types will have a
profitable deviation. Agents’ utilities from pooling are:
*%! = −
[





%(8 = 0|B = 1)<(4) + %(8 = 1|B = 1) (1 − <(4))
]
− 242.
The first-order condition shows that *%
!
is strictly decreasing in effort, i.e., the low
agent wants to pool at minimum effort. Similar to the separating equilibrium case,
the low agent should be weakly better off than her ideal effort when perceived as a
low type. In fact, since *%
!
is decreasing and we want the best possible case for
the principal (pooling at the highest effort), (1) either the low agent is indifferent
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between pooling and choosing her optimal effort when perceived as a low agent, or
(2) pooling occurs at the highest effort level 4 = 1 (if we make sure that the high
type does not want to deviate in either case). Since we have already seen that the
low type’s ideal effort level when considered low is 0, we can calculate the pooling
effort level.
Claim 2 When the agent decides effort: pooling has to always occur at an effort
level less than or equal to 4∗, with equality if there exists off-path beliefs that do not
make high type want to deviate.
4∗ =





−1+82+2\ if 2 > 0.375(2\ − 1)
.
Fixing the effort level, each type would rather be considered a high type than a low
type. This is true because G08 < G18 for 8 ∈ {0, 1} for any realization of the public
signal: a final policy choice is higher if the principal believes the private report was
high as well. Therefore, the easiest off-path belief to sustain the pooling equilibrium
is considering anyone who exerts 4 ≠ 4∗ to be the low type.
Proposition 25 When the agent decides effort: in the best pooling equilibrium for
the principal the agent pools at the same effort level 4= = 4∗ described in the
previous claim. The off-path beliefs are assuming the agent to be a low type. For
cost low enough, 2 < 2̄, where the separating equilibrium does not exist, this pooling
equilibrium also satisfies the Intuitive Criterion.
As shown on the graph below, for low cost, the agent pools on the maximum effort
level 4∗ = 1, and the low type is strictly better off choosing 4∗ over 4 = 0. In the
case when pooling occurs on an intermediate effort level 4∗ < 1 (higher cost), the
low-type agent is indifferent between choosing 4∗ or putting no effort and being
considered a low type.
Proving this is actually an equilibrium strategy involves showing that the high type
has no incentive to deviate and be treated as a low type. In the pooling equilibrium
described above, the high type gets strictly better utility than the low type, and since
4∗ is chosen to make the low type indifferent, the high type does not want to deviate
either.
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For 2 < 2̄ the low-type agent is strictly better off deviating to any effort level
4 ≠ 4∗, if being considered a high type. This means that any off path beliefs are not
equilibrium dominated by the low type and. Therefore, the off-path beliefs always
assuming the agent is the low type satisfies the Intuitive Criterion.
To illustrate why the Intuitive Criterion might fail for 2 > 2̄, imagine an agent
who deviates and exerts maximum effort level 4 = 1. Even if the low agent is
considered to be the high type, she would not want to exert so much effort since
(1) it is costly and (2) likely to agree with her low private signal leading to a lower
policy choice. As for the high type, she actually benefits from investing in the
public signal since it is likely to agree with her high private signal leading to a
higher policy choice. If the cost is not too high, the high-type agent strictly wants
to deviate to the maximum effort level when considered a high type, making 4 = 1
not equilibrium dominated for her. Off-path beliefs satisfying Intuitive Criterion
cannot put a positive probability on the agent who exerts 4 = 1 effort being a low
type. But if the principal believes 4 = 1 comes from the high agent, the high type
has a profitable deviation.
To conclude, for 2 > 2̄, 4∗ is the upper bound for the best pooling equilibrium
satisfying the Intuitive Criterion. However, even with this upper bound we later
show that the principal strictly benefits from imposing the formal requirements on
the effort level invested in the public signal.
a: Pooling at 4= = 1 b: Pooling at 4= < 1
Figure 4.1: These figures illustrate the regionswhere the best pooling equilibrium for
the principal satisfies the Intuitive Criterion and performs better than the separating
equilibria. For a low cost, the agent pools at maximum effort 4 = 1 (Figure 2a). For
a high cost, the agent pools at intermediate effort 4 < 1 which makes the low agent
indifferent to deviation (Figure 2b). The off-path belief of the principal is always
low.
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4.5 No Commitment with Formal Requirements
Now we consider the case when the principal can require different effort levels from
the agent, but he cannot credibly commit to an arbitrary decision rule. In the case of
the RUC, it is reasonable for the committee to require a certain number of surveys
depending on the soft information provided by the proposer. After providing all the
soft and hard information, the committee is expected to make an "interim rational"
decision. The principal’s policy decision will be based on his posterior belief about
the state being high, based on the reported private signal B̃ and public information 8
with required effort level 4( B̃). Consequently, if the principal believes agent’s private
report, policy choices will be the same as in Observation 3: -∗ = {G00, G01, G10, G11}.
The principal chooses effort levels after low and high reports from the agent. There
are two possibilities:
1) Pooling equilibria: when the principal requires the same level of effort despite
the agent’s report 41 = 42 ≡ 4.
2) Separating equilibria: when the principal requires a different level of effort
based on the agent’s private report 41 ≠ 42.
Pooling: One Effort Level
The analysis of this case is straightforward since if the principal requires the same
effort from both types, then the reports from the agents are just cheap talk. When
the principal requires only one effort level, he should disregard private reports and
make a decision just based on the realization of the public signal. Consequently,
the principal’s policy decision after observing low and high public signals will be











%(l = 1|8 = 0) (1 − G0)2 + %(l = 0|8 = 0)G20
]
.
Simplifying this objective function and substituting the values of G0, G1 and <(4),
we get that the principal’s optimal effort level for pooling.
Lemma 26 When the principal can put a formal requirement on the effort level for
public information, if he does not differentiate based on the agent’s private report,
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he always requires a maximum effort level 4A = 1 and makes the policy decision
solely based on the realization of the public signal.
This is trivial since in case of pooling, the only information he takes into account is
the public signal and therefore the principal wants it to be as accurate as possible.
Separating- Different Effort Levels
In this chapter, we consider only full separation- when the principal requires two
different amounts of effort and agent types do not mix.9 The objective function that





%(8 = 0|B = 0)
(
%(l = 1|8 = 0, B = 0) (1 − G00)2 + %(l = 0|8 = 0, B = 0)G200
)
+
%(8 = 1|B = 0)
(





%(8 = 0|B = 1)
(
%(l = 1|8 = 0, B = 1) (1 − G10)2 + %(l = 0|8 = 0, B = 1)G210
)
+
%(8 = 1|B = 1)
(
%(l = 1|8 = 1, B = 1) (1 − G11)2 + %(l = 0|8 = 1, B = 1)G211
)]
,
subject to two intensive compatibility (IC) constraints for each realization of the
private signal B:
0 : *!! (40) = −%(8 = 0|B = 0) (1 − G00) − %(8 = 1|B = 0) (1 − G01) − 2420 ≥
−%(8 = 0|B = 0) (1 − G10) − %(8 = 1|B = 0) (1 − G11) − 2421 = *

! (41)
1 : * (41) = −%(8 = 0|B = 1) (1 − G10) − %(8 = 1|B = 1) (1 − G11) − 2421 ≥
−%(8 = 0|B = 1) (1 − G00) − %(8 = 1|B = 1) (1 − G01) − 2420 = *
!
 (40).
Lemma 27 When the principal imposes formal requirement that induce separation,
for the optimal effort levels, the IC constraint of the low agent is binding and the IC
constraint of the high type is slack.
Intuitively, if 0 does not bind and the low agent does not exert maximum effort,
then the principal would profit by increasing 40. The low-type agent cannot exert
maximum effort since this would violate her IC constraint (for both agents, it is
the worst-case scenario to be considered a low type and be required to exert the
maximum effort). This lemma shows that in separating equilibria, the principal
9Pure strategies let us concentrate on truthful revelation of the agent’s type in separating equi-
librium B̃ = B.
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primarily takes care of the IC constraint of the low agent, since this agent has the
most incentive to hide her private information.
Corollary 28 When the principal imposes formal requirements and induces sepa-
ration, the optimal strategy requires a high-type agent to exert maximum effort, i.e.,
41 = 1.
This result follows directly from the previous lemma. Both incentive compatibility
constraints cannot be binding for the given cutoffs and 40 ≠ 41. Thus, 1 is not
binding. If optimal 41 < 1, increasing it with n small enough does not violate any
IC constraints and increases the objective function, which gives us a contradiction.
Substituting all these results in 0 and solving for 40 provides the optimal solution
for the case when the principal imposes different requirements based on the private
report of the agent.
Proposition 29 If the principal imposes formal requirements on the effort level for
the public signal, separation is only possible for 2 > 2̄. Moreover, the optimal effort




2(−3−4\+4\2) < 1 for the low type.
This proposition shows that, similar to the case when the agent decides the effort
level, when the principal imposes formal requirements he can only induce separation
for high enough cost. The effort levels have two functions for the principal: (1)
more effort increases the precision of the public signal and therefore leads to better
decision rules, (2) the principal uses effort requirements to satisfy the incentive
compatibility constraints of the agent and extract their private information. The
optimal strategy, when separation is possible, has an intuitive structure. When the
agent is reporting a low private signal, she is going against her preferences and is
rewarded by being required to exert less effort in the public signal. Meanwhile,
the agent with a high private report has to provide maximum effort in the public
signal to support her proposal. As the cost increases, formal requirements on effort
become a more effective tool for inducing separation and, therefore, the low-type
agent’s required effort level increases as well. So far, we have characterized optimal
strategies for the required effort in both separating and pooling cases. In equilibrium,




In order to calculate the equilibrium effort levels when the agent can impose for-
mal requirements, we compare *? (40 = 41 = 1) and *? (40 = 4A0, 4
A
1 = 1).
Substituting the optimal values gives us the following result:








\ > \̄ and 2 < 2̄
]
: the principal imposes the
same maximum effort level after both private reports and the policy decision
is made solely based on the public signal.
• For
[




\ ≥ \̄ and 2 ≥ 2̄
]
: the principal imposes maximum
effort level after the high private report 4A1 = 1 and intermediate effort level




Figure 4.2: This figure shows equilibriumwith formal requirements. For low enough
costs, both agents exert maximum effort and the principal follows only the public
signal. For high costs, the high-type agent exerts maximum effort and the low-type
agent exerts intermediate effort level.
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There are two different situations in this case. (1) The cost of acquiring additional
information is not high enough to satisfy the incentive compatibility of the low
agent even when the high type agent is required maximum effort and the low type is
required no effort (2 < 2̄). Therefore, the principal disregards the reported private
signal from the agent, always requiring the maximum amount of effort and making
a decision based solely on this information. In the RUC example, this would mean
that the cost of filling out surveys and of providing hard information is so low that
it does not give the committee enough power to extract private information from
the proposer. Consequently, the RUC requires the maximum number of surveys
and makes a decision only based on this "hard information." (2) The cost is high
enough (2 ∈ (2̄, 2̃)) to induce separation, but the separation is not worth it. When the
principal induces separation, he has to incentivize the low-type agent by decreasing
the required effort level for her. This means forgoing some precision in the public
signal after a low private signal. For low enough \ and the cost, this "forgone"
public signal is significant and it is not worth learning the private signal of a
relatively incompetent agent. Therefore, even though separation is possible, the
principal always requires the same maximum level of effort from the agent, and the
final decision is made solely based on the public signal.
Case 2: The equilibrium for parameters on the highlighted region of the graph
has the following form:
4A0 < 1, 4
A
1 = 1.
This corresponds to a situation inwhich the cost is high enough to give leverage to the
principal for extracting private information. In our example, for these parameters,
the proposer truthfully reports her professional opinion. If this opinion supports
high prices, the principal requires the maximum amount of public information
(surveys), while the low agent is asked to exert intermediate effort. In both cases,
the principal makes a final decision based on his updated posterior, after observing
all the information. Note that, 40 is increasing in cost 2. This result is intuitive,
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since a higher cost gives more leverage to the principal and enables him to require
more hard information.
Next, we do the welfare comparison between the two models to see the advantages
of formal requirements for the principal.
4.6 Welfare Comparison
The graph below represents the relationship between the expected utility of the
principal in equilibria of two models when the competence of the agent is \ = 0.65.
Figure 4.3: Expected Utilities of the Principal in Equilibria: \ = 0.65
Proposition 31 The principal always weakly (and sometimes strictly) benefits from
imposing formal requirements on the amount of hard information acquired.
This proposition shows that the relationship between the expected utilities shown on
the graph is true for general parameters. This result has direct policy implications for
the case of the RUC. As already mentioned, the current procedure puts no restriction
on how many surveys the proposer should provide to support her proposal. Our
analysis shows that even in the best-case scenario for the principal (our equilibrium
selection favored the principal), he would achieve better results by imposing formal
requirements on the number of surveys needed to support the proposal.
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The proof of this proposition is rather straightforward. Separating equilibia (where
the agent truthfully reveals their soft information by choosing different effort levels)
in both models only exists for a cost high enough 2 > 2̄. When the cost is lower
than this threshold, in the main model, the principal knows that he cannot impose
separation (the effort is cheap, and pretending to be a high type increases the policy
choice of the agent for any realization of public signal). Therefore, in equilibrium,
the principal requires both types to exert maximum effort and only makes a decision
based on public signal 4A = 1. As for the case when the agent decides the effort
level, in the best equilibrium for the principal, for low enough costs, both types exert
maximum effort 4= = 1. Since the effort is not very costly, they would rather pool
on the same (maximum) effort level than be considered the low type. When the cost
increases, however, the pooling effort starts to decrease 4= < 1 in order to make up
for a higher cost and not give an incentive to the low type to deviate to no public
signal. Overall, we have:
for 2 < 2̄, 4A ≥ 4= =⇒ *A ≥ *=.
Since the principal always prefers a higher effort level in pooling equilibria, when
both models have pooling equilibria 2 < 2̄, the principal is weakly better off by
imposing formal requirements. Observe that when the agent controls the effort
level, we select the best-case scenario for the principal. Even with this selection
criterion, the principal is strictly better off with formal requirements for high enough
cost 2 > 0.375(2\ − 1) (when 4= < 1 = 4A).
When the cost is high enough, 2 > 2̄, separation can exist in both models. However,
this does not mean that when the principal controls the effort level he would always
prefer to separate. In fact, he might just benefit from ignoring the private signal
and always requiring the maximum level of effort. In the equilibrium of the model
with formal requirement, the principal is weakly better off than if he imposed
the separation with 0 < 4A0 < 4
A
1 = 1. For the comparison between the two
models, we can show that even with these effort levels (and separation), the principal
would benefit from formal requirements on effort. When 2 = 2̄, both models have
equilibrium with pure separation i.e., 0 = 40 < 41 = 1. However, when the cost
increases further, the effort levels change to:
4A0 > 0, 4
A
1 = 1;










1 and since in a separating equilibrium the principal
always prefers higher efforts, he is better off with formal requirement.10 The logic
behind this result is straightforward. Both start out with the same pure separation:
no effort for the low agent and maximum effort for the high agent (red solid and gray
dotted lines start from the same point). When the agent decides effort, the low-type
agent exerts no effort, while the high-type agent exerts just enough effort to separate
themselves from the low type. Consequently, when the cost increases, the high type
can more easily separate themselves even with a lower effort level and 4=1 decreases.
This is the reason why the expected utility of the principal (red solid line on the
graph) is decreasing in cost.
On the contrary, in the main model with formal requirements, the effort levels
are used to extract soft information B but also collect the maximum possible hard
information (higher effort means a more precise public signal 8). When the cost
increases, the effort becomes a more effective mechanism for the principal to impose
separation: he requires maximum effort from the high type, but can now increase the
required effort for the low type as well, without violating her incentive compatibility
constraint. Therefore, the difference between the effort levels shrinks with higher
cost and 4A0 slowly converges to 4
A
1 = 1. This is the reason why the expected utility
of the principal (gray dotted line and blue solid line) is increasing in cost.
The reason we chose this particular value of \ is to illustrate one more interesting
feature that equilibria exhibit. Sometimes, when the agents separate themselves,
revealing their soft information, the principal would rather ignore it altogether and
make a decision just based on the maximum required hard information (the area with
the gray dotted line on the graph). This is the case when \ is small enough so the soft
information is not too valuable and the cost is intermediate, so the high-type agent
would use it to separate themselves from the low-type agent if they were to choose
their own effort levels. In fact, when the principal imposes formal requirements, he
could also induce the separation by satisfying the incentive compatibility constraints
of the agents, but with the intermediate cost, it would mean letting the low type off
the hook by requiring relatively lower effort (4A0 low). This, in combination with a
weak private signal (not too high \) does not make the separation worth forgoing
hard information from the low type. Therefore, the principal would rather ignore
10When the principal chooses the effort level, his expected utility is always weakly more than
expected utility from pooling at maximum effort level 4 = 1. For this reason, the principal is weakly
better off with formal requirements comparing to any pooling equilibrium of the model where the
agent chooses her own effort level.
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the private reports and make a decision with the maximum possible effort in hard
information.
4.7 Conclusion
So far, we have shown that when the agent decides her own effort levels, bias in her
preferences generates the possibility of a separating equilibrium (for a high enough
cost). Even though the bias is the same for both types, observing different private
signals drives a wedge between her interim preferences. The main reason for this
disagreement lies in her opposite preferences for the informativeness of the public
signal after observing the private signal. The low type expects the public signal to
be low, leading to a low policy decision. Thus, she prefers the public signal to be as
unreliable as possible. The high type, on the other hand, expects the public signal to
be high, leading to a higher policy decision. Therefore, the high type prefers more
reliable public signal.
Although separation is possible when the agent controls the effort level, it is still
guided by biased preferences, and effort levels are not optimal for the principal.
Observe that this is the case even when we select the best reasonable (satisfying
Intuitive Criterion) equilibrium for the principal. In fact, if an agent’s competence
is low enough, they might be willing to separate themselves, but the principal would
rather usemaximumpublic signal and ignore their private reports (pool at the highest
effort level).
The main purpose of this paper is to show that if the principal takes control and
imposes formal requirements on the agent, he could increase the fairness of the
outcome. Our analysis shows that this is in fact the case. The principal can
use formal requirements on effort, not only to get a direct benefit from a better
public signal, but also to correctly align the preferences of the biased agents. The
optimal mechanism rewards the low private report by requiring a lower effort level
for the public signal. Meanwhile, the high reports need to be accompanied by
the maximum effort in the public signal. The welfare comparison shows that the
principal is always weakly better off and always strictly better off when separation
is possible. This result has some policy implications for our application: it shows
that the current procedure is inefficient, and introducing formal requirements can
significantly increase the fairness of prices.
The next step of the project involves relaxing the pure strategy constraint and
characterizing the optimal mechanism for the general case. This would significantly
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complicate the calculations and require the application and proof of the modified
version of the revelation principle, but potentially it would lead to more interesting
insights into the problem.
In order to incorporate the possibility of a biased committee, a potential extension
of this paper would introduce a third party (AMA) as a principal whose goal is
to maximize social welfare. However, the AMA can only choose effort levels
conditional on the agent’s report of her private signal, while the decision about
prices is still made by (potentially biased) committee members. In this case, each
member of the committee would have the following utility function:
*8 = U81{3̃ = } + (1 − U8)1{3̃ = l},
where U8 measures how biased the committee member 8 is towards the high prices. If
U8 = 0, there is no bias and the committee member is only concerned with fairness.
If U8 = 1, the committee member only gets utility from high prices; therefore,
her preference is identical to the proposer’s preference in our setting. It would be
interesting to observe how the expected outcome of the optimal mechanism changes
with different bias levels of the committee and different voting rules.
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A p p e n d i x A
CHAPTER II
Lemma 2
When the incumbent does not anticipate the external shock, the voter’s strategy is
the best response i.f.f. she reelects the incumbent when
[




H =  and D > D∗

]
and votes for the challenger otherwise.
D∗ =
1 − @ − U + @U + @f − @Uf
1 − @ + @f − Uf
D∗ =
U − @U − Uf + @Uf
1 − @ + @f − Uf .
Proof As discussed in text, this lemma simply follows from the bias rule. After
observing utility D and policy choice H ∈ {, } posterior belief of the voter about
the incumbents type is:
%( =  |D, H = ) = %(D |, H = )%( |H = )
%(D |, H = )%( |H = ) + %(D |!, H = )%(! |H = ) =
=
5 (D − 1)U?
5 (D − 1)U(? + (1 − ?) (@ + (1 − @)f)) + 5 (D) (1 − U) (f@ + (1 − @)) (1 − ?)
%( =  |D, H = ) = %(D |, H = )%( |H = )
%(D |, H = )%( |H = ) + %(D |!, H = )%(! |H = ) =
=
5 (D − 1) (1 − U)?
5 (D − 1) (1 − U) (? + (1 − ?)@(1 − f)) + 5 (D)U(1 − f) (1 − @) (1 − ?)
The incumbent is reelected iff
%( =  |D, H = ) > ? =⇒ D > 1 − @ − U + @U + @f − @Uf
1 − @ + @f − Uf ≡ D
∗

%( =  |D, H = ) > ? =⇒ D > U − @U − Uf + @Uf




When the voter observes her own utility, we have two possible equilibria:
1) If @ > @̃ truth equilibrium.










0.5(−1 + 2U2 − U3)
1 − U + U2
+ 0.5
√
1. + 4U − 8U2 + 6U3 + 4U4 − 4U5 + U6
(1 − U + U2)2
.
In both types of equilibrium, the voter’s strategy is to re-elect the incumbent i.f.f.
(H =  and D > D∗

) or (H =  and D > D∗

).
Proof The voter’s strategy in equilibrium to reelect the incumbent follows directly
from Lemma 7. We have already established that H-type incumbent and L-type
incumbent who sees popular private signal B = , always follow their signal. Now
we show that L-type incumbent who sees unpopular signal B =  does not have
profitable deviations in two cases considered above.









is increasing in f). Therefore, for the given reelection strategy
of the voter, the low-type politician who sees the unpopular signal does not
have incentive to deviate and pander.
1) @ < @̃. In this case voter’s strategy is to reelect incumbent iif (H =  and
D > D∗

(f̃)) or (H =  and D > D∗

(f̃)). Given this strategy of the voter,









(f̃)) if he panders. Since f̃ is chosen to equate these
two expected utilities, the incumbent has no incentive to deviate.
Proposition 5
When the incumbent anticipates the external shock n , we can have the following
equilibrium:
1) If @ > @̄ the politician is always truthful, the voter reelects the incumbent i.f.f.
(H =  and D > D = 1 − U) or (H =  and D > D = U).
2) If @ < @̄:
The Incumbent: • A low-type incumbent who receives private signal B =  and antic-
ipates a positive external shock panders with probability f∗+ (n) > 0
when D < n < D;
• A low-type incumbent who receives private signal B =  and antici-
pates a negative external shock panders with probability f∗−(n) > 0
when D − 1 < n < D̄ − 1.
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Otherwise the incumbent is truthful.
The Voter: After popular policy choice H = :




- The voter mixes between the incumbent and the challenger with
probability +∗

∈ (0, 1) for intermediate levels of utility D < DE <
D̄;




After unpopular policy choice H = :




- The voter mixes between the incumbent and the challenger with
probability +∗

∈ (0, 1) for intermediate levels of utility D < DE <
D;






−@ + 2@U − U2
−@ − U + 2@U D̄ =
−U + U2




@U−@2U for D ∈ (D, D)
0.5@4 (1−U)2+@3 (0.5−0.5U)+@2 (−0.5+0.5U)U




−@2−@U+2@2U for D ∈ (D, D̄)
@−U−@U+@2U











(−1.‘?U(1+n)+?2U(1+n)+?@U(1+n)−?2@U(1+n)) for n ∈ (D − 1, D − 1)
(U+@U+U2−1.‘@U2+@(1+n)−@2 (1+n)+U(1+n)−3@U(1+n)+2@2U(1+n))
(−@2 (1+n)+2@2U(1+n)+U2 (1+n)−2.@U2 (1+n)) for n ∈ (D − 1, D̄ − 1)
f∗+ (n) =

U3 (0.25U−0.25n)+@3 (0.5−U)2 (−1+n)+@U(U(0.5‘−U−0.25U2)+(−0.25+0.25U+0.75‘U2)n)
((0.5U2−@U2+@2 (−0.5+1U)) (U2 (0.5−0.5n)+@(0.5−1U+(−0.5+U)n)))
+ @
2 (0.25−1U+0.5U2+U3+(−0.25+1.25‘U−1.25U2−0.5U3)n)
((0.5U2−@U2+@2 (−0.5+1U)) (U2 (0.5−0.5n)+@(0.5−1U+(−0.5+U)n))) for n ∈ (D, D̄)
(?U−?2U−?@U+?2@U−?n+?2n+?@n−?2@n)
(?U−?2U−?@U+?2@U−?Un+?2Un+?@Un−?2@Un) for n ∈ (D̄, D)
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Figure A.1: This graph shows equilibrium strategy of the low-type incumbent with
unpopular signal B = , depending on realization of the external shock n .
Proof Much of this proof is always done in the main text. In order to prove the
given strategy profile is actually an equilibrium, we should show that neither player
(the incumbent or the voter) has an incentive to deviate, given strategy of the other
one.
The Incumbent
In the second period, absent reelection motives, the incumbent always follows his
private signal since @ > U. We have also shown that the high-type incumbent as
well as the low-type incumbent with popular signal B =  are always truthful in the
first-period and thus have no profitable deviation. We need to show the same for the
low-type incumbent with the unpopular signal B = .
Region 1 As discussed in the main text, for such extreme realizations of the external
shock, the incumbent is either always reelected or always dismissed, and his
policy choice has no impact on his reelection probability. Since his private
signal is informative, the low-type incumbent with the unpopular signal always
follows it to match the state and get a better first-period utility. In this case,
the low-type incumbent has no profitable deviation.
Region 2 For small external shocks, given the equilibrium strategy of the voter, the
incumbent is reelected i.f.f. he matches the state. Since his private signal is
informative, the low-type incumbent is truthful and has no profitable deviation.
Region 3A For medium-low positive shocks, the incumbent is always reelected after
matching the state. If the state is mismatched, he is reelected with probability
+∗








makes the low type indifferent between being truthful
1+∗

is the equilibrium reelection probability for this region.
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and pandering. Since less reelection probability after H =  encourages the
incumbent to be truthful, he has no profitable deviation.
Region 3B For medium-low negative shocks, the incumbent is always dismissed after
a mismatched state. If the state is matched, he is always reelected after the
popular policy choice H =  and sometimes reelectedwith probability+∗

after







makes the incumbent indifferent between being truthful and pandering.
Since reelection probability after  encourages the incumbent to be truthful,
he has no profitable deviation.
4A and 4B In these regions, equilibrium levels of reelection + and + are chosen to
make the low-type incumbent with unpopular signal indifferent between ei-
ther policy choice. Therefore, the low-type incumbent panders and has no
profitable deviation.
InRegion 4, thematched state leads to reelection of the incumbent regardless
the policy choice. If, instead, the state is mismatched, then the voter always
reelects the incumbent after the popular policy choice but mixes after the
unpopular policy choice H =  (+ n

< 1). When the low-type incumbent sees
signal B =  if he follows it and chooses H =  he gets:
* = %(l =  |B = ) (1 + @) + %(l = |B = ) (0 ++ n@).
If instead he panders and chooses H =  he gets:
* = %(l = |B = ) (1 + @) + %(l =  |B = ) (0 + @).
Since the low-type incumbent panders in this region, the equilibrium reelection
probability +∗

makes him indifferent between following the unpopular policy
and pandering, meaning:
+∗ =
%(l = |B = ) (1 + @) − %(l =  |B = )
%(l = |B = )@ .
We have already shown that this reelection probability makes the low-type
incumbent truthful in Region 3.
In Region 4, the voter never reelects the incumbent regardless of the policy
choice after amismatched state. If the state ismatched then he voter sometimes
2+∗

is the equilibrium reelection probability for this region.
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reelects the incumbent after the popular policy choice H =  (+1+n

< 1) but
always elects the challenger after the unpopular policy choice H = . When
the low-type incumbent sees the unpopular signal B = , if he follows it and
chooses H =  he gets:
* = %(l =  |B = ) (1 + 0) + %(l = |B = ) (0 + 0).
If instead he panders and chooses H =  he gets:
* = %(l = |B = ) (1 ++1+n @) + %(l =  |B = ) (0 + 0).
Since the low-type incumbent with the unpopular signal panders in this re-
gion, the equilibrium reelection probability is derived by equating the two
expressions above:
+∗ =
%(l = |B = ) − %(l = |B = )
%(l = |B = )@ .
We have already shown that this reelection probability makes the low-type
incumbent truthful in Region 3.
5A and 5B Similar to the previous case, reelection mixing probabilities make the low-
type incumbent with unpopular signal indifferent between either policy choice
and he has no profitable deviation. Unlike the previous case, both reelection
probabilities play a role in satisfying the indifferent conditions for the low-type
incumbent with the unpopular signal in both of these regions. Consequently,




) for these regions
are derived by solving the systemof equations for double indifference as shown
in the main text.
The Voter
As already discussed in the main text, voter who observes utility beyond (0, 1) range
has no profitable deviation since she learns about matched/mismatched state (given
challenger and incumbent are from the same pool, this is enough information for
them to elect a second-period representative). The rest of the proof falls directly
from the observations in Section 5.3 and uses Bayes Rule for updated posterior
beliefs of the voter.
108
As discussed in the main text, the voter knows the low-type incumbent was truthful
when she observes the utility level from Regions 1 and 2. Since D = 1 − U and
D = U, it follows directly from the truthful equilibrium of the baseline model that
she has no profitable deviation.
For utility levels fromRegion 3, the voter knows that one of the two cases is possible:
• The state was matched and n = DE − 1. In which case, D − 1 < n < D − 1 and
from the previous part, the incumbent is pandering with probability f∗−.
• The state was mismatched and n = DE. In which case, D < n < D, and the
L-type incumbent is truthful.
Based on this information the voter’s posterior beliefs after each policy choice are:
%( |D, H = ) = 5 (D − 1)?U
5 (D − 1)U? + 5 (D − 1)U(1 − ?) (@ + (1 − @)f∗−) + (1 − U) 5 (D) (1 − ?) (1 − @)
;
%( |D, H = ) = 5 (D − 1)?(1 − U)
5 (D − 1) (1 − U)? + 5 (D − 1) (1 − U) (1 − ?)@(1 − f∗−) + U 5 (D) (1 − @) (1 − ?)
.
The equilibrium level of pandering f∗−(n = DE − 1) in this region is derived to
make the voter indifferent between choosing the incumbent or the challenger after
observing the popular policy choice (%( |D, H = ) = ?). We also make sure
that, for this equilibrium level of pandering, the voter wants to elect the challenger
after observing the unpopular policy choice H =  and the utility from this region
(%( |D, H = ) < ?). This derives the threshold D in equilibrium.
In Region 4, the voter knows that one of the two cases is possible:
• The state was matched and n = DE − 1. In which case, D̄ − 1 < n < D − 1 and
from the previous part, the incumbent is truthful.
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• The state was mismatched and n = DE. In which case, D̄ < n < D, and the
L-type incumbent is pandering with probability f∗+.
Based on these beliefs, the voter’s posterior beliefs after each policy choice are:
%( |D, H = ) = 5 (D − 1)?U
5 (D − 1)U? + 5 (D − 1)U(1 − ?)@ + (1 − U) 5 (D) (f∗+@ + (1 − @)) (1 − ?)
;
%( |D, H = ) = 5 (D − 1)?(1 − U)
5 (D − 1) (1 − U)? + 5 (D − 1) (1 − U) (1 − ?)@ + U 5 (D) (1 − @) (1 − f∗+) (1 − ?)
.
In equilibrium, the voter is indifferent between voting for the incumbent or the
challenger after observing the unpopular policy choice H =  and the utility level
from this region. Therefore, the equilibrium level of panderingf∗+ (n = DE) is chosen
to satisfy this indifference condition %( |D, H = ) = ?. The voter has no profitable
deviation if she does not want to vote for the challenger after observing the popular
policy choice H =  for this equilibrium level of pandering f∗+ (n = DE). Therefore
we must have %( |D, H = ) > ?. This condition is always satisfied for D > D̄.
For Region 5we have already shown in the main text how the indifference conditions
for the voter after both policy choices define the equilibrium levels of pandering
(f∗−, f∗+) for the corresponding values of the external shock. This completes our
proof.
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A p p e n d i x B
CHAPTER III
B.1 Preliminary Analysis
In this appendix we conduct a general preliminary analysis of the model; the proof
of main text Lemma 9 characterizing a voter best response is contained herein.
Tomore easily accommodate ex-ante agnosticism as to whether a low-ability incum-
bent distorts his policymaking toward the popular policy  or the unpopular policy
 in equilibrium, we rewrite a low-ability incumbent’s strategy as [ = ([, [),
where [G for G ∈ {, } denotes the probability that the incumbent chooses policy
H = G after receiving signal B = ¬G. Hence, using our main text notation [ = \
is the probability of “pandering” and [ = 1 − \ is the probability of “fake lead-
ership.” We also use \ = (\, \) to denote the entire vector of a voter strategy,
where \G = (aG∅, d
G , aGG , a
G
¬G) for G ∈ {, }.
The Incumbent’s Problem To formally characterize a low-ability incumbent’s best
responses, we first introduce notation to describe the electoral consequences of
choosing each policy G ∈ {, } given a voter strategy \. Let
EGI (\
G) = (1 − dG)aG∅ + d
G
(
%(l = G |I)aGG + %(l ≠ G |I)aG¬G
)
denote a low-ability incumbent’s expected probability of reelection after choosing
G ∈ {, } when he has information I about the state and the voter uses strategy \G
in response to first-period policy G. Applying the notation in the main text we have
*GI = %(l = G |I) + X@ · E
G (I; \G). Next, let ΔGI (\) = E
G
I (\
G) − E¬GI (\
¬G) denote a
low-ability incumbent’s net gain in the probability of reelection from choosing G vs.
¬G when he has information I and the voter uses strategy \ = (\G , \¬G). Finally, let
Δ̄GI =
Pr(l = ¬G |I) − Pr(l = G |I)
X@
,
and observe that Δ̄GB=¬G > 0 ∀G ∈ {, } since @ > c. A low-ability incumbent’s
best-response is then as follows.
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Lemma 32 A low-ability incumbent’s strategy [ = ([, [) is a best response to \
i.f.f.
ΔGB=¬G (\) > (<)Δ̄GB=¬G → [G = 1(0) ∀G ∈ {, }
.
Proof: Straightforward and omitted. QED.
The Voter’s Problem When the voter is initially called to play, she has observed
the incumbent’s first-period policy choice G, and must choose her likelihood of
paying attention dG and of retaining the aG∅ incumbent should she choose not to pay
attention. Should she choose to pay attention, she then anticipates learning the state
l and deciding on the likelihood of retaining the incumbent aGl conditional on this
additional information.
We first discuss the voter’s belief formation. Although some sequences of play
may be off the path of play given a low-ability incumbent’s strategy (for example,
failure of a policy G when a low-ability incumbent is believed to always choose ¬G)
it is easily verified that sequentially consistent beliefs about the incumbent’s ability
aG∅ and the state %(l = G |H = G) prior to the attentional decision d
G , as well as
sequentially consistent beliefs `Gl for l ∈ {, } about the incumbent’s ability after
paying attention, are all unique and straightforwardly characterized by Bayes’ Rule
(as described in the main text). We begin with two useful algebraic equalities about
these beliefs.
Lemma 33 Pr(l = G |H = G) · `GG = `G
Proof: Pr(l = G |H = G) · `GG
=
Pr (H = G, l = G)
Pr (H = G) · Pr (_ =  |H = G, l = G) =
Pr (_ = , H = G, l = G)
Pr (H = G)
=
Pr (H = G |_ = , l = G) Pr (l = G) · Pr (_ = )
Pr (H = G)
=
(Pr (H = G |_ = , l = G) Pr (l = G) + Pr (H = G |_ = , l ≠ G) Pr (l ≠ G)) · Pr (_ = )
Pr (H = G)
=
Pr (H = G |_ = ) · Pr (_ = )
Pr (H = G) = `
G ,
where the second-to-last equality follows from Pr (H = G |_ = , l ≠ G) = 0. QED.
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Lemma 34 `G = Pr(l = G |H = G)`GG + Pr(l = ¬G |H = G)`G¬G
Proof:
`G =
Pr (_ = , H = G)
Pr (H = G) =
Pr (_ = , H = G, l = G) + Pr (_ = , H = G, l ≠ G)
Pr (H = G)
=
Pr (l = G, H = G) Pr (_ =  |l = G, H = G)
Pr (H = G) +
Pr (l ≠ G, H = G) Pr (_ =  |l ≠ G, H = G)
Pr (H = G)
= Pr (l = G |H = G) `GG + Pr (l ≠ G |H = G) `G¬G QED
With these beliefs in hand, it is easily verified that after observing first period policy
H = G, the voter’s expected utility from her anticipated strategy \G = (aG∅, d
G , aGG , a
G
¬G)
following policy G is equal to:


































where the unique sequentially-consistent values of
(
`G , `GG , `
G
¬G , Pr(l = G |H = G)
)
depend on a low-ability incumbent’s strategy [.
It is next immediate that the voter’s retention probabilities aGB after B ∈ {∅, G,¬G}
(where B = ∅ denotes the decision to pay no attention and learn nothing about the
state) will be sequentially rational if and only if `GB > (<) W → aGB = 1(0). To
examine the voter’s attention decision dG , recall from the main text that the values






following policy G are defined to be:










It is readily apparent that qG− is strictly increasing in W (ceteris paribus) while qG+ is
strictly decreasing in W (ceteris paribus). The following lemma helps connect these
values to the voter’s expected utility.







`G − W =
(
Pr (l = G |H = G) `GG + Pr (l ≠ G |H = G) `G¬G
)
− W










X (1 − @) . QED.
Finally, the following facilitates comparisons between the values of information
across policies that will be useful later in the analysis.
Lemma 36 q¬G+ > (=) qG− ⇐⇒
` − Pr (H = ¬G |l = ¬G) W
Pr (H = ¬G) > (=)
Pr (H = G |l = ¬G) W
Pr (H = G)
Proof: Observe from the definitions that q¬G+ > (=)qG− ⇐⇒




> (=) Pr (l = ¬G |H = G) W





`¬G − Pr (l = ¬G |H = ¬G) · W (using Lemma 33)
=
Pr (l = ¬G)
Pr (H = ¬G) (` − Pr (H = ¬G |l = ¬G) W) (using Pr (H = ¬G |_ = ) = Pr (l = ¬G) )
Wenext transform the rhs; we have thatPr (l = ¬G |H = G) W = Pr(l=¬G)Pr(H=G) Pr (H = G |l = ¬G) W.
Substituting in and rearranging then yields the desired condition. QED
With Lemmas 33-36 in hand, imposing sequential rationality on each aGB and rear-
ranging yields that the voter’s expected utility + (dG |[) conditional on dG is equal
to:















This immediately yields main text Lemma 9 characterizing necessary and suffi-
cient conditions for a voter strategy \G following G to be a best-response (where
“best response” is used colloquially to mean “sequentially rational given the unique
sequentially-consistent beliefs implied by the incumbent’s strategy”). We restate
Lemma 9 here, letting Θ̄G ([) denote the set of best responses following G when a
low-ability incumbent uses strategy [.
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Lemma 1 (restated) \̂G is a best-response following G ⇐⇒
âG¬G = 0, `GB > (<) W → âGB = 1(0) ∀B ∈ {∅, G}, and 2 < (>) qG = min{qG−, qG+} → d̂G = 1 (0).
Properties of EquilibriumWe conclude this section by proving some basic proper-
ties of equilibrium and providing an intermediate characterization. The first property
states that equilibrium may involve pandering or fake leadership, but not both.
Lemma 37 In equilibrium, [G > 0 for at most one G.
Proof: First observe that [G > 0 (the incumbent panders toward G) → *GB=¬G ≥
*GB=G (the incumbent benefits from choosing G even after signal ¬G)→ EGB=¬G (\) >
E¬GB=¬G (\) (choosing G is electorally advantageous after signal B = ¬G) since %(l =
¬G |B = ¬G) > %(l = G |B = ¬G) > 0 (¬G is strictly more likely to be correct than
G following signal B = ¬G from @ > c). Next observe that EGB=¬G (\) > E¬GB=¬G (\) →
EGB=G (\) > E¬GB=G (\) (if G is electorally advantageous after signal B = ¬G then it remains
electorally advantageous after signal B = G), since (EGB=G (\) − E¬GB=G (\)) − (EGB=¬G (\) −
E¬GB=¬G (\)) =









which is ≥ 0 since aGG ≥ aG¬G in any best response (the voter is more likely to reelect
after observing a match than after observing a mismatch) and %(l = G |B = G) >
%(l = G |B = ¬G)) (G is more likely to be correct following signal B = G than signal





[¬G = 0 since %(l = G |B = G) > %(l = ¬G |B = G) > 0 (G is strictly more likely to
be correct than ¬G following signal B = G, again by @ > c). QED.
The second property states that any equilibrium involving a distortionmust bemixed.
Lemma 38 If [G > 0 then [G < 1.
Proof: Suppose [G = 1 (so [¬G = 0). Then `¬G = 1 and q¬G− = 0, so a voter’s
best-response requires a¬G∅ = 1 and d




also %(l = ¬G |B = ¬G) > %(l = G |B = ¬G) we must have *H=¬GB=¬G > *H=GB=¬G , and
any [G > 0 cannot be an incumbent best-response. QED.
Collecting the preceding results, yields an intermediate characterization of equilib-
rium as a corollary.
Corollary 39 Profile ([̂, \̂) is a sequential equilibrium i.f.f. it satisfies Lemma 9
and either
• [̂G = 0 and ΔGB=¬G (\) ≤ Δ̄GB=¬G ∀G ∈ {, } (the incumbent is truthful),
• ∃I s.t. [̂I ∈ (0, 1), [̂¬I = 0, and ΔIB=¬I (\) = Δ̄IB=¬I (the incumbent distorts
toward z).
B.2 Equilibrium Characterization
Herein we continue the equilibrium analysis including proofs of Propositions 10
and 11. We first examine properties of the values of attention when the incumbent
is truthful.
Lemma 40 Let q̄GB denote the values of attention when a low-ability incumbent is
truthful and q̄G = min{q̄G−, q̄G+}. These values satisfy the following properties:
• q̄+ > q̄+ and q̄− < q̄−;
• q̄ > q̄ → W < ¯̀;
• q̄ > q̄ → W > `.
Proof: From the definitions, q− > q− ⇐⇒ Pr(l = |H = ) > Pr(l =  |H =
) ⇐⇒(
Pr (H = |l = )
Pr (H = |l = )
) (
Pr (l = )




Pr (H =  |l = )
Pr (H =  |l = )
) (
1 − Pr (l = )
Pr (l = )
)
.





so the condition reduces to Pr (l = ) = c > 12 . Next, from the definitions
q+ > (<) (=)q+ ⇐⇒ Pr(l = |H = ) > (<) (=) Pr(l =  |H = ) when a




) which in turn holds ⇐⇒
Pr(l = |H = ) > Pr(l = |H = ), which is already shown.
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The statement that q̄ > q̄ → W < ¯̀ follows trivially from the first property.
The final property is equivalent to W ≤ ` → q̄ ≥ q̄. To show this we argue that
q̄+ (`) > q̄− (`). From this it is easy to verify the desired property using that (i)
` ∈ ( ¯̀, ¯̀), (ii) q̄− > q̄− , (iii) qG−(W) decreasing in W, and (iv) qG+(W) increasing
in W. First observe from Lemma 36 that for any values of (f, W) we have q+ > q−
i.f.f.
Pr (H = ) ·
(
W − W − `
Pr (H = |l = )
)
> Pr (H = ) · W
. Next observe that when W = ` the condition reduces to Pr(H = ) > Pr(H = ),
which always holds when a low-ability incumbent is truthful. QED.
We next examine how a low-ability incumbent’s potential distortions [ affects these
values of attention. Our next two lemmas are used to this end.
Lemma 41 Pr (l ≠ G |H = G) is strictly increasing in [G (when [¬G=0) and strictly
decreasing in [¬G (when [G = 0).
Proof:Pr (l ≠ G |H = G) = Pr (H = G |l ≠ G) · (1 − c
G)








So [G ([¬G) affect the desired quantity solely through Pr(H=G |l=G)Pr(H=G |l≠G) , where:
Pr (H = G |l = G)
Pr (H = G |l ≠ G) =
` + (1 − `) · (@ (1 − [¬G) + (1 − @) [G)
(1 − `) · ((1 − @) (1 − [¬G) + @[G) .
To perform comparative statics [G , assume [¬G = 0 so
Pr (H = G |l = G)
Pr (H = G |l ≠ G) =
` + (1 − `) · (@ + (1 − @) [G)
(1 − `) · ((1 − @) + @[G)
=
` + (1 − `) · (1 − @ (1 − [G) + (2@ − 1) (1 − [G))







1 − @ (1 − [G)
)
+ (2@ − 1) (1 − [
G)
1 − @ (1 − [G)
which is straightforwardly decreasing in [G when @ ≥ 12 .
To perform comparative statics in [¬G , assume that [G = 0 so
Pr (H = G |l = G)
Pr (H = G |l ≠ G) =
` + (1 − `) @ (1 − [¬G)
(1 − `) · (1 − @) (1 − [¬G) =
`
1−[¬G + (1 − `) @
(1 − `) (1 − @)
which is clearly strictly increasing in [¬G . QED.
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Lemma 42 Pr(l = G |H = G) (`GG − W) is strictly decreasing in [G (when [¬G = 0)
and strictly increasing in [¬G (when [G = 0).
Proof: First observe that Pr(l = G |H = G) is strictly decreasing (increasing) in [G
([¬G) by Lemma 41. Next
`GG =
`
` + (1 − `) (@ (1 − [¬G) + (1 − @) [G) ,
which is also straightforwardly strictly decreasing (increasing) in [G ([¬G). QED.
The preceding lemmas immediately yield comparative statics effects of [G ≥ 0
(when [¬G = 0) on the four relevant values of information (qG−, qG+, q¬G− , q¬G+ ) as a
corollary.
Corollary 43 Suppose that [¬G = 0. Then qG−([G) and q¬G+ ([G) are strictly increas-
ing in [G , while qG+([G) and q¬G− ([G) are strictly decreasing in [G .
We now use the preceding results to examine how an anticipated distortion [I > 0
toward some policy I (with [¬I = 0) affects the electoral incentives of a low-ability
incumbent when the voter best-responds. This analysis yields a key lemma which
implies that the model is well behaved. The lemma states that (despite the greater
complexity of the RA model), a greater distortion toward some policy I still makes
that policy relatively less electorally appealing once the voter best responds (as in




Δ : ∃ \ satisfying \G ∈ Θ̄G ([G) ∀G ∈ {, } and Δ = ΔII (\)
}
denote the set of reelection probability differences from choosing policy I vs.
policy ¬I for a low-ability incumbent with information I that can be generated by
a voter best response to [I ∈ [0, 1] (with [¬I = 0).
Lemma 44 II ([
I) is an upper-hemi continuous, compact, convex-valued, decreas-
ing correspondence that is constant and singleton everywhere except at (at most)
four points.
Proof: Starting with the voter’s objective functions + (\G |[) and the best responses
stated in main text Lemma 9 and Appendix Lemma 32, it is straightforward to verify
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all properties of the correspondence except that it is decreasing using standard
arguments.
To argue that II ([
I) is decreasing, first observe that:
II ([
I) = VII ([
I)−V¬II ([
I), where VGI ([
I) = {E : ∃\G ∈ Θ̄([I) satisfying E = EGI (\
G)}.
Specifically, VGI ([
I) the set of reelection probabilities following policy G that can be
generated by a voter best response to [I ∈ [0, 1] (with [¬I = 0). To show the desired
result we therefore argue that VII ([
I) is decreasing and V¬II ([
I) is increasing.
To argue that VII ([
I) is decreasing, first observe by Lemma 9 and Corollary 43
that qI ([I) = min{qI−([I), qI+([I)}, with qI−([I) strictly increasing in [I and qI+([I)
strictly decreasing in [I. Thus, there ∃ some [̄II where qI ([I) achieves its strict max-
imum over [0, 1], and moreover if [̄II ∈ (0, 1) then qI−([I) < (>) (=)qI+([I) ⇐⇒
[I < (>) (=)[̄II.
Suppose first that 2 ≥ qI ([̄II). By Lemma 9, if [I < [̄II then \̂I ∈ Θ̄I ([I) → âI∅ =
1 > d̂I = 0 → VII ([
I) = {1}, and if [I > [̄II then \̂I ∈ Θ̄I ([I) → âI∅ = d̂
I = 0 →
VII ([
I) = {0}. VII ([
I) decreasing then immediately follows.
Suppose next that 2 < qI ([̄II). There are three subcases.
(a) If [I < [̄II then by Lemma 9 we have \̂I ∈ Θ̄I ([I) ⇐⇒ \̂I satisfies (i)
âI∅ = â
I
I = 1 > âI¬I = 0, and (ii) 2 > (<)qI−([I) → d̂I = 1(0). Since qI−([I) is
strictly increasing in [I, it is easy to see that {d : ∃\̂I ∈ Θ̄I with d = d̂I} is an
increasing correspondence. Moreover, observe that EII (d
I |âI∅ = â
I
I = 1, âI¬I = 0) =
1 − dI Pr(l ≠ G |I) is decreasing in dI (that is, more attention to I hurts reelection
prospects when the voter’s posture is favorable). Thus it immediately follows that
VII ([
I) is decreasing over the range [I < [̄II.
(b) If [I > [̄II then by Lemma 9 we have \̂I ∈ Θ̄I ([I) ⇐⇒ \̂I satisfies (i) âI∅ =
âI¬I = 0, (ii) qI+([I) > (<)0 → âII = 1(0), and (iii) 2 > (<)qI−([I) → d̂I = 1(0).
Since qI+([I) is strictly decreasing in [I, it is easy to see that both {d : ∃\̂I ∈
Θ̄I with d = d̂I} and {a : ∃\̂I ∈ Θ̄I with a = âII} are decreasing correspondences.
Moreover, observe that EII (d
I, aII |âI∅ = â
I
¬I = 0) = dIaII · Pr(l = I |I) is increasing
in both aGG and dI (that is, more attention to I helps reelection prospects when the
voter’s posture is adversarial). Thus it immediately follows that VII ([
I) is again
decreasing over the range [I > [̄II.
(c) If [I is sufficiently close to [̄II then by Lemma 9 we have \̂I ∈ Θ̄I ([I) → d̂I =
âII = 1 > âI¬I = 0→ VII ([
I) = {Pr(I = l|I)} and constant.
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Finally, exactly symmetric arguments show V¬II ([
I) is increasing, beginning again
with the observations (byLemma9 andCorollary 43) that q¬I ([I) = min{q¬I− ([I), q¬I+ ([I)},
but with q¬I+ ([I) strictly increasing in [I and q¬I− ([I) strictly decreasing in [I. QED
With the preceding lemma in hand, we first prove main text Proposition 10 stating
that the incumbent is always truthful when c = 12 (i.e., is no ex-ante “popular"
policy).
Proof of Proposition 10 Applying Proposition 39 and Lemma 44, to rule out an
equilibrium distorted toward a policy G ∈ {, } ([G > 0, [¬G=0), it suffices to
show min{GB=¬G (0)} ≤ 0 (intuitively, that there is no electoral benefit to policy
G after signal ¬G when the incumbent is believed to be truthful). Given ex-ante
policy symmetry and incumbent truthfulness, there always exists a best-response \̂
in which the voter treats the incumbent identically after either policy, so ΔGB=¬G (\̂) =
dG (Pr(l = ¬G |B = G) − Pr(l = G |B = G)) ≤ 0. QED.
We next prove Proposition 11 ruling out “fake leadership” equilibria.
Proof of Proposition 11 Applying Proposition 39 and Lemma 44, to rule out fake
leadership equilibria ([ = 0, [ ∈ (0, 1)) it suffices to show that min{
B=
(0)} ≤ 0
(intuitively, that there is no electoral benefit to the unpopular policy  when the






Suppose first that W ∈ ( ¯̀, ¯̀) so that a∅ = 1 > a

∅ = 0 in a voter best response.
Then it is easily verified that min{
B=
(0)} ≤ − (2 Pr(l = |B = ) − 1) ≤ 0.
Suppose next that W ≤ ¯̀, so that the voter’s posture is favorable after both policies.
Then q̄ > q̄ (by Lemma 40), and there exists some \̂ ∈ Θ̄(0) with âGG = â = 1 >
âG¬G = 0 ∀G and d̂ ≥ d̂, so ΔB= (\̂) =
−d̂ (2 Pr(l = |B = ) − 1) − ( d̂− d̂) Pr(l = |B = ) − (1− d̂) (1− â) ≤ 0.
Suppose next that W ∈ [ ¯̀





) so that the voter has an
adversarial posture after both policies. Then q̄ > q̄ (by Lemma 40), and there
exists some \̂ ∈ Θ̄(0) with âGG = 1 > âG¬G = â = 0 ∀G and d̂ ≥ d̂, so ΔB= (\̂) =
−d̂ (2 Pr(l = |B = ) − 1) − ( d̂ − d̂) Pr(l = |B = ) − (1 − d̂) â ≤ 0.
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< W; then clearly 
B=
(0) = {0}. QED.
We conclude by proving existence and generic uniqueness of sequential equilibrium.
Lemma 45 A sequential equilibrium of the model exists and is generically unique.
Proof: It is straightforward to verify from the definitions that for generic model
parameters (`, W, c, @, 2) ∈ [0, 1]4 × R+ we have that (i) for any particular fixed
[ = ([, [), 
B=









; then by Proposition 39 there exists a truthful




∀[ > 0. Hence again by
Proposition 39 there cannot exist a pandering equilibrium with [̂ > 0.




; then by Proposition 39 there does not exist a





is decreasing and satisfies

B=
(1) ≤ 0 < Δ̄
B=





so by Proposition 39 a pandering equilibrium exists at [̂. Moreover, for generic














for [ < (>)[̂ and no other pandering equilibrium
exists. QED.
B.3 Main Proofs
In this appendix we prove Propositions 12—19 and Lemma 14 describing the form
of equilibrium across the parameter space. Since fake leadership has been ruled out,
for the remaining analysis we return to the notation in the main text, denoting the
probability that a low-ability incumbent chooses  after signal  as simply f (rather
than [) and assuming throughout that a low-ability incumbent always chooses 
after signal  (i.e., [ = 0).
Simplified Equilibrium Characterization
We first collect definitions and properties from the main text and preceding Appen-
dices.
With respect to the voter, recall that (i) q̄− > q̄− and q̄+ > q̄+ , (ii) q− (f) and
q+ (f) are strictly increasing in f, (iii) q+ (f) and q− (f) are strictly decreasing in
121
f, and (iv) qG−(f) < (>) (=)qG+(f) ⇐⇒ `G∅ (f) > (<)W, further implying that
qG (f) = min{qG−(f), qG+(f)}.
With respect to the incumbent, having ruled out fake leadership we may focus




(1 − d)a∅ + d




(1 − d)a∅ + d
 Pr(l =  |B = )
)
(imposing 1 = aGG > aG¬G = 0 which always holds when dG > 0 is a best response),
and also
Δ̄B= =
Pr(l =  |B = ) − Pr(l = |B = )
X@
.
Next recall from the main text that @̂ is the unique solution to
X@̂ ((1 − c)@̂ + c(1 − @̂)) = @̂ − c.
It is helpful to observe that Δ̄
B=
< (=) > 1 ⇐⇒ @ < (>) = @̂. Finally, recall
from the main text that @̄ is the unique solution to
X@̂ ((1 − c)@̂ + c(1 − @̂)) = @̂ − c.
It is again helpful to observe that Δ̄
B=
< (=) > Pr(l = |B = ) ⇐⇒ @ < (>) =
@̄.
The simplified equilibrium characterization is then as follows.
Corollary 46 Profile (f̂, \̂) is a sequential equilibrium i.f.f. it satisfies Lemma 9
and either









A sequential equilibrium of the model always exists and is generically unique.
Truthful Equilibria
Recall from Proposition 8 that a truthful equilibrium of the CHS model exists i.f.f.
either (i) W ∉ ( ¯̀, ¯̀) or (ii) @ ≥ @̂. We now provide conditions for existence of a
truthful equilibrium in the RA model; Propositions 12 and 13 are then immediate
corollaries.
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Lemma 47 There exists a truthful equilibrium of the RA model if and only if:





and @ ≥ @̄;
• 2 ≥ max{q̄, q̄} and either (i) W ∉ ( ¯̀, ¯̀) or (ii) @ ≥ @̂.
Proof: Suppose first that 2 ≤ min{q̄, q̄}; then there exists a voter best response
\̂ to truthfulness with full attention ( d̂ = d̂ = 1), for any such \̂ we have
Δ
B=
(\̂) = Pr(l = |B = ) − Pr(l =  |B = ) < 0 < Δ̄
B=
, so truthfulness is a
best response to full attention, and a truthful equilibrium exists.




. Then in any best response \̂,
either d̂ = 1 > d̂ = 0 and W < ¯̀ implying â = 1, or d̂ = 1 > d̂ = 0 and
W > ¯̀ implying â = 1. In either case, Δ
B=
(\̂) = Pr(l = |B = ). This in turn
is ≤ Δ̄
B=
(and thus a truthful equilibrium exists) i.f.f. @ ≥ @̄.
Finally suppose that 2 ≥ max{q̄, q̄}; then there exists a voter best response \̂ to
truthfulness with no attention after either policy, and conditions on the remaining
quantities for truthful equilibrium are trivially identical to conditions in the CHS
model. QED.
Asymmetric Attention and Pandering Equilibria
The precise structure of equilibrium is relatively complex within the asymmetric
attention region when a low-ability incumbent panders. To describe these equilibria
first requires a closer examination of how pandering affects the value of attention
after each policy.
The Value of Attention with Pandering
Consider two distinct values of attention qGB (f) and qG
′
B′ (f), which are strictly
monotonic in f. It is straightforward to see that their derivatives will have opposite
signs, and hence cross at most once over f ∈ [0, 1], if either G = G′ or B = B′.
However, single-crossing is not assured when both G ≠ G′ and B ≠ B′. In particular,
in our analysis it will be necessary to compare the value of negative attention q− (f)
after  and of positive attention q+ (f), which are both increasing in f. We thus
begin by proving that these functions also cross at most once over f = [0, 1].
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Lemma 48 q− (f) and q+ (f) cross at most once over [0, 1].
Proof: By Lemma 36, the condition q+ > (=)q− can be equivalently written both
as / (f, W) > (= 0), where
/ (f; W) = Pr (H = ) · (` − Pr (H =  |l = ) W) −Pr (H = ) ·Pr (H = |l = ) W,
and also /̂ (f, W) > (= 0), where
/̂ (f; W) = Pr (H = ) ·
(
W − W − `
Pr (H = |l = )
)
− Pr (H = ) · W
(Intuitively, / (f; W) and /̂ (f; W) are distinct functions of f and W with potentially
distinct derivatives in (f, W), but both of whose zeroes over [0, 1] are crossings of
q+ and q−).
Now / (f, W) is strictly decreasing in W and / (f; `) = Pr (H = ) −Pr (H = ) > 0
∀f ∈ [0, 1]; hence, q+ − q− > 0 ∀f ∈ [0, 1] when W ≤ `. Next observe that
/̂ (f; W) is strictly increasing in f at any (W, f) where both W > ` and /̂ (f; W) ≥ 0
(since then W > W−`Pr(H=|l=) ), so /̂ (f; W) and hence also / (f; W) and q

+ − q−
satisfy single-crossing in f. QED
Having shown that single-crossing holds for all necessary pairs for our subsequent
analysis, we next introduce several useful definitions.
Definition 49 For each (G, B) ∈ {, } × {−, +}, let q̃BB (f) denote the unique
continuously-differentiable function that extends qGB (f) linearly over R, and define
cutpoints fG
′,B′
G,B and fGB (2) as follows:1
• Let fG
′,B′
G,B denote the unique solution to q̃GB (f) = q̃G
′
B′ (f);
• Let fGB (2) denote the (well-defined) inverse of q̃GB (f).
In short, fG
′,B′
G,B denotes the level of pandering that equates the values of attention
qGB (f) and qG
′
B′ (f), while fGB (2) denotes the level of pandering that equates the value
of attention qGB with its exogenous cost 2. (We intermittently indicate the dependence
of these cutpoints on W, depending on the context). We now prove several essential
properties of these cutpoints.














Lemma 50 The cutpoints fG
′,B′
G,B satisfy the following:




− (W) ∈ (0, 1) and is constant in W;
• f+
+ (W) ∈ (0, 1) and is < f
+
− when W > `;
• f−
− (W) is strictly increasing in W when f
−
− (W) ∈ [0, 1], and there ∃ W, W̄
with ` < W < W̄ < ¯̀ such that f+
− (W) = 0 and f
+
− (W̄) = f
+




Proof: The first property is an immediate implication of Lemma 35 and Proposition
8, and the second is easily verified from the definitions.
Proof of third property: We argue that W > ` → q+ (f+−) < q+ (f+−); combined
with q+ (0) < q+ (0) (from Lemma 40), q+ (f) decreasing in f and q+ (f) increas-
ing in f (from Corollary 43) this yields the desired property. Recall from the main
text that there exists a unique level of pandering f̂ ∈ (0, 1) that makes policy choice
uninformative and thus satisfies ` (f̂) = ` (f̂) = `. Further, is easily verified that
at f̂, for all G ∈ {, }we have Pr (H = G |_ = !) = Pr (H = G |_ = ) = Pr (l = G)
(since a high-ability incumbent always chooses correctly). Now suppose that ` < W.





= W, and (iii) ` (f) increasing jointly
imply that f̂ < f+
− . We last argue that q

+ (f̂) < q+ (f̂), which implies the de-
sired property since q+ (f) is decreasing and q+ (f) is increasing. Observe that
q+ (f̂) < q+ (f̂) if and only if








⇐⇒ ` − Pr (l = |H = ) W < ` − Pr (l =  |H = ) W
⇐⇒ Pr (l = |H = ) > Pr (l =  |H = )
⇐⇒ ` Pr (l = |H = , _ = ) + (1 − `) Pr (l = |H = , _ = !)
> ` Pr (l =  |H = , _ = ) + (1 − `) Pr (l =  |H = , _ = !)
⇐⇒ Pr (l = |H = , _ = !) > Pr (l =  |H = , _ = !)
⇐⇒ Pr (H = |l = , _ = !) Pr (l = )
Pr (H = |_ = !)
>
Pr (H =  |l = , _ = !) Pr (l = )
Pr (H =  |_ = !)
⇐⇒ Pr (H = |l = , _ = !) > Pr (H = |l = , _ = !)
⇐⇒ @ + (1 − @) f > @ (1 − f) , which holds ∀f > 0.
The first equivalence follows from Lemma 33, the second from ` (f̂) = ` (f̂) =
`, the fourth fromPr (l = G |H = G, _ = ) = 1, and the sixth fromPr (H = G |_ = !) =
Pr (l = G) at f̂. QED.
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Proof of fourth property: Recall from the proof of Lemma 48 that q+ (f; W) −
q− (f; W) > (=) 0 i.f.f. / (f, W) > (= 0), where / (f, W) is strictly decreasing in W
and crosses 0 over f ∈ [0, 1] at most once.
We first argue thatf+
− (W) is strictly increasing in W whenf
+
− (W) ∈ [0, 1]. For W <
W′ where both f+
− (W) ∈ [0, 1] and f
+
− (W
′) ∈ [0, 1] we have that /
(
f+






− (W) ; W
′) < 0, implying f+
− (W
′) such that /̂
(
f+
− (W) ; W




− (W) by single crossing of / (f, W) over f ∈ [0, 1].


















= 0. To see this, observe that / (f; `) =


















= 0 and the
inequality from Lemma 35).
Lastly, since f+
− (W) is strictly increasing in W, f
+



























− (W̄) = f
+
− (W̄). QED.
Having established properties of these critical cutpoints, we are now in a position to
bound the equilibrium level of pandering f∗
'
under a variety of different conditions.
Lemma 51 An equilibrium level of pandering f∗
'
in the RA model satisfies the
following.












• If W ∈ [W, W̄] then 2 > (<)q+ (f+−) = q






Proof: We first argue W ≤ W̄ → f∗
'
≤ f+





then a = 0 in any best response. Supporting such an equilibrium requires that
a low-ability incumbent who receives signal  have a strict electoral incentive




−), and also that d










). Clearly we cannot
have W ≤ ` since then f+










































































We next argue W ≤ W → f∗
'
< f−
− . By the definition of W we have we have





















. Now consider a voter best response \̂ to f−







then in any best response, a = 1 > d = 0; but then Δ
B=












then in any best response \̂ we































); in either case Δ
B=
(\̂) ≤
− (Pr (l =  |B = ) − Pr (l = |B = )) < 0 < Δ̄
B=




We next argue that W ≥ W̄ → f∗
'
≤ f+































. We now consider a voter best
response \̂ to f+











, then the voter will replace the
incumbent outright after either policy, so Δ
B=
















then the voter will pay attention after
either policy, so Δ
B=
























































Now consider a voter best response \̂ to f+











then the voter will retain the incumbent outright after  and replace her af-
ter , so Δ
B=
















then the voter will pay attention after either policy, so
Δ
B=







Finally, we are now in a position to characterize which policy receivesmore attention
in the asymmetric attention region.























Lemma 51 we have f∗
'
∈ [0, f−

















































, implying d ≥ d. By
Lemma 51 we have that f∗
'
∈ [0, f+




















































from the definition of W, again yielding the desired property.















(≥) d. Observe that f∗
#
= f+
























































→ d ≥ d. QED.
Equilibrium with Moderate-Quality Information
We now use the preceding to fully characterize equilibrium in the asymmetric
attention attention region when a low-ability incumbent receives moderate-quality
information. Propositions 16 and 18 in the main text are corollaries of this more
complete characterization.








q (0) , q (0)
}]
. Then by
Lemma 47, there exists a truthful equilibrium .
Case 2. Suppose that 2 ∈ (max
{









≠ 0 and W ∈ ( ¯̀, ¯̀). Then in any best response \̂ to truthfulness we have
â = 1 > â = d̂ = d̂ = 0, implying Δ
B=
(\̂) = 1 > Δ̄
B=
, so truthfulness is not a
best response to \̂.

































we argue that there exist an equilibrium with f̂' = f+ (2). First observe that





, we have that â = 1 > d̂ = 0 is a best
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, \̂ is a
best-response to f+ (2) ⇐⇒ â = 0. Since,
ΔB= ( d̂ = 0; \̂) = 1 > Δ̄B= > ΔB= ( d̂ = 1; \̂) = Pr (l = |B = ) ,
there exists a best response \̂ with partial attention d̂ ∈ (0, 1) after  and no
attention d̂ = 0 after  that supports an equilibrium.









− , so the











. Thus, there exists
a well-defined cutpoint min
{







; we argue that there exists
an equilibrium with f̂' = min
{
f+ (2) , f− (2)
}
.








= 2 and \̂ with â = 1 > d̂ = 0








\̂ is a best-response to f+ (2) ⇐⇒ â = 0. Since
ΔB= ( d̂ = 0; \̂) = 1 > Δ̄B= > ΔB= ( d̂ = 1; \̂) = Pr (l = |B = ) ,
there exists a best response \̂ with partial attention d̂ ∈ (0, 1) after  and no
attention d̂ = 0 after  that supports an equilibrium.








= 2, and \̂ with d̂ = â = 0 is a








is a best response to f− (2) ⇐⇒ â = 1. Since
ΔB= ( d̂ = 0; \̂) = 1 > Δ̄B= > ΔB= ( d̂ = 1; \̂) = Pr (l = |B = ) ,
there exists a best response with partial attention d̂ ∈ (0, 1) after  and no attention
d̂ = 0 after  that supports an equilibrium.





















. Thus, there exists





; we argue that there exist an equilibrium









− , we have d̂
 = â = 0 is a best response after . Next observe that since







, \̂ is a best-response to f− (2) ⇐⇒ â = 1.
Since,
ΔB= ( d̂ = 0; \̂) = 1 > Δ̄B= > ΔB= ( d̂ = 1; \̂) = Pr (l = |B = ) ,
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there exists a best response \̂ with partial attention d̂ ∈ (0, 1) after  and no
attention d̂ = 0 after  that supports an equilibrium. QED
Equilibrium with Low-Quality Information
We last fully characterize equilibria in the asymmetric attention attention region
when a low-ability incumbent receives low-quality information (@ ∈ (c, @̄)). Propo-
sitions 17 and 19 are corollaries of this more complete characterization.
Recall that @ < @̂ ⇐⇒ Δ̄
B=
< Pr(l = |B = ) and
2 ∈ (min
{













We divide up into several cases.





Webegin by arguing that (i)min
{
q (0) , q (0)
}


















, so that the asymmetric attention condition reduces to
2 ∈
(




First observe that W < ¯̀ → q− (0) < q+ (0). Second recall from Lemma 40 that
q− (0) < q− (0). Third recall that W < W → q− (f) < q+ (f) ∀f ∈ [0, 1]. These
immediately yield (i), as well as (ii) when W ≤ ¯̀ so that f∗
#



























We now argue that there exists a pandering equilibrium at
f̂' = min{f− (2), f− (2), f+−}.
To do so observe that W < ¯̀ → f+
− ∈ (0, 1) and f
−
− is constant in W. We now
examine three exhaustive and mutually exclusive conditions on the cost of attention
2.
Subcase 1.1 (High Attention). 2 ∈
(









. It is easily
verified that 0 < f− (2) < min
{
f− (2) , f+−
}
so f̂' = f− (2). Clearly, any \̂






















, so any \̂ that is a best
response to f− (2) must have d̂ = 1. Thus, we have:
ΔB= ( d̂ = 0; \̂) = Pr (l = |B = ) > Δ̄B= > ΔB= ( d̂ = 1; \̂)
= − (Pr (l =  |B = ) − Pr (l = |B = )) ,
and there exists a best response to f− (2) with partial attention d̂ ∈ (0, 1) and a
favorable posture â = 1 after , and full attention d̂ = 1 after .

























recall that by Lemma 50 that q+ (f) > q− (f) ∀f when W < W, which→ f+− <
f−































It is easily verified that f+
− < min
{
f− (2) , f− (2)
}
so f̂' = f+− .
Now clearly any \̂ with d̂ = 0 is a best response to f+
− , and any \̂
 with d̂ = 1
is a best response to f+
− . Thus, we have that
ΔB= (â = 1; \̂) = Pr (l = |B = ) > Δ̄B= > ΔB= (â = 0; \̂) = −Pr (l =  |B = ) ,
and there exists a best response to f+
− with no attention d̂
 = 0 and a mixed posture
â ∈ (0, 1) after , and full attention d̂ = 1 after .































































− . Next since f
+
− is
increasing in W, f+
− is decreasing in W, and f
−








− for W < `. Consequently, the































when W < `, which is always









Next, it is easily verified that 0 < f− (2) < f+− < f

− (2) so f̂' = f− (2).















(by f− (2) < f−− ) which
is = 2, so \̂ is a best response to f− (2) i.f.f. â = 1 > d̂ = 0. Thus, we have that:
ΔB= ( d̂ = 1; \̂) = Pr (l = |B = ) > Δ̄B= > ΔB= ( d̂ = 0; \̂) = 0,
so there exists a best response to f− (2) with partial attention d̂ ∈ (0, 1) and a
favorable posture â = 1 after , and no attention d̂ = 0 with a favorable posture
â = 1 after .













+ and also q






+ ∈ (0, f∗# ),
and (iii) q+ (0) > q+ (0) (and so f++ ∈ (0, 1)). Combining these observations
yields that the cost condition reduces to






















. To do we examine three exhaustive mutually exclusive conditions on the cost.






It is easily verified that f− (2) < f+ (2) < f+− < q
+
−; we argue that there exists
an equilibrium with f̂' = f+ (2). Using this we have that \̂ is a best response after
 i.f.f. â = d̂ = 1 and \̂ is a best response after  i.f.f. â = 0. Thus, we have
that:
ΔB= ( d̂ = 0; \̂) = Pr (l = |B = ) > Δ̄B= > ΔB= ( d̂ = 1; \̂)
= − (Pr (l =  |B = ) − Pr (l = |B = )) ,
so there exists a best response to f+ (2) with partial attention d̂ ∈ (0, 1) and an
adversarial posture â = 0 after , and full attention d̂ = 1 after .
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It is easily verified that f+ (2) < f− (2) < f+− ; we argue that there exists an
equilibrium with f̂' = f− (2). Using this we have that \̂ is a best response after
 i.f.f. â = 1 and \̂ is a best response after  i.f.f. â = 0 < d̂ = 1. Thus, we
have:
ΔB= ( d̂ = 0; \̂) = Pr (l = |B = ) > Δ̄B= > ΔB= ( d̂ = 1; \̂)
= − (Pr (l =  |B = ) − Pr (l = |B = )) ,
and there exists a best response to f− (2) with partial attention d̂ ∈ (0, 1) and a
favorable posture â = 1 after , and full attention d̂ = 1 after .











It is easily verified that f+ (2) < f+− < f

− (2); we argue that there exists an
equilibrium with f̂' = f+− . Using this we have that \̂
 is a best response after 
i.f.f. d̂ = 0 and that every \̂ that is a best response after  satisfies d̂ = 1. Thus,
we have that
ΔB= (â = 1; \̂) = Pr (l = |B = ) > Δ̄B= > ΔB= (â = 0; \̂) = −Pr (l =  |B = ) ,
and there exists a best response to f+
− with no attention d̂
 = 0 and a mixed posture
â ∈ (0, 1) after , and full attention d̂ = 1 after .
CASE 3: W ∈ (W̄, 1]









+ , (ii) q











, and (iv) q+ (0) > q+ (0) (and so f++ ∈ (0, 1)), and (v) 0 < f++ <
f−
+ . Combining these observation yields that the cost condition reduces to:











argue that there exists a pandering equilibrium at
f̂' = min
{
f+ (2), f+ (2)
}
.
To do we examine two exhaustive and mutually exclusive conditions on the cost 2.
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Subcase 3.1 (High attention): 2 ∈
(





It is straightforward that f+ (2) < f+ (2); we argue that there exists an equilibrium
with f̂' = f+ (2). Since f+ (2) < f++ < f+− we have that \̂ is a best response to










so that in any best response \̂ to f+ (2) we must have d̂ = 1. To see this, observe





























Thus, we have that:
ΔB= ( d̂ = 0; \̂) = Pr (l = |B = ) > Δ̄B= > ΔB= ( d̂ = 1; \̂)
= − (Pr (l =  |B = ) − Pr (l = |B = )) ,
so there exists a best response to f+ (2) with partial attention d̂ ∈ (0, 1) and an
adversarial posture â = 0 after , and full attention d̂ = 1 after .












It is straightforward to see that f+ (2) < f+ (2); we argue that there exists an







, we have that \̂ is a best
response to f+ (2) if and only if â = 0. Next, since f+ (2) < f++ < f−+ we have












, so that \̂ is a best response to
f+ (2) if and only if â = d̂ = 0.
Thus, we have that:
ΔB= ( d̂ = 1; \̂) = Pr (l = |B = ) > Δ̄B= > ΔB= ( d̂ = 0; \̂) = 0,
so there exists a best response to f+ (2) with partial attention d̂ ∈ (0, 1) and an
adversarial posture â = 0 after , and no attention d̂ = 0 and an adversarial
posture â = 0 after .
B.4 Voter Welfare
In this Appendix we prove main text results about voter welfare.
Proof of Lemma 20 There are three parts of the utility difference between the two
models, where the last term represents the net loss in accountability in the first
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period. To see this, we can write the first period voter expected utilities in equilibria
for each model as follows:
Pr(_ = ) + Pr(_ = !)
(
Pr(l = ) (Pr(B = |l = )+
Pr(B =  |l = )f∗) + Pr(l = ) Pr(B = |l = ) (1 − f∗)
)
=
` + (1 − `)
(
c(@ + (1 − @)f∗) + (1 − c)@(1 − f∗)
)
,
where f∗ is the equilibrium pandering level for each model. Now if we take the
difference of these values between the two models and simplify the expression, we
get
−(1 − `) (@ − c) (f∗' − f∗# ).
As for the first two terms, they represent the second period benefit of paying attention.
Let ℎ' and ℎ# denote the probability that a high-ability incumbent will be reelected
in each model. For general value of ℎ, the second period expected benefit equals to
X(ℎ + (1 − ℎ)@).
Therefore, second period net benefit (excluding the cost of paying attention) in the
rational attention model is
X(ℎ' + (1 − ℎ')@) − X(ℎ# + (1 − ℎ# )@) = X(1 − @) (ℎ' − ℎ# ).
Now we need to calculate X(1 − @) (ℎ' − ℎ# ). There are several cases to consider.
High Attention (dG > 0 ∀G): If attention is at least sometimes acquired after either
policy then qG = min{qG−, qG+} ≥ 2 ∀G. In the rational attention model expected
utility can therefore be calculated “as if” the voter was always pays attention, so
ℎ' = Pr(H = ) (Pr(l = |H = )` + Pr(l =  |H = )W)+
Pr(H = ) (Pr(l =  |H = )` + Pr(l = |H = )W).
As for ℎ# there are two cases:
• If W < ` (the incumbent is strong) then in the CHS equilibrium aG > 0 ∀G,
so expected utility can be calculated “as if” the incumbent is always reelected
and
ℎ# = ` = Pr(H = ) (Pr(l = |H = )` + Pr(l =  |H = )`

)+
Pr(H = ) (Pr(l =  |H = )` + Pr(l = |H = )`),
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where the quantities in the decomposition that depend on the incumbent’s
strategy are calculated using the equilibrium pandering levelf∗
'
in the rational
attention model. Therefore the anticipated net benefit of attention is:
X(1 − @) (ℎ' − ℎ# ) − 2 = Pr(H = ) (X(1 − @) Pr(l =  |H = ) (W − `) − 2)+
Pr(H = ) (X(1 − @) Pr(l = |H = ) (W − `) − 2) =
Pr(H = ) (q− − 2) + Pr(H = ) (q− − 2).
• If W > ` (the incumbent is weak), then in the CHS equilibrium aG < 1 ∀G,
so expected utility may be calculated "as if" the incumbent is never reelected,
and
ℎ# = W = Pr(H = ) (Pr(l = |H = )W + Pr(l = |H = )W)+
Pr(H = ) (Pr(l =  |H = )W + Pr(l = |H = )W),
where again the quantities in the decomposition are calculated using f∗
'
.
Therefore the anticipated net benefit of information is:
X(1 − @) (ℎ' − ℎ# ) − 2 = Pr(H = ) (X(1 − @) Pr(l = |H = ) (` − W) − 2)+
Pr(H = ) (X(1 − @) Pr(l =  |H = ) (` − W) − 2) =
Pr(H = ) (q+ − 2) + Pr(H = ) (q+ − 2).
Medium Attention (d = 1 > d = 0 ∀G): In the rational attention equilibrium the
voter always pays attention after policy  but never pays attention after policy  and
is indifferent between incumbent and challenger.
• If W < ` (the incumbent is strong) we can calculate expected utility in the
rational attention model as if the voter never acquires information and always
retains the incumbent after policy , so
ℎ' = Pr(H = ) (Pr(l = |H = )` + Pr(l =  |H = )`

)+
Pr(H = ) (Pr(l =  |H = )` + Pr(l = |H = )W),
and the overall second period net benefit of information is
X(1 − @) (ℎ' − ℎ# ) − %(H = )2 = Pr(H = ) (X(1 − @) Pr(l = |H = ) (W − `) − 2) =
Pr(H = ) (q− − 2).
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• If W > ` (the incumbent is weak) we can calculate expected utility in the
rational attentionmodel as if the voter never pays attention and always replaces
the incumbent after policy , so
ℎ' = Pr(H = ) (Pr(l = |H = )W + Pr(l =  |H = )W)+
Pr(H = ) (Pr(l =  |H = )` + Pr(l = |H = )W),
and the overall second period net benefit of information is
X(1 − @) (ℎ' − ℎ# ) − %(H = )2 = Pr(H = ) (X(1 − @) Pr(l = |H = ) (` − W) − 2) =
Pr(H = ) (q+ − 2).
Observe that in this case, for Rational attention model we have q = min{q− , q+ } <
2.
Low Attention (dG < 1 ∀G) In the rational attention equilibrium the voter at least
sometimes chooses not to acquire information after either policy. In addition, it is
easily verified that in all low-attention regions we have aG > 0 ∀G if the incumbent
is strong (W < `) and aG < 1 ∀G if the incumbent is weak (W > `). Hence, expected
utility in the rational attention model can be calculated as if the voter never pays
attention, always retains a strong incumbent, and never retains a weak incumbent. In
the CHSmodel expected utility can also be calculated as if the voter always retains a
strong incumbent and never retains a weak incumbent, so there is no anticipated net
benefit of attention. Further in the RA model we have qG = min{qG−, qG+} ≤ 2 ∀G.2
QED
Proof of Proposition 21 When a low-ability incumbent receives moderate-quality





*'+ −*#+ = Pr (H = ) ·max
{
qB − 2, 0
}︸                               ︷︷                               ︸
≥0
+Pr (H = ) ·max
{
qB − 2, 0
}︸                               ︷︷                               ︸
≥0
− (1 − `)︸  ︷︷  ︸
>0




)︸       ︷︷       ︸
≤0
≥ 0.





so the third term becomes strictly positive and rational attention
2Note that there still might be overall change in the expected utility due to the first period utility
through different pandering levels.
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and the whole expression equals to 0 (the voter cannot be
strictly better off if the information is never acquired). QED.
Proof of Proposition 22 We directly consider the case of W < `. The case of
W ∈ (W̄, ¯̀GG) is shown with symmetric but slightly simplified arguments; for the





is at least weakly better off in the rational attention model.
If 2 > q (f∗
#
) the voter never pays attention, equilibrium of the two models is
identical, and so the voter’s utility is the same in both models.
If 2 < q− (0) the incumbent is truthful in both models, so there is no accountability
cost. From the equilibrium characterization we generically have dG = 1 =⇒
qG − 2 > 0 ∀G, so
*'+ −*#+ = Pr (H = ) ·max
{
q− − 2, 0
}︸                               ︷︷                               ︸
>0
+Pr (H = ) ·max
{
q− − 2, 0
}︸                               ︷︷                               ︸
>0
− (1 − `)︸  ︷︷  ︸
>0




)︸       ︷︷       ︸
=0
> 0,
and the voter is strictly better off in the rational attention model.
If 2 ∈ (max{q− (f−− ), q

− (f−+ )}, q
 (f∗
#
















the accountability cost is strictly positive. Moreover, from construction of the
equilibrium we have dG < 1→ qG (f∗
'
) − 2 ≤ 0 and qG (f∗
'
) = qG−(f∗') ∀G so
*'+ −*#+ = Pr (H = ) ·max
{
q− − 2, 0
}︸                               ︷︷                               ︸
=0
+Pr (H = ) ·max
{
q− − 2, 0
}︸                               ︷︷                               ︸
=0
− (1 − `)︸  ︷︷  ︸
>0




)︸       ︷︷       ︸
>0
< 0.
Finally, if 2 ∈ (q− (0),max{q− (f−− ), q

− (f−+ )}) we show that there is a unique






− (f∗) = 2. Since q− is an increasing function in
f we always have q− (f∗') <= 2. Moreover f∗' is weakly increasing in 2 and q−
is strictly decreasing in f, Pr(H = ) is strictly decreasing in f and therefore it is
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weakly decreasing in 2 (f∗
'
is weakly increasing in 2). Overall, when 2 increases:
*'+ −*#+ = Pr (H = ) ·max
{
q− − 2, 0
}︸                               ︷︷                               ︸
=0










︸                                                                   ︷︷                                                                   ︸
weakly decreasing
− (1 − `)︸  ︷︷  ︸
>0











is weakly decreasing in 2. Now we show that this expected utility
difference is also strictly decreasing in 2. For this, we only need to account for the
region where f∗
'
is constant in 23 i.e, when 2 ∈ (q− (f−+ ), q

− (f−+ )). For these




2 < q− (f∗' = f−+ ). Overall, we have
*'+ −*#+ = Pr (H = ) ·max
{
q− − 2, 0
}︸                               ︷︷                               ︸
=0










︸                                                    ︷︷                                                    ︸
strictly decreasing
− (1 − `)︸  ︷︷  ︸
>0











is strictly decreasing in 2 and there exists an unique 2̂(W) above
which the Rational attention decreases voter welfare. QED.
3If f∗
'
is not constant, it is strictly increasing in 2 and overall expected utility difference is
trivially strictly decreasing in 2 because of the last term.
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A p p e n d i x C
CHAPTER IV
Proof of Claim 1




%(8 = 0|B = 0) (1 − G10) + %(8 = 1|B = 0) (1 − G11)
]









is trivially increasing in effort 41. Therefore we only need to show that

!
is decreasing in 41. Substituting the values of G10, G11 and <(41) and derivating





41\ (2 − 6\ + 4\2)
(−1 + 421(0.5 − \)2)2
< 0.
Observe that for \ ∈ (0.5, 1) we always have 2 − 6\ + 4\2 < 0 and therefore the
benefit as well as overall expected utility of the low agent when treated as high is
decreasing in 41.
Proof of Proposition 24
Proof Wehave already discuss a few important observations in themain text needed
for this proof:
1 In equilibrium, low type exerts no effort 4=0 = 0.
2 *
!
is decreasing in 41.
3 4=1 is the lowest effort level for which the principal believes the agent is a high
type.





(4=1), with equality if the off path
beliefs satisfy the Intuitive Criterion.
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First we prove that separating equilibrium cannot exist for 2 < 2̄. From observations
above we know that in order for the low type not to have an incentive to deviate in
equilibrium, we must have *!
!







0) = −(1 − \) > −\ = *!
!
(4=0 = 0), *

!






0) = −\ is constant in 4=1. Consequently, the condition for the low type stated above
can never be satisfied if *
!
(4=1 = 1) > −\ which implies that in order for the
separating equilibrium to exist, we must have 2 > 2̄. Since, *
!
(4=1) is strictly
decreasing in 4=1, this also proves that there is an unique value of 4
=
1 ∈ (0, 1] for
separating equilibrium satisfying the Intuitive Criterion.
We have already shown that these equilibrium quantities are feasible, and the low
type has no incentive to deviate. As for the high type, since *

is decreasing, she
never has the incentive to deviate to the effort levels where the principal correctly












(4=0 = 0) = *
!

(4=0 = 0) = −\. This means
that if the high type was considered to be a low type, she does not want to deviate to
4=0 = 0. We now only need to show that for 2 > 2̄, *
!

(4) is a decreasing function
so the high type does not want to deviate to 4 ∈ (0, 4=1).
*! = −
[
%(8 = 0|B = 1) (1 − G00) + %(8 = 1|B = 1) (1 − G01)
]







Unlike the case with the low type treated as high, the benefit of the high type treated
as a low !

is actually increasing in 40. This is again because of the fact that the






(−1 + 420(0.5 − \)4
(
2 (−2 + 4420(0.5 − \)
2 − 2440(0.5 − \)
4)︸                                            ︷︷                                            ︸
<0
+ \ (−2 + 6\ − 4.\2)︸                 ︷︷                 ︸
>0
)
Note that this value is decreasing in cost and increasing in 40 ∈ (0, 1). Therefore




< 0 for 2 = 2̄ and 40 = 1, which is always the case for
\ ∈ (0.5, 1). This proves that the high type would not want to deviate to any effort
level 4 ∈ (0, 4=1). 2
1Last inequality is satisfied for any positive effort level since the high type expects public signal
to agree with her private signal while the low type expects the public signal to point towards lower
state of the world.
2An interesting observation to make is that, since the derivative is increasing in 40 ∈ (0, 1),
*!

cannot have an interior maximizer for 40 ∈ [0, 1].
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Now we only need to verify that this equilibrium satisfies the Intuitive Criterion.
Since *
!
is decreasing in 4 and 4=1 makes the low type indifferent, any belief
4 ∈ (0, 4=1) is not equilibrium dominated. Therefore, the principal’s beliefs that the
agent is a low type when deviating to 4 ∈ (0, 4=1) satisfies the Intuitive Criterion.
For 4 > 4=1, we have equilibrium dominated for both types and therefore any belief
would satisfy Intuitive Criterion on this region. This completes our proof.
Proof of Claim 2
Proof Since being considered as a low type is the worse possible case for the agent,
in pooling equilibrium, the low-type agent should be weakly better off than at her
ideal point when considered as low type. We have already established that the low
agent when perceived as low maximizes her expected utility when 4 = 0, and this
maximum utility is *!
!




%(8 = 0|B = 0)<(4) + %(8 = 1|B = 0) (1 − <(4))
]




If we simplify this expression, we get that %
!
= −0.5 + 42(0.125 − 0.25\) which is
strictly decreasing in 4 ∈ ([0, 1] since \ > 0.5. This result is not surprising since the
decision is made just based on the public signal and low type expects public signal
to be low. For higher effort level, low public signal will decrease policy choice even
more. Since the cost of effort is increasing, the low type wants to exert as little effort
as possible in pooling equilibrium.
*%
!
is decreasing in 4 and 2 and wemust have *%
!
≥ −\. For 2 ≤ 0.125(−3+6\),
this inequality is satisfied for any 4. Since we are considering the best possible
equilibrium for the principal, we could have pooling at the maximum level without
violating the incentive compatibility of the low type when considered low. For




Proof of Proposition 25
Proof Wehave already shown that this strategy is feasible and the low-type agent has
no profitable deviation. We only need to make sure that high type when considered
3Observe that this value is always between 0 and 1 for 2 > 0.125(−3 + 6\) and \ > 0.5.
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as low does not want to deviate from the equilibrium pooling level of effort. In
previous proofs we have already established that if the high type is considered as
low, her expected utility is maximized at the border 40 = 0 or 40 = 1. Therefore, we
only need to check incentive compatibility of the high type at these two effort levels.
*!

(40 = 0) = *!! (40 = 0) = −\ and for the same effort level, in pooling





since 4∗ makes the low type weakly better off than exerting no effort and being
considered as low, the high type will also be better off for this equilibrium pooling
level 4∗.
Similar to previous proposition, it is easy to verify that for 2 > 0.125(−3 + 6\),
*!

(40) is decreasing in 40, therefore we do not need to compare equilibrium
expected value to 40 = 1. For 2 > 0.125(−3 + 6\), *! (40), we have 4 = 1 and
comparing to 40 = 1 is trivial since for a fixed effort level both types are better if
the principal disregards the private reports than considers her to be the low type.
Therefore, high type has no profitable deviation.
Nowwe show that for 2 < 2̄ this pooling equilibrium satisfies the Intuitive Criterion.
For such a cost level, we know that for any effort level 4, the low type is strictly better
off being considered a high type than exerting no effort and being considered as low
type (or exert equilibrium pooling level). Therefore, for low type all of the effort
levels are not equilibrium dominated and our beliefs satisfy the Intuitive Criterion.
Proof of Lemma 26
Proof The objective function of the principal is to maximize:
max
4∈[0,1]
*A% = −%(8 = 1)
[





%(l = 1|8 = 0) (1 − G0)2 + %(l = 0|8 = 0)G20
]
.
From earlier we already know that G0 = 1 − <(4) and G1 = <(4). Simplifying
this objective function and substituting the values of G0, G1 and <(4), we get that
*A
%
(4) = −0.25 + 0.062542. This function is increasing in 4 for 4 ∈ [0, 1] and it
is trivially maximized at 4A = 1.
Proof of Lemma 27
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Proof The Incentive Compatibility constraints for each realization of the private
signal B are:
1 : *!! (40) = −%(8 = 0|B = 0) (1 − G00) − %(8 = 1|B = 0) (1 − G01) − 2420 ≥
−%(8 = 0|B = 0) (1 − G10) − %(8 = 1|B = 0) (1 − G11) − 2421 = *

! (41);
2 : * (41) = −%(8 = 0|B = 1) (1 − G10) − %(8 = 1|B = 1) (1 − G11) − 2421 ≥
−%(8 = 0|B = 1) (1 − G00) − %(8 = 1|B = 1) (1 − G01) − 2420 = *
!
 (40).
We have already established the following facts:
1) *!
!
(40), *! (41) and * (41) are decreasing in effort levels.
2) *!

(40) is decreasing in 40 for high enough cost, and it is always maximized
at the border.
If we substitute values of G8 9 and <(4) is the objective function we trivially get that
the expected utility of the principal is increasing in both 40 and 41. Meaning, the
principal who imposes different effort levels, always wants to increase the effort
levels as much as possible after each private signal (if the agent is truthful).
Now we prove why the IC of the low type is binding for optimal effort levels. There
are several possible cases:
• Both IC constraints are binding. If both constraints bind then we should have
*!
!




0)\ (1 − 3\ + 2\
2) = 0.
Since for separating case we have 41 ≠ 40, both effort levels are positive
and \ ∈ (0.5, 1]), this condition can never be satisfied. Therefore, both IC
constraints cannot bind.
• Trivially both IC constraints cannot be slack. In this case we could increase
the effort level 40 or 41 (whichever is not at the maximum level) by n small
enough and it will not violate either IC constraints but will increase the value
of the objective function.
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• IC constraint of the high agent is binding and IC constraint of the low agent
is slack. We can show that IC of the high type can only be binding for
2 > −1 + 2\. If the cost is lower than this value even for the highest (worst)
effort level 41, the high type strictly wants to be truthful.4 For this high cost,
*!

(40 = 0) is decreasing in 40. Now we cannot have 40 = 1 otherwise the
IC constraint of the low agent would be violated (it is the worst case to be
considered a low type and be forced to exert maximum effort). In this case,
by increasing 40 with n small enough would not violate IC constraint of either
type but increase the objective function. Therefore, in equilibrium this case
is not possible either.
The only possible case left is that when the principal imposes different effort levels
depending on the private report, for the optimal effort levels, the IC constraint of
the low type is binding and IC of the high type is slack.
Corollary 27When the principal imposing formal requirements induces the separa-
tion, the optimal strategy requires high agent to exert maximum effort, i.e., 41 = 1.
Proof This directly follows from the previous lemma. If 41 < 1, we can increase 41
with n small enough. It will not violate IC low since *
!
(41) is decreasing in 41
and will not violate IC high since the incentive compatibility constraint of the high
agent is slack. However, increasing 41 would increase the objective function giving
us the contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 29
Proof We have already established that in this case, the IC constraint of the low-type
agent is binding, the IC constraint of the low-type agent is slack, and 41 = 1. The
low-type agent’s IC constraints becomes:
*!! (40) = −@ − 2420 = 

! (41 = 1) − 2 = *! (41 = 1)
Observe that RHS is constant in 40 while the LHS is strictly decreasing. Moreover,
for 40 = 1 we trivially have *!! (40 = 1) < *! (41 = 1), while *!! (40 = 0) >=
*
!
(41 = 1) ⇐⇒ 2 > 2̄.5 Therefore, separation is only possible for 2 > 2̄ and
4*!

(40) is maximized at the border. We trivially have * (41 = 1) > *! (40 = 1) since
being considered a high type for the same effort level is strictly better. We have *

(41 = 1) >
*!

(40 = 0) for 2 < −1 + 2\.
5Observe that this is the same threshold as before and allows the low agent not to have an
incentive to deviate with 40 = 0, 41 = 1.
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there is an unique value of 40 ∈ [0, 1) that makes the low type indifferent. This
proves that 4A0 is feasible and the IC constraint of the low type is satisfied. We also
check that for 2 > 2̄ we also have *

(41 = 1) > *! (40 = 4A0). The effort levels
described in the proposition are feasible, satisfy both incentive constraints, and are
optimal based on the previous lemma and its corollary.
Proof of Proposition 30
Proof We have already shown the optimal strategies for separating and pooling
cases. We need to show that the principal has no profitable deviation (from pooling
to separating and vice versa). The principal’s expected utility in pooling equilibrium
does not depend on cost. Substituting the optimalmaximumeffort level, the principal
in the optimal pooling case gets * ? (4A = 1) = −0.1875.
The principal can induce separation i.f.f. 2 > 2̄. Therefore, the equilibrium below
this cost level is simply requiring maximum effort level after each private report. For
2 > 2̄, the principal’s expected utility playing the optimal strategy with separation
is * (4A0(2), 1). Even though the principal does not bare the cost of effort directly,
this expected utility depends on 2 through the optimal effort after the low report
4A0(2).
We know that 4A0(2 = 2̄) = 0 and 4
A
0(2) is increasing in 2. Since the principal
always prefers more effort, * (4A0(2), 1) is also increasing in 2. Moreover,when
2 → ∞ =⇒ 4A0(2) → 1 =⇒ * (4
A
0(2), 1) → * (40 = 1, 41 = 1) > *
? (4A =
1). While * (4A0(2̄), 1) = * (0, 1) ≤ −0.1875 ⇐⇒ \ ≤ 0.698539 ≡ \̄.
Therefore, we get that for \ > 0.698539, the optimal strategy in separation is always
strictly better than the optimal strategy in pooling for the principal (whenever the
separation is possible 2 > 2̄). For \ ≤ 0.698539, there is an unique 2̃ > 2̄ such that
* (4A0(2), 1) > *
? (4A = 1) ⇐⇒ 2 > 2̃.
